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INTRODUCTION 
The country in southeastern Europe known as "little 
1 Greece" to its inhabitants of the nineteenth century had 
a population of one million just before the Crimean War 2 
3 
and its territory amounted to 47,000 square kilometers. 
The newly formed nation became a kingdom in 1832 when Great 
Britain, France and Russia, the three Protecting Powers of 
Greece, appointed a Bavarian Prince, Otho I, to reign over 
4 
the country. Otho came to Athens early in 1833 but the 
king did not assume his responsibility as a ruler until he 
was twenty years of age in 1835. The man who dominated the 
1 The Greeks of the nineteenth century had the Byzan-
tine Empire in mind when they characterized the nation as 
"little Greece." 
2 E.About, E Hellada tou Othonos (E Synchrone Hellada, 
1854), translated by A. Spelios, La Grece Contemporaine 
(Athens), 52, who was writing before 1854 recorded that the 
population of Greece was 950,000. A.R. Rangabes, Greece: Her 
Present Progress and Position (New York, 1867), 22, maintains 
that the population-of Greece in 1853 was 1,042,529. E. Nomi-
kos, "The International Position of Greece During the Crimean 
War'' {Ph.D.Dissertation, Stanford University Press, 1962), 
290, has it at 1,000,000 for 1854 and it is safe to say that 
this is the correct figure. 
3 Nomikos, "International Position of Greece," 290. 
4 For the text of the Treaty of May 7, see British 
and Foreign State Papers, XIX, 33-41. Also see G.F. Martens, 
et ~., eds., Recueil ~ Traites d'alliance, de paix, de 
treve et plusieurs autres actes servant '~ la connaissance 
des relations etrangeres des puissances et etats de !'Europe 
depuis 1761 jusqu'a present, X, 550-64. Gottinque, 1819-1944 
{title Changes to Nouveau recueil general des traites • • • · 
from IX on). 
1 
2 
scene and exerted much influence in the government was Count 
5 Joseph von Armansperg. After February 1837 Otho became the 
absolute ruler of Greece as he dismissed Armansperg from his 
position as Arch-Chancellor. The king ruled without a con-
stitution for about seven years after the Armansperg dismis-
sal, but not without opposition. During that time he managed 
to accomplish nothing more than hatred from his subjects, riv-
alry from the Greek political parties and the three Protecting 
Powers, all elements which contributed to the weakness of the 
young nation. As Professor Tsivanopoulos points out: 
Instead of exerting himself to consolidate the freedom 
which the Greeks had conquered, the efforts of King Otho 
were all directed toward the complete extinction of that 
freedom. The Bavarian ruler, forgetful that he was an 
elected Monarch, and that his subjects had won their in-
dependence by their own swords, thought that he was 
called to govern after the fashion of his ancestors. 
• • • The people who had preserved their institutions 
entirely under the weight of Ottoman dominance, now saw 
their cguntry transformed into the likeness of a German 
duchy. 
Othonian absolutism was too unpopular among the freedom-
loving Greeks who in 1834 revolted and demanded that a con-
5 Armansperg was appointed president during the first 
Regency in Greece by a decree of 5 October 1832 of Ludwig, 
King of Bavaria. Armansperg was known for his liberal ten-
dencies and this is the reason he was favored for the Regency 
in Greece which he shared with the first regency headed by 
Professor Ludwig von Naurer and Major-General Karl Wilhelm 
von Herdeck. See J.A. Petropoulos, Politics and Statecraft 
in~ Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843 (Princeton;-1968), 155, 
for the period of the first Regency see 153-217. 
6 S.I. Tzivanopoulos, Katastasis ~ Hellados ~ 
Othonos kai Prosdokiai Aftis Ypo ~ Aftou Megalioteta ~­
giou A Basilea Hellinon (The Condition of Greece under Otho 
and Her Expectations under His Majesty George I, King of the 
Greeks) (Athens, 1864), 4-5. 
3 
stitution be drawn up so that the people would have some 
form of representation in their government. 
7 
The principal leaders of the September revolution 
were military officers who had much of the public support 
in the ·capital. The 1843 revolution was bloodless and more 
important it was successful in driving the Bavarian bureau-
cracy from Greece and persuading Otho to agree to a forma-
tion of a constitution. The French constitution of 1830 was 
used as the model for the Greek Constitution of 1843 which 
was to change the political system and hopefully bring eco-
nomic relief and general progress to "little Greece." In 
the field of religion, the Greek Orthodox Church was recog-
nized as the official national Church but all religions would 
be tolerated. (Arts. 1 & 2.) 8 In the field of civil rights 
important accomplishments were achieved. "All Greeks are 
equal under the law •••• " (Art.3.) "The press is free, 
and censorship is not allowed." (Art.lO.) The new Constitu-
tion secured certain legislative rights for the representa-
tives of the people as it stated that the legislative power 
9 belongs to the king, the Boule (Parliament), and the 
7 See Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 434-52. 
8 For the full text of the Constitution see G. Aspreas, 
Politike Historia tes Neoteras Hellados (Political History of 
Modern Greece) (Athens), I, 175-84. 
9 All transliterations and translations in this work 
are those of the author unless otherwise indicated. 
4 
Gerousia (Senate). (Art.lS.) "The official interpretation 
of the laws belongs to the Legislative authorities." (Art.l9.) 
Even though the Constitution did provide for many 
political and civil rights of the people, it was still a Con-
stitution which fell short of creating a liberal form of gov-
ernment such as enjoyed by Great Britain at the time. The 
king was guaranteed such powers that if put to use, as they 
were, would in fact make him an absolute monarch. The king 
had the right to appoint and dismiss ministers at will. (Art. 
24.) He had the right to declare.war and conclude treaties 
of peace, alliances and commerce. (Art.25.) He also had the 
right to dismiss the Parliament, (Art.30) and also to appoint 
senators, (Art.70) and judges, (Art.86). The most important 
accomplishment of the revolution of 1843 and the constitu-
tional achievement was the elimination of the Bavarian 
bureaucracy which administered the affairs of the country 
since 1832, and the theoretical limitation of the monarchical 
power. 
There were three political parties; the "French 11 
party or moshomanga as it was commonly known, the "Russian'' 
party or napist and the "English" party. All parties were 
in a position to share in the power of governing their 
10 
country. As the names of these parties indicate they 
were set up and supported by individuals who were convinced 
10 See Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 96-106, for 
the origin of the parties. 
5 
that the Protecting Power, which they modeled their party 
after, had helped the Greeks in the past and would help 
Greece more than any other in the future. The parties also 
designated the internal policy supported by their followers. 
Those who were affiliated with the "Russian" party wanted 
the government of Greece to be modelled after that of the 
Tsarist Russia and to be as friendly as possible to that 
Protecting Power. Those who followed the "English" tended 
to be constitutionalists and were opposed to the Bavarian 
Dynasty in Greece as long as it would insist in ruling ab-
solutistically. The "French" party was somewhere in between 
the one extreme and the other though it tended to side with 
the "Russians" more often than with the "English." Natur-
ally the three Protecting Powers infiltrated the political 
parties of Greece in order to exert the maximum possible in-
fluence in the governing process of the country. According 
to the treaty of 7 May 1832 11 drawn up by the Protecting 
Powers, Greece would be under the constant surveillance of 
Great Britain, France and Russia until it had discharged its 
financial obligations to these countries. Article XII of 
the Treaty states that Greece was guaranteed a loan of 60 
million francs by the three Powers for which: 
The sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be 
bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest 
and sinking fund of such instalments of the loan as 
11 K. Strupp, ed., La situation internationale de la 
Grece (1821-1917); Recueil de documents choisis et ~dites ~ 
une introduction historigue et dogmatigue {Zurich, 1918), 136-39, 
6 
may have been raised under the guarantee of the three 
Courts, the first revenues of the state in such a manner 
that the actual receipts of the Greek treasury shall be 
devoted, first of all, to the payment of the said in-
terest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for 
any other purpose, until those payments on account of 
the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee 
of the three Courts, shall have been completely secured 
fo~ the current year. The diplomatic representatives 
of the three Courts in Greece shall be especially charged 
to watch1~ver the fulfillment of the last mentioned stipu-lation. 
Under such conditions it was clearly impossible that the Pro-
tecting Powers would not interfere in the internal affairs 
of Greece. The stage for foreign political dominance was 
set therefore by the Treaty of May 1832 when the Bavarian 
Prince, Otho, was elected to rule over the Greek people and 
when strict measures were set up by the Powers to influence 
the government of Greece. 
The history of the Othonian period in the political 
sphere is marked by rivalries among the parties and there-
fore among England, France and Russia. From 1837 when Otho 
dismissed Armansperg and assumed the role to an absolute 
monarch until 1840 the "Russian" party was the dominant fac-
13 
tion in Greece. From 1841 until 1850 the "French" party 
enjoyed political supremacy, leaving the "English" party 
with a brief period of four months in 1844 to play the domi-
nant role in the political sphere. The importance of con-
12 J.A. Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the 
Great Powers, 1821-1898 (New York, 1944), 36. 
13 Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 291-320. 
7 
troling or having a good deal of influence in the Greek 
Government was immense for the Great Powers. There were 
economic, strategic and political reasons which made Greece 
an attractive nation to control in the Near East. 
The dominance of one party in the government meant 
the alliance of Greece with that party's patron nation and 
her opposition to the patron nations of the other two par-
ties. During the 30-year period of "foreign party" rule 
Greece became victim of such politics which continuously 
placed her under the antagonisms of the Protecting Powers. 
The worst of all the devastating consequences suffered by 
the young nation was in the period during the Crimean War 
when her foreign policy antagonised that of the Allied 
Powers and favored Russia. In this work the development 
of foreign and domestic Greek policy as well as interna-
tional incidents which occured in Greece from 1844 until 
1857 will be traced to unfold the whole story of the insur-
rection of 1854 and the Franco-British occupation of Greece 
which followed. The reason that this study begins with the 
Kolettes administration in 1844 and not with the Menshikov 
mission in 1853 is because the causes which gave rise to 
the events of 1854 are to be found in the decade earlier. 
First, the government of Kolettes, founder of the "French'' 
14 
party, supported a policy of irredentism, as opposed to 
internal development, second, it supported brigand chiefs 
who were a potential threat to the neighboring Turks, third, 
14 ~., 137-41. 
8 
it opposed constitutionalism in Greece, and fourth, it created 
a very hostile environment for Greek-British relations which 
led to a number of confrontations between the two countries, 
Greece always coming out as the loser. 
At the opening of Greek-Turkish hostilities in 1853 
the British minister at Athens, Thomas Wyse, felt that the 
era of the Kolettes administration was responsible for the 
problems which were currently facing Greece. 
"Place" and "Religion," "Hellenic Nationality" and 
"Eastern Church" against the Proselytism and Anti-hel-
lenism of the Western Religions and Politics, is the 
cry put forward in plain terms, in all their recent 
publications. This cry might have been resisted some 
years ago with every prospect and probability of suc-
cess, by the counter cry of Commerce and Constitution 
and by a cordial cooperation in support of both, on 
the part of the two great Western Powers, England and 
France. But these claims have of late years much di-
minished principally owing to the narrow and purely 
personal policy pursued by France since the Administra-
tion of Mr. Coletti (Kolettis), surrendering for the 
illusory influence derived from ephemerel Portofolios 
and Court favors that solid power, now required, which 
can only be attained by honest and pre~~rving exertions 
for the true interests of the people. 
As the Kolettist era was linked with the rise of the events 
of 1854, the Greek-British hostilities from 1847 to 1850 
were also responsible for harsh measures adopted by the 
Allied Powers against Greece during the occupation. The 
three-year Franco-British occupation, the persistent attempts 
by the king to carry out a policy of irredentism, and the 
socio-economic consequences of the war and occupation will 
15 F.O. 32/205 (No. 33) Confidential, Wyse to 
Clarendon, Athens, March 23, 1853. 
9 
all be discussed in order to determine what the role of 
Greece was during the Crimean War. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE KOLETTES ADMINISTRATION AND 
ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN GREECE 
A. The Nature of the Kolettes Government 
John Kolettes, the founder and leader of the "French" 
party, was appointed Prime Minister of Greece by the king on 
6 August 1844 after he had contributed a ·great deal to the 
disturbances which led to the resignation of the Mavrokor-
datos Government. Alexander Mavrokordatos, leader of the 
"English" party, was elected Prime Minister on 30 March 1844. 
Besides the political opposition pressures from Kolettes and 
Metaxas, founder and leader of the "Russian" party, several 
other incidents occured which contributed to the downfall 
of Mavrokordatos on August 4th. The press accused him of 
"becoming an English organ for a British conquest of Greece 
according to the method applied by the British in the con-
1 
quest of India and presently applied in Greece." Another 
factor which damaged the image of the Prime Minister was 
the publication of the Londos, Minister of Justice, letter 
which ordered the authorities of Patras to "secure his elec-
tion at any price." Finally, the illegal election of Kalergis, 
1 D. Fotiades, Othonas: E Exosis (Otho: The Exile) 
(Athens, 1975), 26. 
10 
11 
the General who led the military against the absolutist 
regime of Otho in the revolution of September 1843, helped 
2 
to bring the resignation of Mavrokordatos. 
The new Prime Minister's sympathy with the Crown 
influenced the royal decision. In a message sent to Desages, 
the French Charge d'Affaires, dated 29 February 1844, Kolettes 
expressed his real views about the constitutionalists of 1843. 
He claimed he had to infiltrate the National Assembly "in 
order to neutralize the influence of the revolutionary sec-
tor," so that the King, the monarchy, and the country would 
3 
be saved. 
Kolettes became one of the most notorious dictators 
in the history of modern Greece when he realized that his 
affection for the Crown would give him unlimited power to 
act at will instead of following the Constitution. Even 
though he declared in public that he was a firm believer 
2 For details on the resignation of Mavrokordatos 
and the summoning of Kolettes see Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 
188-92, also P. Karolides, Synchronos Historia ~ Hellinon 
kai ton Loinon Laon tes Anatoles, 1821 mechri 1921 (Contem-
porary-History ~he-Greeks and the Rest of the People of 
the East 1821 until 1921) (Athens, 1922), III, 138-70. For 
details on the revolution of 1843 see D. Fotiades, Othonas: 
! Monarchia (Otho: The Monarchy) (Athens, 1963), 281-369, 
also see B. Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of 
1843 (Munich, 1966). For details-on the origin, nature-and 
purpose of the Greek political parties see A. Skandames, 
Selides Politikes Historias kai Kritikes, E Triakontaetia 
tes Basileias tou Othonos, 1832-1862 (Page; of Political 
lli;tory and Criticism, The Th!rty=y;ar Kingdom of Otho, 1832-
1862) (Athens, 1961), 596-660, also Petropoulos, Kingdom of 
Greece, 53-106. 
3 Karolides, History £f the Greeks, III, 145-46. 
12 
4 
in justice, impartiality, and constitutional principles, 
he acted in a dictatorial manner and disregarded the laws of 
the land. Most of his contemporaries as well as modern his-
torians agree that Kolettes abused the Constitution (of 1843). 
Nicholaos Dragoumes, affiliated with the "English" party, des-
cribed Kolettes as a liar, a man who suppressed public author-
ities, persecuted the press, intervened in elections, and sys-
5 
tematically eliminated political opposition. 
Another contemporary - - a French writer - - wrote: 
The manner in which Kolettes attempted to wipe out the 
Parliament, is all new, alien to Greek ethics •••• 
The last struggle of the government against the island 
of Hydra in the election recognized by the examining 
committee as perfectly legal was cancelled. This strug-
gle proclaims • • • the first step toward the establish-
ment of a system of dictatorship. 6 
Scholars of modern Greek history, whether they are leftists 
like Kordatos, 7 liberal like Douglas Dakin, 8 or monarchists 
9 like Aspreas, all characterize the Government of Kolettes 
4 Fotiades, Otho: The Exile, 29, also see Nikos A. 
Antonakeas, Favlokra~ 1821-1950 (Government by Villains, 
1821-1950) (Athens, 1950):-I; ~ 
5 N. Dragoumes, Historikai Anamneseis (Historical 
Recollections) (Athens, 1925), II, 124-126. 
6 "Revue de Deux Mondes'' quoted in Dragoumes, Recol-
lections, II, 127. 
7 G. Kordatos, Historia tes Neoteras Helladas (His-
tory of Modern Greece) (Athens, 1957-1958), III, 367-76. 
8 Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 1770-
1923 (London, 1972), 80-8~ 
9 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 206-10. 
13 
as "Parliamentary Dictatorship." 
Born in Epirus and educated in Italy, Kolettes be-
came the doctor of Ali Pasha of Janina which may explain his 
attitude about government. Bower and Bolitho, biographers 
of Otho I, write that: 
His (Kolettes) idea of ruling Greece was founded on the 
principles of his former master Ali Pasha; bribery, cor-
ruption and malversation of public funds. His party was 
composed of the least stable elements of the country and 
he deliberately set out to assimilate as many of these 
as possible into the administration in order to prevent 
them from making trouble. 10 
. 
At the beginning of his appointment "the Prime Minister of 
the 6th of August," as Kolettes was known by his contempora-
ries, had the support of Metaxas and the "Russian" party 
otherwise he would not have been able to maintain a majority 
11 
needed to form a government. Metaxas was in charge of 
the Ministries of Navy and Economics, and the Prime Minister 
reserved for himself the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of 
Internal Affairs and of Ecclesiastical Affairs. The Kolettes-
Metaxas coalition was designed to eliminate the threat of 
constitutionalism in Greece. By the time of the first elec-
tiona, "having at its disposal the military and political 
authorities, using force and intrigue, the allied govern-
12 
ment almost anihilated the "English" party in all of Greece." 
10 L. Bower and G. Belitho, Otho I: King of Greece: 
A Biography (London, 1939), 137. 
11 Mavrokordatos had 53 Deputies while the Kolettes-
Metaxas coalition had 67. See Fotiades, The Exile, 31. 
12 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 196. 
14 
It was not the intention of this dictator, however, 
to share his power with the "Russian" party and Metaxas. 
By 30 December 1844 Piscatory, the French Minister at Athens, 
could write to Guizot that, "the success of Kolettes is con-
tinuing. Metaxas until now is following an honest policy. 
And he sees that his party is disintegrating under the sun 
13 
of Kolettes' [party]." On July 26th Metaxas gave his 
written resignation to the King and so Kolettes and the 
Moschomanga, as the "French" party was commonly known, mono-
14 polized political power. 
With the Napists out of the picture Kolettes had 
concentrated his power in his own hands but he was also 
fearful of the political opposition which was building as 
a result of the government's inability to accomplish any-
thing other than corruption. On 2 September 1845 ~ 
(Century), the Russian newspaper, published an article ex-
posing the unconstitutional practices of the government. 
"Greece is ruled constitutionally and Kalerges, Spiro-Melios, 
13 Cited in Karolides, History of the Greeks, III 
205-6. 
14 The apparent cause for the withdrawal of Metaxas 
from the Kolettes Government was that the Napists-"Russian" 
party - - wanted to control Church affairs. Metaxas had 
asked for the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs but was 
denied by the Prime Minister since two of his men, (R. Pala-
mides and D. Kalifronas), also had a strong claim to it. 
See Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 523-24. 
15 
Skarveles, Rodites and other "Septemberist" officers are 
being ostracized, mourning away from their families, and 
Makrygiannes is considered suspect of discovering the plot 
15 
against the Constitution." John Makrygiannes, a mili-
tary hero affiliated with the "French" party, was one of 
the leaders who fought for Constitutionalism in 1843. In 
his memoirs Makrygiannes recalled the determination of 
Kolettes to annihilate the "Constitutionalists" of 1843, 
and do away with the Constitution itself and its influence 
on the public mind. In March 1845 Kolettes ordered that 
the inscription of the Constitution should ~ be displayed 
in the public ceremony of the 25th March national celebra-
tion. He further had plans to disperse the "Constitution-
alists" at the ceremony by the military forces. "They were 
determined," writes Makrygiannes, "to destroy the Constitu-
tion. They make an Association at first, to assassinate at 
one time all the "Septemberists" all who did not shut up on 
their own. • " 16 The Prime Minister's plans were never . . 
carried out for they were discovered by ~lakrygiannes and his 
friends, but this one particular case of Kolettist tactics 
exemplified how his government operated while in power. 
15 Aion September 2, 1845. 
16 G. Makrygiannes, Makrvgianne Apomnemoneumata 
(Makrygianne Memoirs) (Athens, 1972), 290-91. 
16 
Kolettes would not have been able to emerge as the 
dynamic dictator that he was in a country whose monarch was 
known for his absolutist tendencies even after he accepted 
the Constitution unless he had the solid support of the 
Crown; In a letter to Metternich, Otho expressed his grea-
test satisfaction with his Prime Minister and his achieve-
ments. 
My present Government for the happiness of Greece has 
faced fortunately all the storms, which threatened it. 
I say for the happiness of Greece, for I doubt seriously 
whether another Government would be in position to in-
sure tranquility in the country. I have also reason to 
be pleased from the devotion of Kolettes to me. 17 
Royal support for the administration of Kolettes secured an 
unchallenged government in power whose major task was to 
stay in power. The major opponent of the "French" party 
was the Mavrokordatos faction which was weakening consider-
ably under the increasing power of the existing administra-
tion. Elections were conducted in an openly illegal manner 
by the use of force exercised by the government in power on 
the voters in order to secure the re-election of the party 
18 
member. The result of course was the lifetime Prime 
Ministership of John Kolettes and the dominance of the 
"French" party in politics for the decade of the forties. 
17 Otho to Metternich, Athens, April 27, 1846, quo-
ted in Skandames, Political History, 942. 
18 E. Kyriakides, E Historia tou Synchronou Hellinis-
~ ~ tes Idryseos ~ Basileiou tes Hellados 1832-1892 
(History of Contemporary Greeks from the Founding of the 
Kingdom of Greece, 1832-1892) (Athens, 1972, I, 523-24. 
17 
Such was the nature of the Kolettes administration; 
brutal, corrupt, dictatorial, all elements which contribu-
ted to the degradation of the young Greek nation in need of 
economic growth and development. If the word "favlokratia" 
(government by villains) is applicable to any Greek adminis-
tration in the nineteenth century, it is certainly a fair 
label for that of Kolettes. His government set out to achieve 
the following goals: (1) The restoration of prestige to the 
Crown, (2) the permanent establishment of his Prime Minister-
ship, and (3) the expansion of the country's boundaries. The 
first two goals were accomplished; as a result the work of 
the Constitutional revolution was wasted as Greece once again 
after the Kolettes administration became in practice an ab-
solute monarchy. 
B. The Expansionist Foreign Policv of Kolettes 
and the Mousouros Incident 
Kolettes' foreign policy has been described by his-
torians by the terms Megali Idea (Great Idea). This concept 
owes its origin to prerevolutionary thought and dreams of 
those Greeks who believed that one day they would free them-
selves from the Ottoman Empire and restore in its place the 
immortal Byzantine Empire. This was a dream which kept the 
Greek spirit alive amidst a Muslim conqueror. For many 
Greeks including Kolettes this dream was taken very seriously. 
In 1844 the "Prime Minister of the 6th of August" conceptua-
lized the Megali Idea in the following manner: 
18 
Greece, by her geographical location is the center of 
Europe; with the East on her right and the West on her 
left she was destined through her downfall to enlighten 
the East. Our forefathers executed this task, the sec-
ond is assigned to us. In the spirit of our oath and 
this great idea we saw always the delegates of the na-
tion assembling to decide not for the fate of Greece but 
for the entire Greek race. A nation which through its 
own downfall enlightened so many other nations, is re-
born today, not divided into many small states, but con-
solidated, with one government and one religion •••• 
What do all the Orthodox Christian peoples in Europe, 
the East, and elsewhere do? All wait to hear whether 
we still possess the Greek idea. 19 
In opposition and as a practical alternative to the foreign 
policy of irredentism of Kolettes and the Crown the "English" 
party with Mavrokordato offered a policy of internal develop-
ment and economic growth. 
Mavrokordatos was a liberal whose main concern was 
the economic strengthening of the weak.young nation. He be-
lieved that the Greek Government should not be looking to 
free the remaining Greek occupied territories of Thessaly, 
Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, and Crete but rather it should 
concentrate on developing internally its economic sector. 
Once the country was strong enough internally it could take 
up the challenge of the Ottoman Empire in order to regain 
its desired territories. Kolletes on the other hand was 
convinced "that the first and major goal of the young coun-
try should be boundary expansion and that the work o£ in-
ternal revival was unattainable with the poor means of the 
19 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 337-40. 
The translation used here is in Petropoulos, Kingdom of 
Greece, 509-10. 
19 
free fragment of Greek land. He felt that the creation of 
the Kingdom wa~ a condition of truce, not peace, and this 
20 
truce should be broken as soon as possible." Even though, 
as Tatsios remarks, "the solution to the nation's internal 
and external problems were identified with two antithetical 
i " 21 pol tical groups, ••• namely that of Kolettes and 
that of Mavrokordatos, it was clear to most people in the 
government and to those comprising an educated public opin-
ion that a policy of internal development was more urgent 
than a policy of irredentism which antagonized not only the 
Sublime Porte but the Great Powers' Near Eastern policy as 
22 
well. 
The only opposition to the Megali Idea foreign poli-
cy came from the "Russian" and "English" parties. In a 
series of articles published in the Aion, the "Russian" 
organ, (on the lOth, 13th and 17th September 1847) the 
Megali Idea was bitterly attacked as a treacherous policy 
23 dangerous to the interests of Greece. The Western Powers, 
20 G.N. Philaretos, Xenokratia kai Basileia en Hel-
ladi, 1821-1897 (Foreign Rule and Royal~in Greece,-r821-
1897) (Athens, 1897), 82. 
21 T. Tatsios, "The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish 
War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irre-
dentism, 1866-1897'' (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 
1973), 26. 
wers 
quo. 
(New 
22 During the Kolettes Administration the Great Po-
Near Eastern Policy was the maintenance of the status 
See M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Ouestion, 1774-1923 
York, 1968), 112-13. 
23 Cited in Fotiades, The Exile, 43. 
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namely France and Great Britain, also criticized the expan-
sionist policy of Kolettes. The French foreign minister of 
Louis-Philippe, Francois Guizot, a long time friend of 
24 
Kolettes, and his most faithful European political sup-
porter, opposed the personal policy of expansionism enter-
tained by Kolettes. 
The Near Eastern policy of Guizot during the Kolettes 
administration was parallel to that of England, namely, the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire and maintenance of the status 
25 quo in the Balkans. In a letrer to Kolettes before the 
new Minister took office, Guizot made it clear that France 
supported the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
You are much preoccupied with the future of the Greek 
race, but don't be deceived; this will not come tomorrow. 
It is very far. Be certain as to this. Europe, and when 
I say Europe I mean the good as well as the bad European 
policy, our friends as well as our enemies, Europe does 
not want the near falling of the Ottoman state •••• 
Europe had made a firm decision and Greece will not black-
mail the hands of Europe • • • direct your attention to 
the domestic affairs of Greece, in order to r~gtate her 
simply as a country governable domestically. 
Kolettes, who had found it convenient to lie about his be-
liefs and convictions concerning the Constitution and the 
idea of justice for all, also found it convenient to lie to 
24 Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 509. 
25 In the correspondence between Princess Lieven and 
Lord Aberdeen there is a desire expressed on the part of both 
France and England not to have a confrontation over Greek af-
fairs, Jones E. Parry, The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen 
and Princess Lieven, 1832-1854 (London, 1938-39), I, 216-17,225. 
26 Cited in Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 
192-93. 
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a European statesman about the foreign policy which he had 
designed to carry out. He wrote to Guizot that the present 
administration in Athens had no intentions or plans to antag-
onize the Ottoman Empire even though he was firmly convinced 
of the·injustice of a "little Greece" carved out by the will 
of the Great Powers. 
This is my belief; but never was it meant that this des-
tiny should be fulfilled by an invasion in the Ottoman 
state of by a forced conversion (propaganda}. I am there-
fore a devotee of the status quo. This is why from the 
beginning of my entrance into the government I seriously 
struggled to curb the forceful excitement of the small 
prudent and small provident of the Parliamentarians who 
push the government on a dangerous and anti-rational road. 
The measures which I have taken have pleasant results; 
the frontier relations between the Greeks and the Ottoman 
authorities are perfectly friendly; and they give cause 
for mutual help to each other. I declare my respectable 
friend that for as long as I am Prime Minister Turkey 
will have nothing to fear for my part. Every unfriendly 
movement against the neighboring frontiers I regard least 
political and very dangerous. 27 
These promises made to Guizot were never kept nor were they 
meant seriously. Kolettes knew what the policy of Europe in 
the Near East was but he had to choose between following the 
wishes of Europe or following his own policy and become popu-
lar with the King as well as with the majority of the people. 
By raising the flag of the Megali Idea the "Prime Minister 
of 6 August" appealed to the nationalist sentiments of the 
masses who were eager to see all Greeks in the Ottoman Pro-
vinces join the mother country. On the one hand the Prime 
27 Cited in ibid., 194. 
22 
Minister was promising to Europe to support the status quo 
in the Near East and on the other he was promising the peo-
ple of Greece expansion of territories. This contradictory 
policy of Kolettes had as its purpose the popularity of his 
own government both with Europe and with the Greek people. 
Some of his astute contemporaries, however, who were 
involved in political life could see this contradiction in 
the government's policy and criticized it as a deceptive 
policy. ''But because the disappointment against the autho-
rities,'' wrote Dragoumes, "inflam~d openly by foreigners, 
was general, the government was fearful of the springing up 
of general disturbances, the Megali Idea was forwarded~ elec-
trifying the people distracting and altering their attention 
28 from the domestic to the foreign grandeur of the country ... 
In this passage Dragoumes explains that the Prime Minister 
used the Megali Idea policy to distract the people's atten-
tion from the domestic to the foreign problems giving them 
hope of national expansion. It cannot be maintained, however, 
that the Kolettes administration went no further than verbal 
promises about national expansion. One of the practical 
steps that the government which believed in the Megali Idea 
adopted was the support of Brigandage. Throughout Greece 
as well as in the Greek-Turkish borders the "war-party'' of 
Kolettes (as it was labeled since they supported war), allowed 
28 Dragoumes, Recollections, II, 135. 
I'' 
23 
Brigandage to continue to grow and actually supported it. 
The Prime Minister viewed the Brigandage chiefs as valuable 
warriors who would be used in an event of a Greek-Turkish 
29 
war. "Always the domestic questions were small and secon-
dary," writes Kyriakides, ''commerce and industry never oc-
cupied his thoughts and his conceptions; about transporta-
tion, about road planning he never thought, because he con-
ceives one and only road to plan, that toward Thessalonika, 
and toward Constantinople; about Brigandage he is never con-
cerned, because the brigands are his future soldiers •• • 
31 The Ottoman Empire as well as Great Britain criticized 
32 
the government in Athens for its support of Brigandage. 
" 
In the House of Lords, Lord Beaumont criticized the domestic 
as well as the foreign policy of Greek aggression against 
Turkey. 
Not only had Athens become the scene of the deepest and 
strangest intrigues • • • but even beyond the internal 
affairs of Greece, beyond the frontiers, had that coun-
try already shown a total disrespect, not only for trea-
ties, but for the common laws of nations - - for the 
common practice of international friendship; and set a 
defiance at the common laws of humanity, by establish-
29 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I 203. 
30 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 527. 
30 
31 Palmerston was chiefly responsible for the deeper 
British involvement in Turk~y and t~e Near East for economic, 
strategic and political reasons. See G.D. Clayton, Britain 
and the Eastern Ouestion: Messolonghi to Gallipoli (London, 
1971), 73-39. 
32 Brigandage was a phenomenon that had been in exis-
tence for as long as Greece was under the domination of the 
24 
ing on the frontiers of Turkey an absolute system of 
Brigandage. 3 3 
The Megali Idea propagated through the government newspapers 
caused Chekib Effendi, the Turkish minister for foreign af-
fairs, to complain to the ambassadors of the three Protect-
ing Powers on 17 March 1845. Chekib Effendi accused the 
Greek Government of exciting revolutionary activities in 
ThessaLy and Epirus, Turkish provinces, populated mostly by 
Greeks. He warned that if support to revolutionary intrigues 
continued in these provinces the Sublime Porte would resort 
34 
to strong measures of repression. Under the pressure of 
the Turkish Government as well as of the Great Powers Kolettes 
was forced to adopt measures less hostile to the neighboring 
nation. 
The most faithful supporter of the Sublime Porte at 
this time was the British foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, 
who reacted with extreme anger toward the government of Athens 
when informed of Greek anti-Turkish schemes. Influenced by 
reports from the Constantinople embassy as well as the Lega-
Sublime Porte. Brigands became the heroes of the country 
during the War of Independence as they took the name of 
klefts (thieves) and armatoloi (guerrila warriors). Brigan-
dage continued after the War of Independence as many hoped 
to free all of the Greek territories. 
33 Sessions of May 22, 1845, Hansard, 3rd series. 
LXXX, 7 56. 
quest 
~, 
34 George Finlay, ! History of Greece 
£y the Romans to the Present Time, R.C. 
VII, (Oxford, 1877), 200. 
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------146 to A.D. 
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tion at Athens, the British Foreign Secretary accused Kolettes 
of encouraging disorder and granting amnesty to bands of brig-
ands. 35 
The government in Athens hoped to counter the British 
antagortism to Greece by using France, the supporter of the 
Moschomanga (the "French'' party), as its protector. Kolettes 
was convinced that he needed to counterbalance the power of 
Lord Palmerston, who opposed the Greek administration in po-
wer, with that of French Foreign Minister, Guizot, and the 
36 
French Legation in Athens who supported the administration. 
Since France had stood solidly behind Kolettes ever since he 
took power, the Greek Prime Minister believed that his patron 
nation would once again come to his rescue. 
The situation was not as simple, however, as Kolettes 
viewed it at the time. Guizot had an obligation to support 
the pro-French government in Athens but he was also committed 
to support Mustafa Reshid Pasha, the progressive Turkish 
statesman who had served as ambassador to Paris after he was 
37 dismissed as Foreign Minister in 1841 and was as much pro-
38 French as Kolettes. If Guizot would have decided to sup-
port the Kolettes administration his country would have risked 
35 Ibid., 200-1, also L. Sergeant, Greece in the Nine-
teenth Centurv: A Record of Hellenic Emancipation and Progress, 
1821-1897 (London, 1897), 236-7. 
36 Douglas Johnson, Guizot: Aspects of French History 
London, (Routledge, & Kegan, Paul 1963), 312-13. 
37 Anderson, Eastern Question, 108. 
38 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 525-6. 
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losing both Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire as impor-
tant allies. So it was impossible for the French foreign 
minister to sacrifice the interests of his country by oppos-
ing Palmerston and the Ottoman Empire in order to satisfy 
the expansionist dreams of a petty Greek politician. As the 
observations made in the House of Lords in 1845 by Lord 
Beaumont indicate, the Near Eastern interests of both Western 
Protecting Powers were identical and not conflicting as 
Kolettes and many other Greeks believed. 
The interests of the two countries were essentially the 
same in both quarters - - their object was, and ought to 
be identical. England and France alike were deeply in-
terested in preserving the independence, integrity and 
due influence of the Ottoman Empire, who was and could 
be the only safe keeper of the Dardanelles; for should 
the key of that gate be wrenched from her, and the open-
ing and shuting of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus be at 
the discretion of the Northern Power, the trade and pos-
sessions of England and France in the Mediterranean be 
at the mercy of Russia. 39 
Since England and France shared common interests in the Medi-
terranean against Russia it would have been logical for 
Kolettes to appeal to the Tsar for help but since the revo-
lution of 1843 Russia had taken a back seat in the affairs 
of Greece. First, the napists were not in control of the 
government, and second, Russia disapproved of the constitu-
40 
tional change which had taken place in Greece. Further-
more, the Tsar had "made it clear" to the British government 
39 Sessions of July 31, 1845, Hansard, 3rd series, 
LXXXII, 1279. 
40 Russia approved of the Kolettes government even 
though she did not support it. Nesselrodo to Meyendorff, 
27 
in the summer of 1844, "that he would oppose control of Con-
stantinople and the Straits by any one of the Great Powers 
41 (including Russia) or by an enlarged and strengthened Greece." 
Considering that none of the Powers were ready to support ex-
pansiou of Greece at the cost or upsetting the status quo in 
the Near East, it would be realistic for Kolettes to abandon 
his immediate plans of Megali Idea. No force, however, was 
large enough to control the germ of expansionism in the Prime 
Minister's mind so he continued searching for an opportunity 
to strike at Turkey. Such an opportunity presented itself 
during the crisis of the Mousouros incident. 
The Mousouros Incident 
Greek-Turkish relations continued to deteriorate 
even after the warnings of the British government to Greece 
and the complaints of the Sublime Porte to the Great Powers. 
In 1847 the ''Mousouros Incident" was responsible for the 
total break in diplomatic relations between the government 
of Athens and the Ottoman state. This affair, which was to 
have far greater consequences than any one in the Kolettes 
ministry could forsee, began in January 1847 when Tsames 
Karatasos, asked for a Turkish visa to visit Constantinople. 
St. Petersburg, December 5, 1844, Nesseerode, compte de 
Lettres ~~ Papiers du Chancelier Compte de Nesselrode 1870-
1856, VIII, 261. 
41 Anderson, Eastern Question, 112. 
28 
The Turkish embassy denied Karatasos the granting of a visa 
because he was involved in insurrectionary schemes against 
42 
the Porte. When the secretary of the Turkish embassy, 
Komenou Bey, told Karatasos that he could not renew his pass-
port without the proper authorization from the Turkish govern-
43 
ment, the latter replied that such a rejection was an in-
44 
sult to the king of Greece, and proceeded to report the 
incident to the Prime Minister. Kolettes seized upon this 
incident and chose to blow it out of proportion in order to 
45 
create friction with the Sublime PDrte. The reasons that 
the Greek Prime Minister acted in such a manner was first 
because he needed public support and second because he de-
sired to open hostilities in the Near East for the purpose 
of gaining the adjacent Turkish Provinces of Thessaly and 
Epirus. As Professor Karolides explains: 
That Kolettes through these and other aggravating inter-
nal and foreign diversions, precisely in order to rid him-
self from these diversions inventing a great and more 
serious foreign matter, he asked to provoke a rupture in 
the Ottoman state, in order to domestically direct the 
attention of the Greek people to the Megali Idea while 
externally to provoke a clash and a Greek-Turkish war, 
extending it very likely to an Anglo-French and possibly 
42 w. Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 
1801-1927 (Cambridge, 1936), 177. 
43 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 252. 
44 Karatasos was an aid de camp of Otho, Fotiades, 
The Exile, 48. Also see Athanasios Angelopoulos, Dimitrios Tsamis 
Karatasos (Balkan Studies, XVII, 1976) 
45 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 204. 
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converting it into a general European, so that in the 
general confusion of everything he would rise as a 
great political man, a great Greek patriot. 46 
the king was informed of the affairs involving Karatasos and 
the Turkish embassy at a palace dance which Mousouros, the 
47 Turkish charge d'affairs in Athens, attended. Otho ap-
proached the Turkish representative and angerly said, 
\ 
"J'esperais, que le roi de la Grece meritait, plus de res-
, 
pect que vous n'avez pos montre monsieur," and he returned 
his back on Mousouros. When Mousouros related the incident 
to Edmund Lyons, the British minister at Athens, the latter 
advised the Turkish minister to leave the Palace with his 
48 
entire personnel. 
Two days later, (15 January) after further instruc-
tions from Lyons, Mousouros blamed the king's attitude towards 
49 50 him on Kolettes. The Turkish government and all the 
representatives of the Powers - - except for the French 
in Constantinople sympathized with the Tur~ish minister in 
Athens. When Kolettes refused to personally go to the Turkish 
46 Karolides, History~ the Greeks, III, 256-57. 
47 Mousouros was a Greek Phanariot (Constantinople) 
who was loyaly serving the Sublime Porte. 
48 Kyriakides, Contemporarx Greeks, I, 557. 
49 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 205, claims that the 
British embassy in Constantinople was also giving instructions 
to the Turkish embassy in Athens, Lyons and Kolettes were on 
very hostile terms, (see Bower & Bolitho, Otho I, 136) so the 
former had personal as well as political reasons to blame 
Kolettes for the occurence at the palace dance. 
50 The Sultan was Metzid a peace loving ruler Grand 
Vizier was Reshid Pasha, and foreign minister Aali. Both 
30 
embassy and apologize on behalf of his government's conduct, 
the Turkish foreign minister, as Aali had demanded, diplo-
matic relations between Greece and Turkey broke off and were 
not to resume for an entire year. There was a long corres-
pondence between Otho and the Sultan during 1847 which was 
a rather fruitless attempt to restore relations between the 
two countries since the Great Powers behind the scenes ex-
ercised a great influence in the major foreign policy deci-
sions made by either Greece or Turkey. The incident there-
fore remained unresolved and the two powers were only to 
resume diplomatic relations after the death of Kolettes, the 
man responsible for the entire affair. 
c. Anglo-French Rivalry in Greece 
Anglo-French rivalry in Greece existed before the 
pro-French government of Kolettes as a result of conflicting 
51 
interests and power poli·tics among the Great Powers. When 
Mavrokordatos resigned and Kolettes became Prime Minister in 
1844, however, the antagonism between France and England over 
political influence in Greece was greatly accentuated. Kolettes 
made no particular efforts to hide his antipathy for Great 
Britain and, especially, for Edmund Lyons. Both Lyons and 
Palmerston, who supported Mavrokordatos' policy of internal 
Aali Pasha and Reshid Pasha were ''European-minded"politicians. 
51 See Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, for the period 
before 1844 for Anglo-French rivalry in Greece. 
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reform and development, despised Kolettes' policy of irre-
dentism. Palmerston described Kolettes in a letter to Lord 
Normanby as follows: 
I have no doubt that Coletti would, as Wallenstein says, 
prefer France to the gallows, but I do not see why he 
should be reduced to that alternative. To be sure, St. 
Aulaire said to me the other day that Coletti was a neces-
sary minister, for that he is the chief and leader of all 
the robbers and scamps of Greece, •• 6 Otho loves him as 
a second self, because he is as despotic as Otho himself; 
and as long as a majority can be had for Coletti in the 
chambers, by corruption and intimidation, by the personal 
influence of the king and by money from France, Coletti 
will remain minister. 52 
Guizot, however, felt that Kolettes was a good Prime Minister 
for Greece and supported him against the British government's 
53 
attacks. During his administration Kolettes made numerous 
attempts to have Lyons replaced as minister to Athens. In 
August 1845 Kolettes persuaded the king to use his influence 
in removing Lyons from Athens. In August 1845 Kolettes per-
suaded the king to use his influence in removing Lyons from 
Athens. When Otho was informed that the Queen of England 
would visit Germany accompanied by Aberdeen he wrote to his 
father: 
• quite pleased I was informed that the Queen of 
England will travel to Germany •••• I hope therefore, 
that you will have no difficulty in meeting her • • • 
then perhaps the Queen since she has a will power of her 
own may be won over by your politeness dear Father, and 
52 Evelyn Ashley, The Life £i Henry~ Temple Vis-
count Palmerston, 1846-1865 (London, 1876), 181-82. 
53 Robert Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse 
of the Entente Cordiale (London, 1974), 75-78:-;lso-see 
Guizot to Aberdeen, Octomber 28, 1844, quoted in E. Driault 
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that she will believe in your guarantee of my friendly 
feelings toward England and realize the necessity of 
recalling Lyons without jeopardizing his career. One 
can't ignore the danger of Lyons's violent prejudices, 
and no order even from his government, would prevent 
him from intriguing in secret. You most probably know 
yourself that recently, when he was talking to your mini-
ster, he said that if Greece was not able to pay its 
foreign debts, then it was apparent that the country was 
too small for a monarchy. 54 
The conflict between the Moschomanga and the "English" par-
ties did not have an effect on the Anglo-French rivalry or 
the Kolettes-Lyons power struggle but its influence extended 
to the people of Greece who fell victims to power politics. 
As Aspreas explains: 
As the parties evolved, Greeks fought against Greeks, 
but the flags under which they were fighting were not 
Greek. Piscatory was no longer behind Kolettes and 
Lyons behind Mavrokordatos. The representatives of the 
two rival Great Powers had openly come to the arena. 
They were the opposing party leaders under whose in-
spiration the Greeks fought, wearing out their strength, 
paralyzing the gountry and giving a pitiful view of poli-
tical idiocy. 5 
Piscatory, who was devoted to Guizot, and Lyons "who had be-
gun his diplomatic career as a protege of Palmerson," were 
not on speaking terms and were constantly attacking each 
other in the Greek press. 56 
and M. Lheritier, Histoire Diplomatique de la Grece de 1821 
~ ~ jours (Paris, 1925-6), II, 268-69. 
54 Skandames, Political History, 940, also see Bower 
and Bolitho, Otho _!_, 13 9. 
55 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I. 202. 
56 Bullen, Entente Cordiale, 75. 
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The continuing support of Guizot to the Greek govern-
ment 57 forced Aberdeen to order Lyons to break off all re-
58 lations with Piscatory. The ascendancy of the "French" 
party in Greece not only presented a political threat to 
the British interests in the Near East but an economic threat 
as well. One of the instructions by the British government 
to Edmund Lyons was to promote British economic interests in 
59 Greece. As Thouvenel wrote to Desages: 
England has interests in Greece. The neighboring Ionian 
Islands, the between Syra and Patra's commerce, the Lon-
don based colony of Chios' merchants, the totally profi-
table grain transport executed under the Greek flag, 
finally the commerce of imports, all these elements give 
England a material place in Greece. 60 
In 1854 the total imports of Greece amounted to 22.3 million 
drachmas and total exports to 11 million. Corinthian raisin 
(which British merchants exploited) amounted to 3.5 million. 
The major importing ports were Syros and Patras, and the fol-
lowing countries contributed the majority of imports to 
57 The following letter from Guizot to Kolettes 
which was sent 17 April 1845 reveals the enthusiasm of the 
French government toward the Kolettes administration. "mon 
cher et honorable ami, pardonner moi, mon long silence, j'ai 
tort, mais je suis pardonable. • vous avez tres bien con-
duit les affairs de la Grece. Elle enfin un gouvernement, un 
gouvernement Grec. Durez, durez et continuant. C'est ce que 
je vous demande. C'est le premier interet de votre pays comme 
le premier desir de vos amis en Europe. • • " cited in 
Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 534. 
58 Ibid., 535. 
59 V.J. Puryear, International Economics and Dip1o-
macr in the Near East, 1834-1853 (Stanford, 1935), 117. 
60 Cited in Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 364. 
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Greece: Great Britain amounted to 7.3 million, Turkey 4.3 
61 
million, Austria 4 million and France and Russia 2 million. 
One of the ways by which England exerted its influ-
ence and protected its interests in the Near East was by mak-
ing continuous demands on the Greek government to pay the in-
terest on the guaranteed loan of 1832. 62 When Kolettes be-
came Prime Minister he inherited an empty treasury and a pay-
ment of 6.3 million drachmas due to the Protecting Powers. 
Considering that there was a budget deficit every year but 
one, 1836, since 1832 interest pay~ents were repeatedly post-
poned. In 1845 the Prime Minister tried again to postpone 
payments due to the Powers, and Lord Aberdeen as well as 
Cochrane 63 criticized Greece in Parliament for not making 
its payments. Lord Aberdeen stated that: 
We have also guaranteed the payment of the interest of a 
loan contracted by the Greek State, which we have been 
called upon to discharge ourselves for the last two or 
three years. This, therefore, ~ives us undoubtedly a 
right to interfere so far in the internal affairs of 
this State as to see that we should be released from 
these obligations as rapidly as possible. And the Greek 
Government would do well to recollect that, by the pro-
visions of the Treaty, we are enabled to enter into pos-
session of such of the revenues of Greece as we think 
61 S.R. Markezines, Politike Historia tes Neoteras 
Hellados (Political History of Modern Greece) (Athens, 1966). 
62 This loan of 60 million francs was guaranteed to 
Greece by the Protecting Powers by the Treaty of 7 May 1832. 
See Martens, Recueil des Traites, X, 550-64, also Strupp, 
La situation internationale de la Grece, 125, and Levandis 
63 Hansard, 3rd series, LXXVIII, 902-03. 
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64 proper for the repayment of the debt so contracted. 
The concern of the British government over the payments on 
the loan kept increasing as did their dissatisfaction with 
the pro-French Kolettes administration. The British wanted 
the Greek Prime Minister and his government to know just 
how disappointed the Aberdeen government was with the state 
of affairs in Greece so Lyons was instructed to send a letter 
from the Earl of Aberdeen informing the Greek government of 
its negligent financial practices. The British Foreign Sec-
retary stated that Greece had vi~lated the terms of the Treaty 
of May 7th 1832 by not making complete efforts to discharge 
its financial obligations to the three Protecting Powers. 
Aberdeen further noted that Great Britain was determined to 
insist on administrative reform and a reduction in the armed 
forces of Greece. 
The expenses of the war department continue to absorb 
one-third of the revenues of the state. Brigandage has 
increased. The tranquility of the counterminous Turkish 
provinces has been repeatedly troubled by acts of rapine; 
and the Ottoman territory has been repeatedly violated by 
armed Greek bands. Out of respect for the independence 
of Greece, Great Britain is unwilling to interfere in her 
internal affairs. But it is manifest that if Greece de-
sires to be exempt from external control, she must place 
herself in a position to discharge her own financial ob-
ligations without having recourse to the aid of the guar-
anteeing Powers. 65 
Interest payment on the loan was the strongest, although not 
64 Session of July 31, 1845, Ibid., 3rd series, 
LXXXII, 1280. 
65 Aberdeen to Lyons, Foreign Office, October 2, 1845, 
British and Foreign State Papers, XLV. 
. ' 
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always the most effective means used by the Peel administra-
tion, by Palmerston and by the Earl of Clarendon to pressure 
Greece to yield to British demands. The British Parliament 
and certain historians favorable to Palmerston and Great 
Britain maintained that the concern of the Foreign Office 
was with the growth and development of the Greek nation and 
that Great Britain stood for constitutionalism against the 
absolutism of the Bavarian monarchy in Greece and the cor-
66 
rupt and dictatorial Kolettes administration. Nothing 
could be further from the truth.· As Palmerston's letter to 
Prince Albert will reveal below, the concern of the British 
government was not the internal development of Greece and 
her general economic and social progress, but rather the 
dominant influence exercised by the French in that country 
which diminished British influence in the Near East. 
Palmerston made it clear to Prince Albert that his 
nation had nothing against the people of Greece but only 
against Kolettes. He hinted that Trikoupis, the pro-English 
politician, was far more capable of governing Greece in a 
constitutional manner, and that the royal support of Kolettes 
was resented by the Foreign Office. Most strongly the Bri-
tish Foreign Secretary objected to the French influence in 
the Kolettes administration. 
66 George Finlay, History of Greece, VII, 
the historians partial to the British government. 
Sergeant, Greece, shares similar views though not 
ously British as those of Finlay. 
is one of 
Also Lewis 
as notori-
... 
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In the foreign relations of the couitry Mr. Koletti seems 
to have had three leading objects in view, aggression to-
wards Turkey, subserviency of Mr. Koletti toward France, 
and insult towards England. The subserviency of Mr. 
Koletti toward France is too notorious, too evident, and 
has been too publicly boasted of by the French Government 
to be now denied. 67 
Throughout the month of April 1847 Lyons kept asking for the 
700,000 drachmas which the English government paid to the 
Greek nation for the guaranteed loan. 
In Parliament the heat was building against Greece 
68 
which could not make the payments to the Protecting Powers. 
At the same time domestic political opposition to the Kolettes 
administration was building as a result of the Prime Minis-
ter's mishandling of the Mousouros incident. In panic, 
Kolettes consulted with Otho and then dismissed Parliament 
69 
- - the Boule - - and called for elections. The elections 
which took place were conducted in the same corrupt and un-
constitutional manner which suited Kolettes' purposes. The 
leaders of the "Russian" and "English" parties decided to 
form a coalition in order to be able to stop the present ad-
ministration from getting reelected. Their plan, however, 
failed as the government was too well prepared and determined 
to meet the opposition. Makrygiannes described the misfor-
6 7 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho ~' 155-65. 
68 Sessions of February 23, 1846, Hansard, 3rd series, 
LXXXIII, 1389-90. 
69 D. Petrakakos, Koinobouleutike Historia Hellados 
(Parliamentary History of Greece) (Athens, 1935-1946), 137-38. 
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tunes of the elections and how Kolettes was able to retain 
power as follows: 
Grivas went to Bonitsa and raised the flag. They (the 
partisans of Kolettes) attacked him, not even having 
fired at them, and dumped him in the sea. He would have 
been lost if the English had not saved him. Mamoures 
took 35,000 drachmas from Metaxas and Mavrokordatos, 
which they had collected to help the movement; he cheated 
them and turned on the side of the government • • • 
Kolettes began his elections. Everywhere in the nation 
there were murders and disappearances of residents. 70 
Kolettes won all of the electorates out of one hundred. 
This process was called "elections" in mid-nineteenth century 
Greece. A young nation in need of honest progressive politi-
cal leaders was subjected to rule by villains. 
The loss of the "English" party created bitter reac-
tion in England against the existing government. Lord Palmer-
ston openly accused Kolettes in the Rouse of Lords for his 
Francophilism. 
I cannot understand the great value placed by France in 
maintaining in Greece a ministry which is regarded rep-
resentative of French interests. If the French Govern-
ment believes that it is the advantage of France and 
the French nation to regard this as its triumph, that 
the Prime Minister of Greece is their chief •••• I 
cannot say anything more • • • no one in England wants 
to think of bothering the French dominated events. 71 
The Anglo-French rivalry was not destined to last in Greece, 
for Kolettes, leader of the "French" party, died on 1 Septem-
ber 1847. The Revolution of 1848 which brought an end to 
70 Makrygiannes, Memoirs, 198-99. 
71 Cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 421-42. 
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the government of ~ouis Philippe also brought an end to the 
dominating French influence of Greek politics. Even though 
the struggle for power never stopped, the tensions between 
France and England tended to ease as they both realized that 
the foreign policy of the Hegali ~ was in conflict with 
their policy of the Ottoman Empire integrity. The other 
factor which eased the tensions between French and English 
policy in Greece was that Otho was not really favorable to 
either France or England and tended to be drawn towards 
Russia after 1850. 
During the three years of his dictatorial rule 
Kolettes was successful in accomplishing in the domestic 
sphere: (1) the alienation of the "Russian" and "English" 
parties, (2) the violation if not total rejection of the 
Constitution, and (3) the establishment of the Prime Minister-
King dictatorship. In the external sphere, (1) the antago-
nism of England against Greece, and (2) the support of Brigan-
dage against the Ottoman State, and as a result the antago-
nism of Turkey against Greece. This is the Kolettes' legacy. 
The tragedy of it was that its influence extended beyond the 
decade of the 40's to the war period of the 50's. The king 
would follow Kolettes' foreign and domestic policies to 
plunge Greece into a senseless conflict involving Turkey 
and the Western Powers. 
CHAPTER II 
ANGLO-GREEK HOSTILITIES AND THE RISE 
OF RUSSOPHILISM IN GREECE 
A. Foreign Policy and Anglo-Greek 
Hostilities 1847-1850 
The period from the death of Kolettes to the Anglo-
French occupation of 1854 in Greece was characterized domes-
tically by monarchical tyranny, and in the field of foreign 
affairs by expansionist schemes directed against the Ottoman 
Empire. Kolettes reinstated the king's prestige in 1844 
after it was downgraded and limited by the Constitutional 
revolution. When Kolettes was out of the political scene 
the Greek monarchy was determined to absorb all the powers 
of the government into its own hands. 
The only two powerful leaders, Metaxas and Mavrokor-
datos, who were likely candidates to replace Kolettes, would 
not be acceptable to the pro-French Parliament (Boule) and 
much less to the Crown which both politicians had fought 
against. From 1847 to 1853, therefore, absolute monarchy 
was reinstated in practice though not in theory in the back-
ground of void in political leadership. The governments 
which were in power during these seven years were known as 
"court governments" or "court ministries," since the Prime 
40 
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1 Ministers were puppets of the king. 
During the period of the "court ministries" the 
constitutional rights of the citizens were abused by the 
king and his court whose ultimate goal was the full rein-· 
statement of absolutist powers to the Crown. The Kolettes 
administration had already set the stage for a political 
system which would give all the governmental powers to the 
king and create a monarchical dictatorship behind the dis-
guise of puppet ministers. 
The first "court ministry" was headed by an illiter-
ate man, Kitsos Tsavellas, who served as Minister of the 
2 Army in the administration of Kolettes. Kitsos Tsavellas 
was the grandson of the infamous Lambros Tsavellas, a hero 
in the War of Independence. He was not a politically minded 
man but his devotion to the Crown made him the best candi-
date for the position of Prime Minister. The primary con-
cern of the Tsavellas government was the suppression of 
legitimate political opposition to the government which had 
3 begun while Kolettes was in power, as well as revolution-
ary activities throughout Greece which presented a serious 
threat to the Crown. In the summer of 1847 there was a 
1 For political development during the period 1847 
to 1853 see Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 210-220, also Petra-
kakos, Historx £i Greece, 137-153. 
2 Fotiades, The Exile, 74, also Makrygiannes, 
Memoirs, 300-01. 
3 The Greek Senate (Gerousia) or Council of Elders, 
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wave of opposition to the government of Kolettes. Under 
the leadership of Makrygiannes and other prominent military 
figures a coalition of peasants, military officers and poli-
ticians of the opposition was formed and called for the res-
toration of the constitutional principles in government. 
Otho and his court managed to silence Makrygiannes and his 
followers by armed force but the wave of revolution which 
swept Europe in 1848 had too great of an effect on Greece 
4 
even for Otho to control. 
As long as the tide of unrest remained free from 
implicating the Protecting Powers, the Tsavellas government 
could control it. There were two incidents, however, of 
major importance which implicated Great Britain in the revo-
lutionary activities of 1847-1848. The first incident in-
volved Theodore Grivas, inspector in the army during the 
Kolettes government, and Nicholas Kriezotes, Province In-
spector in Euboia. Both men were supporters of Kolettes up 
to the April 1847 elections when the "Prime Minister of the 
4th of August" dismissed the Parliament. At that time 
Grivas and Kriezotes decided to fight against the dictator-
began openly to oppose the unconstitutional practices of 
the monarchy and asked that the king uphold the principles 
of the Constitution. This attack on the monarchy by the 
Senate came as a shock to Otho for senators were appointed 
by the Crown. See Petrakakos, History of Greece, 140. 
4 For the Makrygiannes rising see Kordatos, Modern 
Greece, III, 238-39. 
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ship of Kolettes even though the latter had promised both of 
them seats in the senate. Kolettes sent an armed force 
against Grivas and his rebels but with the help of the Bri-
tish, Grivas escaped to Prevesa where he received assistance 
and cooperation from the British Consulate and ultimately 
5 
resorted in the Turkish province of Janina. 
The second incident involved Merendites, a Captain 
in the army during the Kolettes administration. Merendites 
was dismissed from the army by the Tsavellas government for 
suspicion of being in the opposition. This tragic occurence 
in the captain's life prompted him to resort to brigandage. 
He robbed the Patros Branch of the National Bank of Greece 
of 25,090 drachmas, the Customs House of 32,000 and he took 
92,000 from the Public Fund. He then sought refuge in the 
Austrian embassy but was not accepted so he went to the 
British who were eager to give help to anyone in the oppo-
6 
sit ion. 
In both instances, one with Grivas and the other 
with Merendites, the Greek government found itself in 
another confrontation with the British authorities. When 
Greek officials became aware that the British took part in 
aiding rebels such as Grivas and brigands such as Merendites 
5 Skandames, Kingdom of Otho,· 451, also Bower-Bolitho, 
~ l' 168. 
6 Fotiades, The Exile, 77. 
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they became infuriated. Glarakes, the Greek Foreign Minis-
ter, complained to Lyons about the role of the Rritish au-
thorities in Greek internal affairs and Lyons reported the 
incident to Palmerston. The British statesman who had little 
to be sympathetic about with the government in Athens wrote 
a very aggressive and degrading letter against the Greek au-
thorities which he sent to Lyons. He maintained that: 
Mr. Glarakes will do well to abstain in the future from 
unfounded accusations against her Majesty's government 
and her personnel • • • and if this government showed 
the slightest sympathy towards him (General Grivas) it 
did this only because he has been a victim of tyranny, 
oppressing and agitating the Greek people all over, · 
where the activity of this system is now felt: a sys- 7 
tern provoking natural consequence and evident revolt. 
This letter came as a shock to everyone and, especially, 
the king, who ordered the Foreign Ministry to respond to 
8 
Lord Palmerston in a ''very declaratory manner." The irony 
of this entire affair was that Great Britain the defender of 
liberty and constitutional principles, the only one of the 
Great Powers really to speak out against brigandage in Greece, 
turned to aid rebels and brigands, which proves that all the 
talk of Palmerston and the debates in the House of Commons 
and House of Lords against brigandage was just talk and noth-
1 Cited in Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 396. 
8 For the letter of Glarakes to Palmerston see ibid., 
410-11. 
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9 
ing more. When it came to making a choice between the 
pragmatic interests of their nation and ideology the British 
put aside their ideological jargon. 
As Anglo-Greek relations continued to deteriorate 
the Gieek government was half-heartedly trying to restore 
relations with the Sublime Porte. The Musouros incident, 
which occurred during the administration of Kolettes, was 
unresolved when Tsavellas took power. A solution to this 
incident was imminent not only because it represented a pos-
sible threat to Greek economic, that is to say, commercial 
interests which were threatened by such a break of relations 
between the two countries, but also because the Great Powers 
sympathized with the Turkish position on this matter. On 
October 4, the Greek Foreign Minister sent a memorandum to 
the five Great Powers - - Britain, France, Russia, Austria 
and Prussia - - stating the Greek government's concessions 
to the Sublime Porte's demands and the latter's unwillingness 
10 
to accept these. In response to this memorandum the Sub-
9 Mr. B. Cochrane declared in the House of Commons 
that, "I am pleading for a country from which we, in common 
with all Europe ••• derive all that softens and refines 
the heart, and all that gives life and animation to our de-
bates. It is the cause not of Greece and her isles • 
but the cause of constitutional liberty in all parts of the 
't-Torld." And Palmserston added to this that the Greek usov-
ereign should give to the Greek nation a constitutional sys-
tem of government." Session of March 2, 1848, Hansard, 3rd 
series, Commons, XCVII, 137-8. 
1° For the memorandum see Kordatos, Modern Greece, 
III, /•53. 
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lime Porte charged that Greek brigands were organizing to 
invade Turkish territories. The Turks maintained that the 
Greek position was irreconcilable and should therefore be 
regarded as hostile by the Great Powers. 
Otho realized that unless a friendly power inter-
vened in support of Greece the Turkish demands would have 
to be met and this would mean diplomatic defeat for the 
Greek Court and humiliation of the Crown. The Greek Court 
decided, therefore, to appeal to Tsar Nicholas, who Otho 
felt, would be more sympathetic -to Greece than to the Otto-
man Empire. The Tsar answered Otho on 18 October 1847 not 
at all to the satisfaction of the Greek monarch. " ••• it 
always seemed essential to me that Greece, in the delicate 
position which she is should observe wherever possible, most-
ly a policy of abstention from displeasing the Porte and 
England. It was the only way not to fall into extreme ten-
sions which was produced successively in the relations with 
these two Powers and Greece." 11 The Tsar went on the blame 
the Kolettes' administration for the existing tensions be-
tween Greece and the Porte and England, and did not commit 
himself to helping Greece resolve her existing problems with 
12 
Turkey. It should have occurred to Otho that Russia would 
11 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 141-45. 
12 The letter of Nicholas to Otho is cited in 
Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 958-60. 
l 
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not side with Greece for a minor incident and jeopardize her 
13 
friendly relations with England. 
In the face of political opposition and social unrest 
domestically, and diplomatic opposition from practically all 
of th~ Great Powers the Greek government gave in to the de-
mands of the Sublime Porte. Glarakes wrote a letter express-
ing the apologies of his government to Aali; on 25 January 
Mousouros returned to his post and diplomatic relations be-
14 
tween Greece and the Sublime Porte resumed. This inci-
dent marked the end of Greek-Turkish hostilities which were 
not to reoccur in the Turkish provinces until 1853. 15 
The revolution of 1848 in Europe had a decisive in-
fluence in Greece. Throughout the country there were spora-
die revolts expressing the peoples' dissatisfaction with the 
monarchy, the continuing foreign intervention in Greek inter-
nal affairs, the poor economy, and the corruption on all 
13 Russia was opposed to the enlargement and the 
strengthening of Greece. It was also committed to act in 
cooperation with Great Britain in deciding the fate of the 
Ottoman Empire. See Anderson, Eastern Question, 111-12. 
14 Mousouros was shot and wounded by a Greek radical 
on 28 April 1848. After this incident he was transfered to 
the London Embassy. The Sublime Porte took no hostile ac-
tion against the government of Greece for the shooting of 
its ambassador. For details on the solution of the Mousouros 
incident see Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 596-97. 
15 See chapte~ III section A. 
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16 
levels of government. Under the pressure of revolutionary 
activity the Tsavellas government fell in March and was re-
17 placed by the Koundouriotes' administration. Before 
Koundouriotes was chosen to head the ministry by the king, 
Lyons used his offices to pressure Otho to form a pro-British 
18 government. Otho would not give in to British pressure 
even though he knew that he no longer had the support of the 
19 
French government and that the Russian Court continued to 
maintain a policy of abstention from Greek internal affairs. 
The principal preoccupation of the Koundouriotes 
ministry in the domestic field was to silence the political 
opposition and put an end to the sporadic revolts. In the 
field of foreign relations, the settlement of the disputed 
20 Greek-Turkish frontiers and the establishment of friendly 
relations with the Powers, took precedence. Domestically, 
therefore, the same problems which faced Kolettes and Tsavelas 
also threatened the Ministry of Koundouriotes. In the field 
of foreign affairs also the problems were the existing ten-
sions between Greece and the Ottoman Empire and the Great 
Powers - - primarily England. 
16 The authoritative work on the 1848 Greek revolts 
is Tasos Bournas, To Helliniko 1848 (The Greek 1848) (Athens, 
1952). 
17 See Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 212-13, for details. 
18 Philaretos, Foreign Rule, 86-7. 
19 When the government of Louis-Philippe fell from 
power in 1848 "the prestige of France in Greece fell so low 
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It was to be expected that any government which could 
not be influenced by the British would make Lyons and Palmer-
ston adopt a hostile policy towards Greece. In a dispa:tch 
to Palmerston 29 March 1848 Lyons expressed his disappoint-
ment with the king's influence in government. He charged 
that the current administration in collaboration with the 
Crown was responsible for abusing the Constitution and rob-
bing the people of their rights. If there were any ministers 
in power who wished to alter the course of things for the 
better, they were prevented from·acting out their wishes by 
a Boule which was at the disposal of the king and the Camerilla 
which actually governed the nation. Further the British mini-
ster wrote, 
I am informed that the ministers are determined to resign 
in case the king would continue to reject the measures 
which they would like to employ and it is regarded pos-
sible that the king will make certain concessions be-
cause the news from Pari~! Vienna and Munich have created 
here great disturbance. 
Lyons was eager to keep his position in Athens as he had en-
gaged in a personal war with the "French" party. Even though 
he had at one point told Piscatory, "there is only one good 
policy - - for France and England to act together," he never 
acted on this principle himself, and as Seton-Watson main-
that the French Charge d'Affaires found it difficult to 
change francs into drachmas." See Bower-Bolitho, Otho .!_, 171. 
2° For details on the dispute see Karolides. History 
of the Greeks, III, 434-37. 
21 
cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 462. 
50 
22 
tained, he "treated the Greeks as inferior mortals." 
In 1848, however, Lyons had more than just personal 
feelings against the "French" party to complain about to 
the Foreign Office. The European revolutions of 1848 in-
tensified the existing political opposition to the Greek 
government during the early months of that year. The Bri-
tish Charge d'Affaires at Athens, fearful of further French 
dominance of Greek domestic politics, welcomed revolutionary 
23 
activity in Greece which might weaken the government to 
the point where the king would have to dismiss the Koundourio-
tes ministry and look to the British for support. 
Lyons was not successful in persuading Otho to call 
for the formation of an "English" government so Stratford 
24 . Canning was sent to Athens in May of 1848 to achieve this 
task. 25 Canning's mission proved unsuccessful for the king 
l>ras determined to keep members of the "English" party out of 
22 Robert Seton-l-latson, Britain in Europe, 17 89-1914, 
(Cambridge, 1933), 235. 
23 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 462-63. 
24 For the life and career of Stratford Canning see 
s. Lane-Poole, The Life £i the Right Honourable Stratford 
Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe from His Memoirs 
and Private and Official Papers, (London, 1888). 
25 Canning quarrelled with both Lyons and Sir Richard 
Church within two days of his arrival at Athens and stated 
publicly that they - - Church and Lyons - - were personal 
enemies of the king. This made the position of Lyons in 
Athens very difficult after this affair even though he still 
had the support of Palmerston. See Bowe~ & Bolitho, Otho I, 
173-75. ---- -
the government. 
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Finally after immense domestic and foreign 
26 
pressure the Camerilla came to its senses and dismissed 
the unpopular Koundouriotes government; this time Otho was 
ready to give Mavrokordatos a chance to form a ministry. Be-
fore he summoned Mavrokordatos, however, the king had an in-
terview with him concerning his domestic and foreign policy. 
The first question put to Mavrokordatos was, "Which places 
27 
can and must Greece take?" The answer given was unsatis-
factory to Otho. Mavrokordatos felt as he had in 1844 when 
he was Prime Minister that the internal development of Greece 
was a far more essential matter to deal with and deserved 
all the attention of the government, whereas the question of 
territorial expansion was an issue of the future. Otho's 
foreign policy was basically identical to that of Kolettes, 
namely, territorial expansion should be the primary issue 
of the government. A greater Greece, Otho felt, would mean 
prosperity for the nation: the domestic problems - - economic 
and social would be solved as the goal of territorial ex-
pansion was realized. This basic disagreement on domestic 
and foreign policy between Otho and Mavrokordatos resulted 
in the rejection of the latter as a likely candidate for 
Prime Minister. 
26 Camerilla was the label given to the Greek Court 
as it was often compared with the Spanish Court. 
27 For the full text of questions and answers see 
Dragoumes, Recollections, 137-50. 
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Once again Lyons asked that Mavrokordatos be sum-
moned to form a government but the king went along with the 
wishes of Thouvenel and in October 1848 appointed Admiral K. 
Kanares. 28 The French influence in Greece and the refusal 
of the king to accept Mavrokordatos or Trikoupis in the 
government made Palmerston so furious that he declared that 
he would never approve a government in Greece unless its 
29 leader was from the "English" party. 
Greek-British relations continued to deteriorate 
even further as a series of incidents occurred in the next 
five years which contributed to the existing friction of 
30 
relations between the two countries. The first incident 
involved the British claim of the two islands Elaphonese 
31 
and Sapientza, at the southern tip of Peloponnese. The 
importance of these islands was commercial - - they were 
used as loading bases but to the Greek nationalists the 
sentimental value was far greater than the commercial. 
28 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 545. 
29 Dragoumes, Recollections, 134-35. 
30 The period 1844 to 1850 in British relations with 
Greece has been labeled accurately as "cold" see The Cambridge 
History of British Foreign Policy, edited by A.W. Ward and 
G.P. Gooch, II (New York, 1815-66), 594-96. 
31 In 1839 the Governor of the Ionian Islands wrote to 
Lyons that the two disputed islands belonged rightfully to the 
Ionian Islands. In 1849 Wyse, who had replaced Lyons, wrote 
to Glarakes that Elaphonese and Sapientza were under the juris-
diction of the Ionian Islands, so Greek authorities had no 
legal right to these islands. The Greek government considered 
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There were three more demands made by Palmerston's 
government all which were intentionally used to exert pres-
sure on the Camerilla so that Otho would welcome British in-
fluence in Greek internal and foreign affairs. The first of 
these three demands was indemnity for piracy by Greeks of 
six Ionian ships in September 1847. In this affair Greece 
was blamed for the acts of piracy committed by Greek citizens. 
The government of Greece declared that it could not be held 
32 
responsible for all wrongdoing of its citizenry. Secondly, 
the British demanded indemnity for damages committed against 
Dom Pacifico, a Portugese-Jew who was a citizen of England 
residing in Athens. 33 The damage to Pacifico's property 
was claimed at 886,736 drachmans, an unrealistically high 
the two islands part of Peloponnese and chose to ignore the 
claims of the British authorities. Great Britain had a 
legal claim to Elaphonese and Sapientza according to the 
treaty of Paris (5 November, 1815), the second article of 
which read "all islands, small and large and those uninhabi-
ted lying between the coasts of Peloponnese and Albania" 
should be considered dependant to the Ionian government. 
For details on this subject see Fotiades, The Exile, 126-28, 
also Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 585-87. 
32 For documentation on this subject see British and 
Foreign State Papers 1849-1850, XXXIX under Greece: Corres=-
pondence with Great Britain. "Plunder of Six Ionian Boats 
at Salcina 1846-1847," 315-32. 
3 3 On the day of Good Friday a mob in Athens raided 
his house - - for he was a Jew and identified with Judas - -
and burned and destroyed several of his valuables. Instead 
of going to the Greek authorities and trying to settle the 
matter in court Mr. Pacifico went to the British embassy 
making it thus an international incident. See Kyriakides, 
Contemporarx Greeks, I, 588-89, also Driault, Histoire Diplo-
matique, 328-33. 
54 
34 
figure considering the value of the money at the time. 
The British embassy would under normal circumstances turn 
this matter over to the Greek authorities to handle. They 
chose, however, to make an incident out of it blowing it out 
of proportion and interpreting the abuse of the property of 
a British subject, Dom Pacifico as an act of hostility by the 
Greek government against the British government. When the 
claim of Pacifico was handed over to the Greek authorities 
by the British officials, naturally the reaction of the 
Greeks was the same as it had been in the case of the pirates 
who plundered the six Ionian ships, namely, that they could 
not pay for damages committed by irresponsible individuals 
and that the matter should be taken to the Greek Court to be 
35 
settled. 
Finally, there was a claim of the Scottish historian 
36 
George Finlay to be settled. In 1842 Finlay wrote to the 
34 For Pacifico's claim see British and Foreign State 
Papers, 1850-1!, XL, 619-26. 
35 A. Thomaidou, Historia Othonos, (History of Otho). 
(Athens, Kostichairopoulos). 
36 There were two grievances against Greece by the 
British government which are of some significance. 1. The 
ill-treatment of British officers of a ship, 11 Fantome" by 
Greek authorities at Patras. See British and Foreign State 
Papers, 1849-50, XXXIX, (Correspondence between Great Britain 
and Greece, respecting an outrage committed upon a Boat's 
Crew of Her Britanic Majesty's ship "Fantome" at Patras 1848), 
216-53. 2. Correspondence between Great Britain and Greece 
respecting the ill-treatment of Ionias at Patras and Pyrgos, 
1846-47, 254-313. 
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Earl of Aberdeen complaining that part of his property had 
been incorporated into the Royal Garden and he was not in-
37 
demnified for this property by the Greek government. 
Aberdeen instructed Lyons to proceed to represent the claim 
of Finlay but the matter was not resolved and in 1846 Lyons 
began to pressure Kolettes for indemnification of Finlay's 
38 property. The Greek government felt that the 45,000 
drachmas which Finlay demanded for his property was enormous 
39 
and it refused to meet these demands. 
All of the incidents mentioned above started before 
September 1847 but they were all compiled by Palmerston to 
form a series of charges against Greece at the end of 1849. 
The main reason for this as explained by a prominent Greek 
historian was British fear that Otho might provoke anti-
Turkish activities in the provinces adjacent to Greece. 
Besides the grave political anomalies of Europe the re-
lations between Russia and Turkey were seriously irrita-
ted as a result of Walachia and Moldavia Principalities 
which were occupied by a large number of Russian soldiers 
and fears existed concerning an explosion of war between 
the two powers. Knowing Otho's intentions and fearing 
the Greek call for disturbances in Turkey, regarded oppor-
tune the situation in order to attack Greece during the 
occasion when the complication of.the Powers did not4nl-low them to distract themselves with Greek affairs. 
37 Finlay to Aberdeen, London, October 18, 1842. 
British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX, 410-12. 
38 Lyons to Coletti, Athens, June 17, 1846, British 
and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX, 430-31. 
39 Colokotronis to Lyons, Athens, November 9, 1848, 
British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX, 480-81. 
40 Kyriakides, Contemporarx Greeks, I, 592-95. 
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The British government received intelligence reports to the 
effect that in case of a Russo-Turkish war Greece would side 
41 
with Russia. The Near-Eastern crisis of the fall of 1849 
was the primary reason for the severe demands of Palmerston 
on the government of Otho, but the desire to teach Greece a 
lesson in discipline and British dominance in the European 
community was another reason for what was to follow. At the 
end of 1849 the threat of Russian attack on Turkey was no 
longer in existence as the British ambassador in Russia re-
assured Palmerston. "I think we may reasonably expect that 
at all events during the reign of the emperor Nicholas no 
attempt will be made by Russia to subvert the Ottoman Em-
42 
pire." In spite of this reassurance of Russian peaceful 
intentions towards Turkey, Palmerston sent the following dis-
patch to the Admiralty. 
I have to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands 
that Sir William Parker should be instructed to return 
to Athens or Salamis on his way back from the eastern 
end of the Mediterranean, and that he should, on arriving 
on the coast of Greece, place himself in communication 
with Mr. Wyse, Her Majesty's Minister at Athens, who has 
been instructed to require a final settlement of certain 
claims which have been long pending the Greek government • 
• • • Sir William Parker should support Mr. Wyse in his 
demands for an immediate adjustment thereof. 43 
41 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 553. 
42 Cited in A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery 
in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1971), 35. 
43 Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Ad-
miralty, Foreign Office, November 30, 1848, British and 
Foreign State Papers, XXXIX. 
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On January 3, 1850 the British Fleet of Admiral Parker set 
anchor at Piraeus. The admiral did exactly as he was in-
structed by Palmerston; he went to the British embassy in 
Athens and together with Wyse they visited the Greek Foreign 
Minister. They gave an ultimatum of twenty-four hours for 
their demands to be met otherwise they would be forced to 
44 
execute the orders received from their government. When 
the Greek Foreign Minister told Wyse that the presence of 
the other two representatives of the Protecting Powers was 
required in order for the Greek g~vernment to come to a final 
decision, the British minister simply granted another twenty-
45 
four hour ultimatum. The Greek government did not meet 
the ultimatum so Admiral Parker's fleet proceeded to blockade 
the port of Piraeus and to place under arrest all Greek ves-
sels. Londos, the Greek foreign minister, immediately infor-
med Thouvenel, the French Minister at Athens and Persiany, 
the representative of Russia in Greece. 
Thouvenel wrote, without delay, to Wyse: - - According 
to Article IV of the Treaty of 7 May 1832, Greece is an 
independent monarchy under the guarantee of the three 
Powers. The interdiction which made her dispose freely 
of her war-vessels must be considered as a first blow 
to her independence. Without doubt independence equals 
responsibility and the British government has the right 
to pursue the recovery of her grievances. But the ques-
tion does not present itself only in these simple terms. 
44 Karolides, Historx of the Greeks, III, 465-66. 
45 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 596-97. 
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For the Greek government demands an arbitration which 
conforms with the terms and the spirit of the article 
aforementioned; 46 
Persiany also sent a note of complaint to the British em-
bassy at Athens and both ministers - - of France and Russia 
- - urged Wyse that Londos' suggestion to settle the Greek-
British dispute in the presence of all three representatives 
47 
of the Protecting Powers be accepted. 
Europe was shocked at Palmerson's actions. The Tsar 
wrote a letter to Otho expressing his dissatisfaction with 
British policy towards Greece. He stated that he was very 
displeased with the actions of the British government in 
Greece and he had made his formal protest to the Foreign 
Office. Nicholas advised the king of Greece not to yield 
to the British demands for to do so would mean yielding his 
legitimate claim which belonged to every independent sovereign. 
"It only remains to heal the country's wounds and also to make 
good the losses which recent events have caused to the commerce 
of Greece and Your Majesty can count upon my willingness to 
lighten, for some period of time the pecuniary, burden which 
46 Cited in Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 342-43. 
47 Thouvenel to Wyse, Athens, January 5, 1850, and 
Persiany to Wyse, Athens, January 5, 1850, British and Foreign 
State Papers, XXXIX. Also see for the Greek translation of 
these dispatches Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 555-57. 
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your finances have to bear.'' 48 The press in Greece as well 
as in Europe criticized the actions of Lord Palmerston as 
severe and hostile towards a friendly small nation. 49 Popu-
lar poetry was written and recited by A. Soutso against the 
British imperialists while praises were heard of Russia who 
50 The was assuming the role of the supporter of Greece. 
public mind turned to Russian favoritism and away from the 
Western Powers who seemed always 'to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Greece for their own interests. The layman as 
well as the politically minded Greeks could see that the ~a-
tional interest of Russia as well as of Greece was the dis-
integration of the Ottoman Empire. The Western Powers had 
a policy of supporting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
Their policy, therefore, ran counter to Greek national in-
terests. Furthermore, the Russians viewed the blockade of 
Piraeus as an indirect British display of power to Russia. 
As Professor Karolides explains: 
Russia regarded the Parker events in Greece as a contin-
uation of the British fleet's display of Hellespont, and 
somehow as reprisal to the failure thereof the intended 
British activities; she took from the beginninf of the 
crisis a hostile position at British action. 5 
48 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho. 184, also in 
Petrakakos, History of Greece, 147-49:---
49 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 496. 
5° Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 559-60. 
51 Cited, ibid., 500. 
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On February 7, Nesselrode announced that his government was 
displeased with the hostile activities of the British fleet 
in Greece. The Count criticized Great Britain for reassuring 
the Russian government of the harmonious Anglo-Greek relations 
just before Admiral Parker's fleet entered the Port of Pireaus. 
He also denounced the secrecy of British operations in Greece 
and its insistence on leaving France and Russia, the other two 
Protecting Powers of Greece, in ignorance of British inten-
tions in Greece. He ended his remarks about British involve-
ment in Greece with a strong warning against the illegal 
blockade of Admiral Parker: 
The Imperial Government, commands her ambassador to direct 
towards the British Government serious remarks, asking her 
very seriously to quickly put an end to matters in Greece, 
which are neither necessary and by no means justifiable. 
The prompt acceptance of this measure would indicate to 
the Imperial Government in what manner Great Britain 
wishes to regulate the rest of her relations with the 
Imperial Government. 52 
This announcement of the Russian government motivated France 
to act in the same respect and denounce Palmerstonian diplom-
acy in Greece just as harshly as had Russia, out of fear that 
French influence in Greece might be in danger of being over-
shadowed by that of Russia. Wisely, the Russian government 
allowed France to take the upperhand in the matter since 
French opposition to English policy in the Near East could 
52 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 502-04. 
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only mean the weakening of the Anglo-French alliance which 
53 
resulted from the Near-Eastern Crisis of October 1849. 
On February 7 Drouyn de Lhuys sent a dispatch to 
Palmerston expressing his government's disapproval of the 
hostile actions taken by Britain against Greece without 
54 previous consultation with the French government. Palmer-
ston's answer to Drouyn de Lhuys was very friendly and it 
revealed his fear that France was drawn away from the recent 
Anglo-French alliance, siding on the issue of the Piraeus 
blockade with Russia. He agreed that a French negotiator 
should be appointed to mediate between Britain and France. 
In order to leave the freest scope to the action of the 
French negotiator, Her Majesty's Minister at Athens 
shall be instructed not to mix himself up with the ne-
gotiation of the French Agent, except in5 go far as he may be requested by the Agent to do so. 
Palmerston's kindness to the French in the Greek crisis was 
due not only to the diplomatic reality of a possible Franco-
Russian alliance but also to the internal pressures against 
his mishandling of the British grievances in Greece. The 
British Minister for Foreign Affairs was attacked by the 
53 See Taylor, Mastery in Europe, 34-35. 
54 Drouyn de Lhuys to Palmerston, London, February 7, 
1850, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX. 
55 
Palmerston to Drouyn de Lhuys, Foreign Office, 
February 12, 1850, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX. 
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press, from both Houses and from the Queen for jeopardizing 
the role of Great Britain by mindless actions and by what 
seemed to many a personal foreign policy. In the House of 
Lords, Lord Stanley not only criticized the "ill-advised ex-
pedition to the Dardanelles," but he felt that "we had pro-
ceeded to acts of injustice and violence against a friendly 
foreign Power, or rather, a weak friendly foreign State, the 
very weakness of which state should have been the strongest 
inducement upon our part to exercise that greatest forbear-
ance, whose peculiar position rendered any misunderstanding 
with regard to the affairs of Greece a matter of more impor-
56 tance of the state itself." Palmerston's secrecy regard-
ing his proceedings in the Near East and the official commu-
nication between the Powers and England was also criticized 
57 by Lord Stanley as well as by the House of Commons. 
By the middle of February, the blockade in Greece 
had become a major international matter which was to do the 
greatest damage to the career of Lord Palmerston. "This 
Greek question," wrote Charles Greville, "is the worst scrape 
into which Palmerston had ever got himself and his colleagues. 
The disgust at it here is universal with those who think at 
56 Sessions of February 4, Hansard, 3rd series, 
House of Lords, CVIII, 258. 
57 Sessions of Harch 11, Ibid., 3rd series, CIX, 
645-47. 
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all about foreign matters; it is past all.doubt that it has 
produced the strongest feelings of indignation against this 
country all over Europe, and the ministers themselves are 
conscious what a disgraceful figure they cut, and are ashamed 
58 
of it. 11 
It was agreed by England, Russia and Bavaria that 
France should send a negotiator to Athens in hope of a settle-
ment. Baron Gros was chosen to mediate on behalf of Greece 
and arrived in Athens on 6 March. He began negotiations but 
found progress impossible due to B~itish determination to 
59 
collect full indemnities and to concede nothing. Drouyn 
de Lhuys in London also tried to negotiate a settlement for 
the Anglo-Greek dispute but with no results. In early May, 
the Greek government in Athens informed the French govern-
ment that Lord Palmerston used the demands for indemnity pay-
ments to the British subjects in an extortionist manner to 
humiliate and ridicule the Greek government. This gave cause 
to the government.of Prince Louis-Napoleon to recall its am-
bassador from London and cause a near Anglo-French diplomatic 
58 Charles C.F. Greville, The Greville Memoirs: A 
Journal £i the Reign Queen Victoria from. 1837-1852, II (New 
York, 1885), 425-26. 
59 Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 448-50, see 
also Palmerston to Bloomfield, March 27, 1850, cited in 
Ashley, Palmerston, 196-97. 
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rupture. 60 Palmerston believed that the recalling of Drouyn 
de Lhuys was carried out by the French government as a dis-
play to the public in France of Louis-Napoleon's strong abili-
61 
ties and determined leadership in challenging English policy. 
The House of Lords, however, had a different interpretation 
on the matter. Apparently it was announced that Drouyn de 
Lhuys left London of his own free will when he was actually 
recalled by his government. Upon the news of the truth con-
cerning the recalling of the French minister Palmerston was 
blamed for keeping secret the facxs from both Houses and he 
was once again criticized for jeopardizing the position of 
England in the European community. Lord Brougham stated: 
It turns out that the French government, in the exercise 
of its undoubted discretion, has deemed it to be its duty 
to take a step which has not been taken since the year 
1803 •••• The complaint of the French government is, 
that Lonson is made to focus of all intrigues against its 
existence - - that it is source from which all communica-
tions are made to the "Parti Rouge" - - so called because 
it takes the colour of Blood as its appropriate ensign. 
Yes the "Parti Rouge" takes its orders from the Caussi-
dieres and the other erapulous leaders and miscreants who 
6° For the negotiations of Drouyn de Lhuys in London 
and the rupture of Franco-British relations over the failure 
to reach an agreement in the Greek crisis, see Kyriakides, 
Contemporary Greeks, I, 604-07, also see Karolides, History 
£1 the Greeks, III, 520-25, also Driault, ibid., 352-61. 
61 Pa1merston to Normandy, Foreign Office, May 17, 
1850, cited in Ashley, Palmerston, 201-02. 
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now infest this country after ~~ey h~d been forced to 
desist from infesting France. 
The French government, which felt that Great Britain was ex-
ceeding its power in Greek affairs as granted in the Treaty 
of 1832, was really concerned with its own power which was 
threatened by the presence of the British fleet, but out of 
a Franco-British diplomatic quarrel Greece benefited, if not 
in anything more than the removal of the blockade. Qn July 
6th the negotiating parties reached a settlement in Athens 
and the nightmare which had brought instability to Franco-
British relations and deplorable conditions to Greece was 
63 
over. 
The blockade of Piraeus cost Greece more than the 
180,068 drachmas indemnity damages. The Greek commerce suf-
fered greatly and as a result the already weak economy of 
Greece was seriously damaged. It would be no exaggeration 
to maintain that by far the most damage was inflicted in the 
64 
minds of the Greek people. England, one of the nations 
which once fought for the independence of Greece and signed 
62 Session of May 17, Hansard, 3rd series, House of 
Lords, III, 159-61. 
63 Londos, Greek Foreign Minister, agreed to British 
demands on April 15th but this settlement which was reached 
without the French mediation resulted in a total British dip-
lomatic victory. This was the reason negotiations in London 
were discontinued. 
64 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 520. 
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the treaty which made that country legitimately recognized 
in the European community, came to a point of doing her 
great damage. 
The only one in Greece who really benefited politi-
cally from the blockade was the king. He was viewed as the 
defender of the national rights of the people against the 
65 interventions of foreign powers. Of the three parties, 
the "French," the "English" and the "Russian," the last 
benefited the most from the crisis. France was viewed with 
suspicion by many Greeks for her role in Greece seemed to 
be purely selfish, namely, the curbing of British influence 
66 in the country, whereas Russia was regarded as the only 
true defender of Greek interests. 67 As far as relations 
with England were concerned, Greece got off to a friendly 
start after the settlement of the British grievances but it 
65 The English government thought that the blockade 
would cause political turmoil in the country bringing the 
Court government down from power and making Otho unpopular. 
Furthermore it hoped that the "English" party would benefit 
from all of this and would rise as the popular party. None 
of this occured however. On the contrary the Greek people 
stood firmly behind the king. See Aspreas, Modern Greece, 
182. 
66 Fotiades, Exosis, 141. 
67 Karolides, History of ~Greeks, III, 525-34, 
also L. Th. Laskaris, Diplomatike Historia tes Hellados, 
1821-1914 (Diplomatic History of Greece, 1821-1914) (Athens, 
1947)' 69-70. 
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was not very long before another issue, that of brigandage, 
was to create friction in Anglo-Greek relations. After 
Trikoupis was sent to London as the representative of the 
Kriezes government, Palmerston wrote the following letter to 
Delygiannes, the Greek Foreign Minister: 
I have the honor to assure Your Excellency that Mr. 
Trikoupes has been received and treated with all the 
consideration and regards due to a representative of 
a sovereign with which the Queen desires sincerely to 
maintain relations of the most friendly characte~. I 
avail myself to this occasion to offer to Your Excel-
lency the assurance of the distinguished consideration 
with which I have the honor to be. 68 
This letter was written in December 1850. Nine months later 
the Foreign Office invited the Powers to use their influence 
in Athens to pressure the Greek government to put an end to 
69 brigandage. Even though brigandage was at a considerably 
low level, only to reach its peak in 1854, there was a good 
deal of concern in London with regard to the potential threat 
of brigandage to the Ottoman Empire. 
At the same time that the issue of brigandage was 
brought up there was another crisis developing which was 
to drive Greece even further away from both England and 
France and bring it closer to Russia. 
68 Cited in Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 362. 
69 Ibid. 362-65, for details on the British concern 
on brigandage in Greece. 
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B. Russophilism 1850-1853 
1. The Synodal Tomos 
After the British blockade the attention of the Greek 
public was shifted to ecclesiastical matters. The Greek 
Church had been declared independent and autonomous in 1833 
70 
and had remained so until _1850. As a result of this the 
Patriarch of Constantinople broke off all relations with the 
Greek Church. By 1850, however, it was becoming apparent to 
most Greeks that the Patriarchate desired to reestablish re-
lations with Athens and the reason behind this factor were 
primarily political. Tsar Nicholas was in 1832 opposed to 
an autonomous Greek Orthodox Church, and he resented the 
fact that a Roman Catholic king would assume the role of 
71 
the ceremonial head of an autonomous Orthodox Church. 
After the Anglo-Greek hostilities of 1850 the Tsar urged 
the Synod and the Patriarch in Constantinople to "soften 
72 
their position toward Greece in its moment of crisis." 
The change of attitude toward Otho and the· Greek 
government was due, therefore, to the Tsar's interest in 
penetrating the higher clergy in Greece and in capitalizing 
70 See Laskaris, History of Greece, 53-4. 
71 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 566-67. 
72 Charles E. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and the 
Independent Greece, 1821-1852 (Cambridge, 1969), 173. 
69 
73 
on the recent anti-British movement in the country. Al-
though the Tsar maintained a cool attitude toward the king 
and the Greek government from 1833 to 1850 the "Russian" par-
ty was won over by Kolettes and his anti-Turkish foreign pol-
74 icy. 
By 1850 a great number of people in Greece desired to 
see an end to the existing schism of the Greek Orthodox Church 
and the Patriarchate. The king of Greece also desired the 
same thing but for political and religious reasons. Otho hoped 
that a resolution to the Church controversy would bring him in-
75 
to closer cooperation with the Tsar whose support he needed. 
Missael Apostolides was sent to the Patriarch Anthimos IV deliv-
ering a message written by the Holy Synod of the Church of 
Greece with the desired goal that the Patriarchate would rec-
76 
ognize the Church of Greece. Anthirnos IV rejected the mes-
sage but the Russian minister to the Porte, Titov, who parti-
cipated in the discussions concerning the subject of recogni-
73 The reason that the Tsar and the "Russian" party 
were against an autocephalous church in Greece in 1833 was 
because they wished to exert political influence through the 
Patriarchy in Constantinople. See About, Gr~ce, 178. 
74 Russia did not favor Kolettes, even though the 
"Russian" party did, for the Tsar felt that Kolettes was 
devoted to the king and therefore to an autonomous Greek 
Orthodox Church. See Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 166. 
75 The first to normalize relations between the Greek 
Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate was made by Patriarch 
Anthimos IV in December 1849 when he attended the funeral of 
the devoted servant to Otho in Constantinople (Rizo-Neroulos, 
Minister to the Porte) see Ibid., 171-74. 
76 Kordatos, Hodern Greece, III, 567. 
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tion of the Greek Church, supported it. 77 The Holy Synod 
met again and decided to ask recognition from the Patriarch 
once more, only this time they would present an official 
letter of support to the Synod by Otho. The Patriarch accep-
ted the second request and the king of Greece as well as the 
"Russian" party achieved a great political victory. Nicholas 
was also quite satisfied with the realliance of the Greek 
Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate. He wrote the following 
letter to Otho as soon as he was informed of the recognition 
of the Church by Anthimos IV: 
Sir my Brother, it is with real satisfaction that I re-
ceived from the hands of Archimandite Missael the letter 
of Your Majesty by which it announces to me the canonical 
recognition of the Church of the Greek Kingdom and from 
this Synod by the Patriarchical Ecumenical Throne of Con-
stantinople. It delights me, just as Your Majesty, this 
event, that it responds so well to the desires of the 
people and fulfills one of their spiritual needs, the 
most legitimate so far as it restores the unity and the 
evangelical brotherly relations between her (Greek) Church 
and the other venerable chairs of Orthodox Churches of the 
East and of Russia. It was most particularly pleasant to 
learn that my instructions to my minister at Constantinople 
have contributed to this happy result, to which the solici-
tude of Your Majesty wisely prepared the way. 78 
Not everyone, however, was as happy as Nicholas, Otho and the 
"Russian" party about the results of the Synodal Tome. Many 
progressively minded individuals in Greece opposed the late 
77 Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 175. 
78 Cited in Petrakakos, History of Greece, 151-52. 
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recognition of the Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church 
and believed that it was an insult to the Greek nation that 
the Patriarchate had acted as though no independent Greece 
79 
existed between the period of 1833 to 1850. The British 
government was also displeased with the actions of the Synodal 
Tomes. The British Minister, Wyse, at Athens was stunned 
about the reestablishment of relations between the Greek Church 
and the Patriarchate. He interpreted the recognition of the 
autocephalous Church as a means which Russia used in order to 
exert her influence in the affair~ of Greece. The French Mini-
ster, Sabatier, reacted in the same manner as Wyse. 
It is certain today that M. Titov was the grand agitator 
of this affair at Constantinople and that Russian influ-
ence has dictated the Patriarchical Bull. M. Deliany was 
fooled or seduced but Otho, however, fully accepted the 
results of the Tomos and as a result the Church of Greece 
received the recognition it sought from the Patriarch and 
the Greek government received the moral support of the 
Tsar. 80 
The alliance of the Greek Church with the Patriarchate marked 
the beginning of friendly Greek-Russian relations and the end 
of French support to Greece. The solidarity of the Anglo-
French alliance of October 1849 which was shaken by the Bri-
tish blockade in Greece was restored when Greece chose to side 
79 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 568. 
8° Cited in Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 179-80. 
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with Russia against the Western Powers. This alliance was 
only to become stronger in the following years when the Holy 
places controversy broke out. 
2. The Role of Greece in the Holy Places Question. 
At the same time that the Greek Church was requesting 
recognition from Constantinople, developments leading to one 
of the major crises in the Nineteenth Century were taking 
place in the Middle East. The affair known as the "Holy 
Places Question" began in the middle of 1850 when Louis-
. 
Napoleon decided to demand from the Ottoman Porte Catholic 
81 dominion in the Holy Places. The Sublime Porte decided, 
82 
for purely political and not religious reasons, to grant 
the wishes of the Emperor risking a possible Russo-Turkish 
conflict. The Religious policy of Turkey towards the various 
millets, or religious groupings in the Empire, was very len-
83 ient as all regions were treated with equal respect. Tra-
ditionally, the Orthodox who were the majority in the Empire 
dominated the Holy Places as a privileged religious group. 
So when the Latins requested what seemed to the Sultan's 
government religious rights in the Holy Places their wish 
was granted for it was in accordance with the law. "By a 
81 General Aupick, French Ambassador at Constanti-
nople, made the first demand in 1850. H.W.V. Temperley, 
England and the Near East, The Crimea (London, 1939), 287, 
82 Ibid., 287-88. 
83 Ann Pottinger Saab, The Origins of the Crimean 
Alliance (Charlottesville, 1977), 5-6. 
r 
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note February 9, 1852, it (the Sublime Porte) directed that 
the keys of the north and south gates of the great church at 
Bethlehem and of the grotto of the Holy Manger 'must be given' 
to the Latins, 'as of old' and they were allowed to erect a 
silver star adorned with the French arms in the shrine of the 
84 The French had not counted on direct Russian nativity." 
85 
interference in the Holy Places Question: they thought in-
stead that since this was a matter of religion it would be 
handled by the Patriarchate in Constantinople which represen-
86 
ted the Orthodox millet. Napoieon III used a religious 
matter for diplomatic reasons, namely, to harm "Russia and 
the Holy Alliance, surely normal activity for a Bonaparte 
87 
ruler." Due to the religious controversy over the Holy 
84 Miller, The Ottoman Empire, 200. 
85 Professor Stavrou maintains that the Holy Places 
had become a Russian interest center during the decade of 
the 40's of the nineteenth century. At the same time French 
interest also began increasing in that part of the world so 
"this produced a religious and diplomatic debate involving 
directly Russia and France." The confrontation therefore 
which broke out into a major diplomatic war in the early 1850's 
had its origins a decade earlier. See G.T. Stavrou, "Russian 
Interest in the Levant 1843-1848" Middle East Journal, 17 
(1963): 91-103. 
86 Saab, Crimean Alliance, 10. 
87 Ibid., 11. See also Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian 
Empire, 1801-1917 (Oxford, 1967), 864. 
74 
Places, "Franco-Russian relations deteriorated considerably 
to the point that neither side was totally satisfied with 
88 
the Turkish settlement of the affair. 
During this crisis the Greeks and the "Orthodox" 
party, composed of radical pro-Russian elements, sided with 
Russia against the Roman Catholic French. Russophilism was 
constantly increasing in Greece and the spirit of revolt and 
war against the Turks was once again haunting the country. 
A rising in Montenegro which began as an internal strife con-
tributed to the existing anti-Turkish atmosphere in Greece. 
Prince Danilo, the ruler (the vladika) of Montenegro, attemp-
ted, after he succeeded his uncle Peter II in 1851, to make 
Montenegro more independent from the central control of 
89 Turkey. A minor incident between Montenegrins and Turkish 
authorities was turned into a major Ottoman invasion at the 
request of Orner Pasha, a military leader who became governor 
of Bosnia Hercegovina and Montenegro in 1850. 
The revolutionary activities in Montenegro, whose 
cause was supported by Austria, and the events of the Holy 
Places set the atmosphere for revolution in Greece. Forth-
88 V.J. _Puryear, England, Russia~ the Straits 
Question, 1844-1856 (Berkeley, 1931), 197. 
89 Saab, Crimean Alliance, 19, also see for details 
on the rising of Montenegro Temperley, The Crimea, also 
F.L. Stevenson, A History £f Montenegro-rLondon, 1912),183-84. 
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Rouen, the French Charge d'Affaires in Athens wrote to Paris 
that the conflict in the Holy Places had brought the "Russian" 
party in Greece real strength. He noted further that the 
flag of religion which had often been used in Greece, was 
brought out again. "Religion is in danger and its children 
are called once more to run to its defence. • • • Religion 
is in Greece a powerful element of intrigue, and in repre-
senting Catholicism as invading, as menacing Orthodoxy •• 
90 
one is sure to move the spirits profoundly." France and 
England became increasingly worried when Otho appointed 
Stavro Vlahos, a prominent member of the "Russian" party, a 
Minister of Worship. Wyse and Forth-Rouen were concerned 
with the Russophilism of the king as well as of the public. 
The "Orthodox" party which was totally devoted to Russia was 
becoming more powerful by 1850 and its activities were widely 
publicized. 91 The Papoulakos movement became an instrument 
of the 11 0rthodox 11 party openly to express its hostilities 
against the Catholics, the Liberals - - "French 11 and 11 Eng-
lish" parties - - as well as the Catholic king. 
90 Cited in Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 184. 
91 Chrisoforos Papoulakos was a monk who apparently 
went mad - - had a vision - - and went around the country 
preaching that all evils in Greece were due to the Catholic 
king, Otho. The "Orthodox" party decided to capitalize on 
this situation of the mad-man in order to revenge the·king 
who was responsible for throwing out of the government the 
prominent Russophile Kolokotrones, and also for becoming the 
ceremonial head of the Greek Orthodox Church while he re-
mained a Catholic and refused to convert to the religion of 
,.. 
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The representative in Athens of France and England 
mostly blamed the king for the Russian extremism among the 
public. They felt that Otho was reflecting Tsarist policy 
against the interests of the Western Powers in the Near East. 
Upon the appointment of Vlachos, Wyse commented that the man 
whom Otho chose to be his Minister of Worship, "is little 
qualified by his want of religious moderation for the oner-
ous duties of an office become lately of peculiar responsi-
bility." 92 Neither the British nor the French would rea-
lize that Otho was not acting as an agent of the Russians 
against the Near Eastern interests of the Western Powers 
but that he was acting in accordance with the "Megali Idea" 
policy which he hoped would bring him personal glory. 
C. The Menshikov Mission and Greek Reaction 
On January 14, 1853 Nesselrode wrote to Brunnow: 
To the indignation of the whole Greek population follow-
ing the Greek rite, the key of the Church of Bethlehem 
has been made over to the Latins, so as publicly to dem-
onstrate their religious supremacy in the East. The mis-
chief is done, and there is no longer any question of 
preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy it. 
Nesselrode added: 
the Greek people. For details see Fotiades, The Exile, 167-
78, also Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 582-88. 
92 Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 185-86. 
• 
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The (Russian) emperor is very irritated with the Sultan 
and thinks it necessary to intimidate him to avoid being 
obliged later to come seriously and actually to war, 
which according to him must at all costs be avoided, 
whether in the East or West. 93 
The measure taken by the Tsar to put an end to the Holy Places 
controversy was to send Prince Sergeevich Aleksandr Menshikov, 
head of the Naval Ministry, to Constantinople with a set of 
Russian demands to present to the Ottoman government. The 
Menshikov mission was doomed to failure for its purpose as 
revealed in the Russian demands was one which invited hostili-
94 
ties by the Great Powers and the .Sultan's government. 
As was anticipated by Nesselrode the negotiations of 
Prince Menshikov and the Turkish authorities were a failure 
when it was apparent that the Sublime Porte refused to comply 
with a number of the Tsar's requests and especially the re-
quest "for a note from the Sultan to the Tsar, pronouncing 
his intentions with reference to Greek Christians and guaran-
95 
teeing Russian rights in Turkey." The government and most 
Greeks anxiously awaited developments of a Russo-Turkish con-
flict, They would then be able to strike at the Turks in 
the provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia in order to 
93 Cited in Temperley, The Crimea, 303 • 
94 M.S. Anderson, The Great Powers and the Near East, 
1774-1923 (Documents of Modern History) (London:-1970), ~ 
95 Puryear, The Straits Ouestion, 261. 
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free all Greeks from the Ottoman yoke and also expand the 
national boundaries of Greece. Then the unexpected occurred. 
Prince Menshikov's aide-de-camp, Admiral Kornilov arrived in 
Athens on 15 March 1853 on the war steamer, "Bessarabia.'' 
The visit, the Russians explained publicly, was due to the 
Admiral's archeological and historical interests. For the 
Western Powers, the Greek government and the people of Greece, 
the Kornilov visit was somehow politically connected to the 
Menshikov mission. On March 17th, the day the Russian war 
vessel departed from Athens to Constantinople the British 
Minister at Athens wrote to the Earl of Clarendon about the 
Kornilov visit to Athens expressing his dissatisfaction and 
96 
suspicions about it. Forth-Rouen was even more apprehen-
sive about the unexpected visit of Kornilov to Greece. He 
expressed his fear that a visit such as the one the Admiral 
made would have grave consequences in the public mind es-
pecially when Russo-Turkish negotiation settlements were 
prepared for the rights of Christian subjects in the Ottoman 
97 
Empire. 
Five days after the ''Bessarabia" had left the port 
of Pireaus, Wyse had met with the Turkish Charge d'Affaire, 
Nechid Bey, in Athens to discuss the Kornilov visit. Wyse 
96 F.O. 32/205, Wyse to Claredon, Athens, March 17, 
1853. 
97 Grice 61 (Files 196-201) Rousen to Drouyn de 
Lhuys, Athens, March 27, 1853. 
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wrote to Clarendon that: 
Nechid Bey said that whatever might be given to the con-
trary he was convinced that the visit was political. He 
brought dispatches for Mr. Persiany with whom he was in 
continual communication and had on the day of his arri-
val a private audience with the king of two hours. The 
'.'Bessarabia" war steamer which brought him here, left 
Constantinople after midnight, and her departure and 
destination were kept so secret, that it was not known 
that she had gone till the next day, and then it was be-
lieved for exercise to the sea of Marmora. It. is also 
to be added that the Admiral returned to Constantinople 
in utmost speed, though Prince Menshikov it is under-
stood remains there for some months. Mr. Persiany de-
nied all this; he stated to me the other day that the 
Admiral came for personal objects only, ~ he had ~ 
private interview with the king, and that he leaves 
Prince Menshikov and the mis~ion for Russia immediately 
on his return to Constantinople. 98 
If the French and British representatives were suspecting 
the Russian government's intentions concerning Greece they 
had every right to do so since events made the Russian posi-
tion a suspicious one. Contrary to the suspicions of Forth-
Rouen and Wyse, however, the Russians had no intention of 
arousing excitement against Turkey in Greece since the Tsar 
determined to avoid war 99 and as long as Prince Menshi-was 
kov was in Constantinople there was a chance of a peaceful 
settlement. "Persiany," writes Dr. Donta, "tried to con-
vince the Greek government to prevent the press from pre-
98 F.O. 32/205, Confidential, Wyse to Claredon, Athens, 
March 23, 1853. The same observations are made by Rouen, see 
Grece 61 (No. 25) Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, March 27, 
1853. 
99 Theodore Martin maintains that the Tzar had told 
Seymour that he opposed an extension of the Greek state, but 
a few months later Russian agents were preparing the Greeks 
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senting to the people a misleading picture of Russia press-
100 
ing for war against Turkey." The Menshikov mission, how-
ever, was interpreted in Greece by the people as well as by 
the authorities as an indication of increased Russian power 
in Constantinople. 
The king and the Greek government thought that the 
Tsar's plans did not include a Russo-Turkish war nor did 
they include the reestablishment of a Byzantine Empire with 
101 Otho as the emperor. Even though Paicos, the Greek 
foreign minister, tried to reassure the representatives of 
France and England that no hostilities would be undertaken 
against the Turks, and even though Fort-Rouen strongly urged 
the Greek government to suppress the anti-Turkish and pro-
102 Russian propaganda in the press, the public mind was pre-
for a war against Turkey in the frontier. He further claims 
that Russia helped in organizing troops for the insurrection 
and that on March 2, 1854 Count Nesselrode sent a note to all 
Russian representatives abroad "in which active support of 
Russia to the movement was promised •••• " It is highly 
doubtful that Russia gave any support to the Greek insurrec-
tion of 1854 other than moral support. The insurrection as 
it will become clear in the following pages was the work of 
the Greeks and the Greek government. Theodore Martin, The 
Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort, III, (London, 
1877), 53-4. 
100 D. Donta, E Hellas kai ai Dynameis kata ton Krimai-
kon Polemon (Greece and the Powers During the Crimean War) 
(Thessalonike, 1973), 23. 
101 Ibid., 23, also see M.S. Anderson, Near East, 69. 
''(d) Reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire, (e) Reunion 
with Greece, (f) Impossibility of both." 
102 Gr~ce 61 (no. 27) Fort-Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, 
Athens, April 7, 1853. 
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pared by the "Russian" party propaganda and by the nationa-
list press, which continuously exalted the Megali Idea, for 
a Greek-Turkish conflict. In a dispatch on the state of the 
public mind in Greece, Wyse reported the following: 
"Religion 11 and 11 race" the two great objects from princi-
ple and passion, of Greek devotion, are used as watch-
words to stimulate the popular enthusiasm. Heterias 
never extinguished are again rising. Their organization 
has been long familiar to every Greek and it requires not 
time nor discipline but opportunity to bring them into 
action. 103 
Wyse went on to report that the only ones in Greece who were 
against Russia and did not support a policy of irredentism 
and Greek-Turkish conflicts were the professional and com-
mercia! classes, but that the king and the "Russian" party 
104 
were in favor of territorial expansion. The commercial 
105 
class was against Russia and a policy of expansion for 
the simple reason that a war against Turkey on the side of 
Russia would be inviting another blockade as in 1850, if not 
an actual war by the Western Powers against Greece. Such a 
103 F.O. 32/205, Confidential, Wyse to Claredon, 
Athens, March 23, 1853. 
104 The government at the opening stages of the 
Greek-Turkish hostilities was made up of individuals loyal 
to the Crown! The Minister of Foreign Affairs was A. Paicos, 
the Minister of Worship and Education was s. Vlahos, the Mini-
ster of War, Spiromelios, all affiliated members of the "Rus-
sian" party. The Prime Minister Admiral Kriezes, Minister 
of the Interior, Riga Palmides, and Minister of Justice Sp. 
Pelikas all were affiliated with the "French" party. Of all 
the ministers only Pelikas showed any definite signs of op-
position to inviting hostilities between Greece and Turkey. 
105 Commercial class included primarily Greeks in-
volved in navigation and trading. For details on the com-
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conflict would have a disastrous outcome for the commercial 
class which did a great deal of business with the West. The 
idea of a Greek-Turkish war appealed to the masses, however, 
who were constantly under the propaganda machine of the Greek 
religion and press. These people knew nothing of power poli-
tics and were not, as Wyse and Fort-Rouen presented them, 
more inclined to favor Russia than the Western Powers for any 
other reason than perhaps the common religion and common enemy 
- - Turkey. As one prominent historian of Greek diplomatic 
history explains: 
The unofficial Greece, however, in the exhortation of 
Russian extremists, had as its only purpose the dynamic 
realization of the Megali Idea, because as it proclaimed, 
the existing suffocating restricted boundaries did not 
permit Greece to evolve into a contemporary and organized 
state. 106 
mercia! families in Greece and their growth see Petropoulos, 
Kingdom of Greece, 56-7. 
106 Donta, ~ Crimean War, 24. 
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CHAPTER III 
GREEK-TURKISH HOSTILITIES IN 1853 AND 
ANGLO-FRENCH REACTION 
A. Causes of the 1854 Greek-Turkish Conflict and 
Anglo-French Reaction to Greek Foreign Policy 
The Turkish provinces of Thessaly and Epirus were 
predominately populated by Greeks at the outbreak of the 
Crimean War. According to one French official 1 in 1850 
the population of Thessaly ranged from 350,000 to 400,000 
inhabitants. From the total population only 70,000 were 
Turks. In Epirus the population was approximately 450,000 
2 
with two thirds Christian and one third Moslem. 
In a part of the world where religion and common 
heritage were regarded as the binding forces of all Greeks 
it was only natural that after the War of Independence 
1 E. Grasset to General Lafitte, Salonique, tom. 24 
(1850-1858), 82-107, Thessalonike, 24-12-1850, cited in 
Elias Pangiotes Georgiou, "Gallikou Schediou Aposbeseos tes 
Thessalikes Epanastaseos tou 1854" (French Plans to Extin-
guish the Revolt of Thessaly in 1854) Thessalika Chronika, 
(Athens, 1965), 746. Nomikos, "International Position of 
Greece" has the Thessaly population at 250,000 of whom four 
fifths were moslem. The source for these figures is ques-
tionable this is why I have chosen to use the figures de-
rived from French documentations. 
2 Nomikos, "International Position of Greece," 83. 
83 
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nationalist uprisings would take place in an effort to "li-
berate" all Greeks from Turkish domination. The geographi-
cal position of Thessaly and Epirus as well as Macedonia 
facilitated the attempt of the Greek nationalists to revolt 
against the Turks in 1854. These provinces which were pre-
dominately populated by Christians and were adjacent to 
Greece were subject to constant raids from brigands ever 
since the War of Independence. 
The brigandage acts carried out by Greeks on Greek 
soil as well as on Turkish - - Thessaly and Epirus - - were 
not entirely acts of looting but were primarily intended to 
stimulate insurrection in the Turkish provinces. Such acts 
led to the break of relations between Greece and Turkey and 
eventually into a war in 1854. There is a complexity of 
reasons as to how and why brigands were turned into profes-
sional revolutionaries and brigandage became a means of ex-
pressing the nationalist commitments of the Greek people. 
Although many brigand chiefs who took part in the rising of 
Epirus, Thessaly and Chalcidice in 1854 were determined 
nationalists who needed no external agitation to drive them 
to fight the Turks, many were recruited by the Greek govern-
ment either directly or indirectly, and still others joined 
the brigand bands after they came under the enormous propa-
3 ganda of the "Russian" party and the Greek Court. 
3 Greek brigands of Asia Minor influenced by anti-
Turkish propaganda were transported on Greek ships to the 
85 
A recent study of the insurrection of 1854 in Thes-
saly entitled The Insurrection of 1854 and the Thessaly Under-
4 
taking presents the events which led to the war of 1854 as 
purely acts of liberation on behalf of the Greek people who 
sought to free themselves and their brothers who were living 
in the Ottoman Provinces. As it will become apparent towards 
the end of this chapter there is a certain amount of truth 
to this thesis, but to go as far as equating the revolution 
of 1854 with the War of Independence as not only Professor 
Koutroumbas has done but other Greek historians as well, is 
misleading if not biased. The reality of the Greek-Turkish 
conflict and the events which led to it are too complex to 
be dismissed as another war of independence. 
The Montenegro rising, the Holy Places controversy, 
the Menshikov mission, and the Kornilov visit to Athens were 
all elements which contributed to an already critical situa-
tion between the Turks and the Greeks. Naturally, tensions 
ran just as high on the Turkish side as they did on the Greek. 
The Sublime Porte feared that serious trouble on the Greek-
Turkish frontiers would be stirred up by the Greek brigands. 
On March 2nd, 1853, Metaxas, Greek minister to Constantinople 
Agean Islands with a final destination of Thessaly. Donata, 
~ Crimean War, 25. 
4 D.G. Koutroumbas, E Epanastasis tou 1854 kai ai en 
Thessalia, Idia Epicheireseis (The Revolution of 18~and the 
Thessaly Undertaking) (Athens, 1976). 
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and a member of the "Russian" party, informed Paicos that 
Rifaat Pasha, the new Turkish foreign minister, informed him 
that the Ottoman government threatened to take possession of 
two villages on the Greek-Turkish frontier which were legally 
5 
occupied by the Greeks. The Turkish foreign minister claimed 
in a dispatch to the Greek government that the villages 6 leg-
ally belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the Sub-
lime Porte claimed the villages under its authority because 
of the universal brigandage which threatened the peace of the 
Ottoman Empire. Rifat further asflerted that the Sublime Porte 
had no d~sire to go through another struggle with revolution-
7 aries as it had recently in Montenegro. 
The Turkish occupation of villages, which the Greeks 
claimed legally belonged to them, triggered a number of inci-
dents which intensified hostile feelings between the Greeks 
and the Turks. The Greek government, which really sought an 
opportunity for confrontation with the Sublime Porte made no 
effort to compromise, that is to say, to take measures to 
5 A.Y.E. 1853 4/la (no. 330), Metaxas to Paicos, 
Constantinople, March 2, 1853. 
6 The real concern of the Greek government was over 
the 3,000 armed Turkish troops concentrated on ~he Thessaly-
Epirus frontier. Donta, The Crimean War, 26-7. 
7 A.Y.E. 1853 4/la (No.54), Copy (Dispatch of the 
Turkish Foreign Minister). 
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repress brigandage on the frontiers in order to relieve ten-
sions and reassure the Turkish authorities of their peaceful 
intentions. Instead Paicos wrote the following letter to 
Metaxas challenging the latest Turkish acts in the Provinces: 
The Ottoman Porte has forgotten it seems, that the sepa-
rate Ottoman State's boundaries in Greece stretched under 
the terms of the three Great Powers under whose guarantee 
Greece remains, and therefore the present question cannot 
be solved by taking the law into one's own hand arbitrarily 
but the consent of the three Guarantors is required. 8 
Paicos proceeded to inform the Greek people of the presence 
of Turkish troops on the frontiers which intended to take 
over the Greek villages. By thus provoking the anti-Turkish 
sentiments of the public, Paicos and the Greek government 
hoped to gain public support in order to justify sending 
troops to the Epirus-Thessaly frontiers to counter the action 
of the Sublime Porte. Nothing could be more dangerous and 
explosive than the presence of both Greek and Turkish troops 
on the frontier, for immediately the Greeks in Thessaly and 
Epirus thought that the time for a showdown had finally ar-
9 
rived and they were preparing for war. 
Neshid Bey, the Ottoman Charge d'Affaires at Athens, 
complained to both representatives of the two Western Powers 
8 A.Y.E. 1853 4/la (No. 1393), Paicos to Metaxas, 
Athens, March 19, 1853. 
9 Donta, The Crimean War, 28. 
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about the action taken by the Greek government on the Greek-
Turkish frontier. On March 23rd he informed Wyse that Greek 
emissaries in Albania and neighboring Provinces had been ac-
tive. He further complained that the Greek emissaries and 
brigands who were on the frontier and in the Provinces of 
Epirus, Albania and Thessaly were connected with the parties 
in Greece and acted under the watchful eye of Greek authori-
ties. Neshid Bey also complained about the Brigands in Asia 
Minor and the islands and especially Crete. All these events 
were taking place under the eyes·of Greek authorities who 
10 
allowed them to continue. 
Wyse informed Clarendon, the British foreign secre-
tary, that Neshid Bey related these complaints of his govern-
ment to Paicos but, 
Mr. Paicos in answer to these remonstrances had promised 
nothing: nor did he (Nehid Bey) expect from what he had 
already seen anything really effective from the Greek 
government. At the same time he was convinced that if 
his representations continued to be disregarded, this 
indifference sooner or later would infallibly lead to 
open dissensions and disturbances in the Turkish villages 11 
and to consequences he need not say, the most disastrous. 
Forth-Rouen also reported to Paris that even though Paicos re-
assured him that the mission of Scarlata Soutzo and his troops 
10 F.O. 32/205, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, March 23, 1853. 
ll Ibid. 
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to the frontier was to put an end to brigandage, the Greek 
troops were there for security reasons only. Forth-Rouen ex-
plained to Drouyn de Lhuys, French foreign minister, that in 
spite of these reassurances the presence of Greek troops gath-
ered on the frontier could only have negative consequences and 
leave an impression of tensions among the Greeks of the Prov-
12 
inces. 
The Greek government was well aware of British, French 
and Russian policy in the Near East and especially Greece. 
All three Powers maintained that.Greece should not be enlarged 
at the cost of Turkish territory. Greece had experienced dev-
astating consequences as a result of her long antagonism with 
Great Britain during the Kolettes ministry and later during 
the "Court governments" with the Pacifico and Finlay claims. 
After the Holy Places question her good relations with France 
deteriorated as both the court and the people sided with Rus-
sia. At the opening of the Menshikov negotiations the Greek 
government was composed primarily of Russophiles and royal-
13 ists, an indication that the king was blind to Near-Eastern 
policy of the Western Powers. 
12 Gr:ce 61 (No. 33), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, 
April 1, 1853. 
13 Paicos, Foreign Minister, Vlachos, Minister of Edu-
cation and Religion and Sp. Melios, Minister of War, were all 
members of the "Russian" party and were supported by Queen 
Amalia. A Krieze, Prime Minister and Minister of the Navy, 
R. Palamedes, Minister of the Interior, and s. Pelikas, Mini-
ster of Justice, were moderate pro-French politicians who 
would support the Crown and the "Russian" party. 
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Otho and his Russophile ministers chose to disregard 
all realities of international politics and pursued a risky 
policy of antagonizing the Sublime Porte. In the first week 
of April, reports showed that regular and irregular troops 
numbering one thousand two hundred were sent from Athens to 
the frontier near Lamia by orders of the government. This 
action was taken on behalf of Greek authorities without in-
forming the representatives of France and England and Neshid 
Bey. This arbitrary action greatly alarmed both Wyse and 
Forth-Rouen who immediately reque·sted a conference with 
Paicos and demanded an explanation of the Greek government's 
hostile moves towards the Ottoman Empire. Paicos explained 
that the reason the troops were sent to the frontier was be-
cause Rifaat Pasha had threatened forcibly to take the two 
villages which were rightfully inhabited by Greeks. Forth-
Rouen and Wyse warned Paicos of the damaging consequences a 
Greek military occupation of the villages could have but 
Paicos reassured the two ministers stating that Greec~ would 
14 
abstain from any military advances on the frontier. Wyse 
in a private meeting with Forth-Rouen found that the French 
minister was as worried about the turn of events in Greece 
as he was. When the British minister visited Persiany to 
14 Gr~ce 61 (No. 33), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, 
Athens, April 1, 1853, also F.o. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, April 7, 1853. 
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find out what his feelings about the late developments in the 
frontiers were, he was surprised to hear that the Russian min-
ister also was not informed about the Greek military opera-
tions on the frontier. Persiany sympathized with his French 
and British colleagues and pledged his full support and coop-
15 
eration to them in this crisis. 
The cooperation between the Protecting Power's rep-
resentatives and Paicos reassurances to maintain peace on the 
frontiers left Wyse, Rouen and Persiany optimistic about the 
future conditions in Greece although they both expressed con-
cern about the revolutionary and warlike state of mind of 
Greek public opinion. Reacting to the pressure of the three 
Powers and fearing another blockade such as the one that had 
taken place in 1850) the Greek government temporarily retreated 
from any further agitation with the Turks. Public opinion, 
however, influenced by the propaganda of the press, and es-
pecially Aion, the organ of the "Russian" party, openly ex-
pressed its anti-Turkish and pro-Russian sentiments; it was 
ready for a conflict. An article, which appeared in Aion 
written as an address to the English state reveals the nature 
of propaganda to which the Greek public mind was exposed. 
15 Gr~ce 61 (No. 33), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, 
Athens, April 1, 1853, also F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, April 7, 1853. 
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We love Russia because she crushed the head of the Turk 
which you want to lift again and to last forever. The 
all powerful and magnificent eagle of the North, which 
possesses seven parts of Europe, who has advanced to the 
new frontiers, the Emperor Nicholas occupied Dacia and 
Moldavia in the end forcing the English to renounce their 
protection over the Ionians in favor of the future Hellen-
ic Empire, which it will restore in opportune time Dacia 
and Moldavia. 16 
The Greek Court took no measures to curb propaganda in the 
press for it wishes that the public be indoctrinated with 
ideas which conformed to the Megali Idea. Demonstrations 
and protest gatherings directed against Turkey were allowed 
to continue in Athens, in spite o~ solemn promises made to 
Wyse and Forth-Rouen and to Turkey by Paicos that Greeks de-
17 
sired peace. Not only were the anti-Turkish demonstra-
tions and propaganda allowed to continue, but the Greek gov-
18 
ernment encouraged and supported them. 
After the Sultan, Abdul-Mejid, had made up his mind 
not to give in any more to Russia's demands even if it meant 
going to war, the Ottoman Empire was determined to take strong 
measures to deal with Greece, Rifaat Pasha who replaced Fuad 
as foreign minister demanded from the embassy in Constantinople 
that the Greek troops on the frontier be removed, otherwise the 
16 Cited in Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 376. 
17 F.O. 32/206 (copie), Paicos to Neshid Bey, Athens, 
April 5, 1853. 
18 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 600. 
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19 Turkish government would resort to armed force. The last 
thing France and England wanted was another Greek-Turkish 
conflict over two insignificant villages, during the time 
when Russo-Turkish relations were becoming more strenuous. 
Both Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys instructed their ministers 
in Constantinople to intervene between the Sublime Porte and 
20 Greece in order to settle the dispute diplomatically. 
The Greek troops by the middle of April numbered two 
thousand. A firm indication that Greece was no more looking 
for a peaceful settlement than was Turkey. Paicos insisted, 
however, that the troops were to suppress brigandage and not 
to begin a war. 21 When a conference took place in Constan-
tinople between the Greek and Ottoman legations "the three 
Protecting Powers provided that the Greek government on its 
side would immediately withdraw the troops lately concentra-
ted on the frontier and thus obviate the necessity on the 
part of the Sublime Porte of augmenting its force in the 
22 
same direction." In spite of the efforts of the three 
Powers (Turkey, France and England) to have the Greek troops 
removed from the frontier, the Greeks did not recall a single 
19 Donta, ~ Crimean War, 31-2. 
20 Ibid., 32-3. 
21 F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 26, 
1853. 
22 F.o. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 29, 
1853. 
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23 
soldier back to Athens. This indicated that the Greek 
government was not at all serious about maintaining peace 
with Turkey. In reality Greece was looking for an oppor-
tunity to start a war. 
The break in diplomatic relations between Russia 
24 
and Turkey on May 17th and the four-hundredth anniversary 
of the Fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1853, helped to set 
the stage for great expectations by the Greek people and, es-
pecially, by king Otho. 
Now that the Russians had struck at the Turks, the long-
awaited moment for increasing his dominions seemed at 
hand; greater men than Otho might be excused for yield-
ing to this temptation. He would never remember that 
the guarantee of Greek independence by the Protecting 
Powers was, in a sense, a two edged weapon. These Powers, 
or at any rate England and France would be as anxious to 
protect the existing frontiers of Turkey as those of 
Greece. 25 
If the king was blinded by the expansionist ideas which he 
formulated largely under the influence of Kolettes, his minis-
ters and many politicians who embraced the foreign policy of 
"Megali Idea" were deceived by looking back at the position 
of France and England during the War of Independence. Many 
Greeks felt that, in case of a Russo-Turkish conflict, Greece 
should strike in the Northern Provinces, and if the takeover 
of the Provinces was successful they argued, the Western Powers 
23 F.o. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, May 13, 
I 1853, also see Grece 61 (No. 32), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, 
Athens, April 22, 1853. 
24 See Temperley, The Crimea, 324-29 • 
. --
25 Bower & Bolitho, Otho l• 190-91. 
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would not try to intervene. A similar situation had occurred 
during the War of Independence, with the only difference be-
ing that there was no Greek state to fight against Turkey, 
only Greeks. In 1853, however, if Greece would strike against 
Turkey this would mean official declaration of war of one coun-
try against another, which could very well mean that Turkey's 
allies would come to her aid in case of war. Many chose not 
to follow this course of reasoning and rely on history in-
stead hoping that it would repeat itself in their favor. The 
realities of international polit~cs, however, were quite dif-
ferent than the reality conceived by most officials in the 
Greek government. 
The Western Powers had a much greater problem to 
solve in order to allow Greece to become an obstacle in their 
Near Eastern policy. On May 7th Wyse sent a formal letter to 
Paicos expressing "the regret of her Majesty's government that 
at a moment when it was so manifestly desirable to preserve 
the public tranquility, measures should have been adopted by 
the Greek government which could not fail to produce the 
greatest public excitement." 26 The efforts of the "Russian" 
party continued to press for open hostilities against Turkey. 
With the exception of the small professional class and the 
classes of merchants and businessmen, the majority of the 
2 6 A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos (copy) Athens, May 7, 
1853. 
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country the peasants and much of the working class supported 
27 
the "Russian" party and the king. The actions, military 
or brigandage, taking place in the Provinces against the Turks 
were wholeheartedly supported by the masses in Greece. Towards 
the end of May a band of brigands from Lamia murdered the ex-
demarch (mayor) of Eubea and wounded several persons while 
the two thousand troops of the Greek government were stationed 
in the frontiers with their only purpose being to suppress 
brigandage, and maintain tranquility. 
During the time that hosti~e actions were taking place 
on the Greek-Turkish frontiers and were allowed to continue un-
der the watchful eye of the Greek local authorities, the gov-
ernment in Athens placed an order for twenty-five thousand to 
twenty-seven thousand rifles from France which were to be 
28 
shipped without delay to the National Arsenals. The French 
government obviously turned down the request but the fact that 
the Greeks ordered arms from the French with the covert inten-
tion of using them against the Turks shows their naivite about 
international politics. The irony of this entire affair is 
that Paicos continued to reassure Wyse of the Greek peaceful 
intentions towards the Ottoman Empire 29 while the intelli-
27 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 599-600. 
28 F.o. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 2, 1853. 
29 A.Y.E. 1853 (copie), Paicos to Wyse, Athens, May 13, 
1853, also A.Y.E. 1853 (copie) Paicos to Wyse, Athens, May 26, 
1853. 
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gence reports of the British Legation in Athens indicated 
that Greece was indeed preparing for war or an organized 
revolt in the provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Chaliidice. 
The efforts of the Western Powers after the month of 
May to neutralize Greece in case of a possible open war be-
tween Russian and Turkey became more intense. On June 4th 
Wyse sent a dispatch to Paicos pointing out the determina-
tion of the Western Powers to maintain the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed by 
the Earl of Clarendon to state to you that her Majesty's 
Government have had much reason to complain of the Greek 
Government for sending troops to the Frontier and keep-
ing their intentions secret from the representatives of 
the three Powers at Athens; that at a moment, when it was 
important to allay invitation these troops were sent un-
der circumstances calculated to increase and to turn to 
account the pressure of Prince Menshikoff and Constanti-
nople and the unfounded rumors currently respecting the 
object of his mission; that in thus causing excitement, 
and creating false hopes, in the minds of the Greek peo-
ple the Greek Government have displayed a want of judge-
ment as well as knowledge of the policy of the Great Po-
wers of Europe, who have never been more firmly deter-
mined than at the present time, to maintain the integrity 
and independence of the Turkish Empire. 30 
Even though this warning dispatch came as a shock to the Greek 
government and took by surprise both Persiany and Forth-Rouen, 
it cannot be argued that the British government had not warned 
Greece before about its hostilities towards Turkey and that 
Clarendon was not justified in taking such extreme measures 
to warm Greece about any anticipated plans of war against its 
30 A.Y.E. 1853 4/lc, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, June 4, 
1853, also, F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, June 4, 1853. 
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31 
neighbor. The British suspicions about Greek anticipa-
tion of war were well founded. The British and Ottoman in-
telligence had discovered that, as early as June, Greeks 
from London, Vienna, Trieste collected funds in order to aid 
the Greek population in Turkey in case of war. 32 
France was as concerned about the developments in the 
frontiers as England. The Quai d'Orsay had been informed 
that the Orthodox, pro-Russian Greeks, identified with the 
Russian cause and that Greece would find herself in danger 
if she followed a policy which endangered the interests of 
33 the Western Powers in the Near East. 
At the same time troubles and incidents among the 
irregular troops stationed on the Greek Turkish frontier and 
31 Dr. Donta argues that there was no call for such 
harsh warning by Clarendon to Greece, since it could do little 
good and even perhaps cause the Greek government and the peo-
ple to become more attached to Russia. It remains, however, 
that the Greek government had done nothing to show that the 
troops in the frontiers would be removed and furthermore brigan-
dage continued to grow. Given that the Greek court government 
and the majority of the people were turning pro-Russian and 
anti-Turkish there was very little else Clarendon could do un-
der such circumstances. For Donta's argument see.!..!!.!. Crimean 
Har, 44-5. 
32 F.O. 32/207, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 17, 1853. 
33 See Grece 62 (No. 47), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, 
June 7, 1853. France was also concerned over the fact that 
Menshikov had frequently visited the Greek Charge d'Affaires 
while in Constantinople. See Grece 62 (No. 49), Rouen to 
Drouyn de Lhuys, June 10, 1853. 
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the residents began to annoy the Turkish authorities. Also 
the Greek press kept increasing its anti-Turkish propaganda 
and was not at all discouraged by the government's injunc-
tion to refrain from attacking a friendly neighboring nation. 
Finally, Nechet Bey complained about the developments in 
Greece which placed the Ottoman Empire in a defensive posi-
tion and jeopardized the peaceful coexistence of the two 
nations. Paicos replied to the Turkish Charge d'Affaires 
that he would endeavor to maintain tranquility in the border 
Provinces. He stated, however, that he could not regulate 
or suppress the press which was engaged in a press war with 
Turkey. "Permettez-moi, tout-fois de vo~s faire observer 
' qu'il n'est pas a son pouvoir de corriger le languge de quel-
I I ques journalistes, ni de regler les idees et les pensees de 
tout le monde." 34 He went on to charge that bands of brig-
ands were supported by Turkish authorities and ''were admitted 
to the public service" of the Ottoman Provinces. 
The Paicos communique was obviously not intended to 
soften Neshid Bey but he was correct that there were brigands 
used by the Turks to run the Provinces and, as the inter-
Legation correspondence concerning the frontier indicates, 
Greek subjects under Ottoman rule in the Provinces were harsh-
ly treated throughout 1853 (another reason why so many Greeks 
of the Provinces of Thessaly and Epirus joined the insurrec-
34 A.Y.E. 1853, Paicos to Nechet Bey, Athens, July 7, 
1853. 
100 
35 
tion as will be shown in following sections). The mal-
treatment of Greeks by the Ottoman authorities was due partly 
to the rise of Russophilism in Greece and anti-Turkish propa-
ganda, and partly to the recent developments on the frontiers 
which made the Turks very apprehensive as they very well knew 
that liberation of all of Greece - - from Crete to the gates 
of Constantinople - - was the goal which they had to confront. 
The Greek government sought the opportunity to capi-
talize on the cruel treatment of Greek subjects in the Pro-
vinces and on the use of brigandage by Turkey. On July 8, 
the Greek ministers in London, Paris, St. Petersburg and 
Munich expressed to the Protecting Powers and to the European 
community the Greek government's grievance against the irre-
gular Albanian troops, and the government's desire to main-
tain Greek troops in the frontiers for the sake of keeping 
order in the troublesome areas. 36 All the Protecting Powers 
advised the government in Athens and the king to retain order 
35 For more on this see A.Y.E. 1853 4/lb, Peri ktematon 
kata ta Methoria Proxenike Allelographia (Concerning the Em-
bassy Correspondence of the Lands on the Frontier). (No. 8508), 
D. Kyriakides to the Embassy of Epirus and Albania of His Ma-
jesty the King, also (No. 142) Gregoriades (agent at Arta) to 
the Epirus and Albania Embassy of Greece. 
36 The Ottoman regular troops were pulled out of the 
Provinces in June and reports from the Greek embassies in the 
Provinces complained about Albanian irregular troops abuses. 
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and not to step out of line. 37 The plan to gain the sym-
pathy of Europe as during the War of Independence - -
did not work for it was obvious that Otho and his Court had 
38 
more in mind than keeping peace in the Provinces. While 
the government in Athens promised Europe that her plan for 
the future only included peaceful coexistence with Turkey, 
39 there were undergoing secret preparations for war. On 
September 19, Wyse wrote to Paicos that he had been instruc-
ted by the Earl of Clarendon to bring to the attention of 
the Greek government several inci~ents involving ammunition 
transport on Greek vessels. Gun powder was transported from 
Syra to the ports of Prevesa and Arta for the use by the 
Greek brigands. The transportation of gun powder and other 
war supplies were carried out with a prior knowledge by the 
Greek authorities, Wyse charged and further 
37 Donta, Crimean War, 47. 
38 The movement for a Greek-Turkish war was pushed 
behind the scenes by such extremist nationalists as Spiro-
milio and Scarlata Soutzo who were instrumental in having , 
their influence exerted in the Greek Court, see Crece 63 
(No. 69), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, July 29, 1853. 
I Also Grece 63 (No. 74), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, 
August 17, 1853. It cannot be deduced from this that the 
king was really pushed into a conflict he did not ask for. 
Because as the next section will reveal the role of the 
king in the preparations for war was very much of his own 
will. 
39 See~., 48-9. 
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It has been stated to the Lord High Commissioner (of the 
Ionian Islands) that a large depot of powder and other 
military stores had been framed at Syra by persons in 
connection with the Greek Hetaerias, 40 and Signor Posali, 
a responsible merchant at Corfu, while he denies any con-
nection with the present cargo admits that to his know-
ledge many similar consignments have been made from Syra 
to Prevesa and Arta during the last few weeks, the object 
of which can be easily understood. 41 
l~hile preparing for war the Greeks searched desperately for 
allies who would support their expansionist policy. Obvious-
ly, England and France would never support Greece since its 
foreign policy stood in opposition to theirs. Russia would 
have no part in supporting Greece ·in extending its territory 
since Nicholas feared that the creation of a strong state in 
the south would mean limitation of his country's power in the 
Aegean Sea. Greece therefore appealed to Bavaria for help 
but the Bavarian Court would not support an expansionist pol-
icy since the Tsar had declared that he opposed Greek terri-
i 1 . 42 tor a expans~on. The situation for Greece and especially 
for Otho who was the most devoted supporter of the Megali 
Idea was critical. He had to make a difficult decision: 
40 Hetaerias were the various nationalist .liberation 
organizations which provided money and supplies for the cause 
of freeing the Greeks from Turkey and reestablishing a "Great-
er Greek" nation. 
41 A 
.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, September 19, 
1853. 
42 See Donta, Crimean War, 49-50. 
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either to go to war with Turkey and ther~by risk an Allied 
blockade of Greece, even an occupation, or to give up all 
immediate plans for expansion and wait for the propitious 
moment in the future. 
B. Otho's Support for Greek-Turkish Hostilities 
Historians of contemporary Greek history agree that 
Otho and the Greek Court were responsible for pressing for 
a Greek-Turkish war and territorial expansion. Even though 
the king has been praised by some scholars for acting on be-
43 half of the nation's interests, most agree that the foreign 
policy executed by him during the Crimean War period was dis-
astrous to the welfare of the nation. .,Otho and Amalia," 
~vrites Philaretos, "nursed under Kolettes in the Megali Idea, 
were thirsty for greater ambitions in which they found con-
sultation from the bitterness of their childlessness and 
weariness from the domestic convulsive wailing. Thus Otho 
became the leader of the war policy himself assuming the 
44 direction of every operation." Another prominent Greek 
historian writes: 
The war-like psychology of the Greek people as we saw, 
was adopted by Otho and Amalia, not because they were 
patriots and wished to free Epirus and Thessaly, but so 
43 Aspreas who is a royalist argues in this manner, 
see Modern Greece, I, 224-30. 
44 Philaretos, Foreign Rule, 98. 
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that they could strengthen their throne which was shaky. 
And they succeeded by pretending to be warlike. So for 
a period they succeeded to win the sympathies of the 
greater mass of the people. 45 
King Otho was confronted with a very peculiar situation in 
1853. He remembered how he became popular with the masses 
in 1850 during the British blockade for not giving in to the 
demands of a Great Power. Now he had once more the oppor-
tunity to become popular by posing as a Greek nationalist 
and if everything went his way he would be popular and a 
king of a "Greater Greece." At the same time, however, he 
. 
was confronted with serious warnings from the Western Powers 
against any undertakings in the Turkish Provinces. 
In June Otho wrote to his father that he had to post-
pone his trip to Germany due to the developments in the Near 
East. "The latest events," he wrote, "have irritated the 
Great Powers to the point that in order to calm them I have 
to remain here." 
46 A month and a half later the situation 
in Greece was much more critical and the king expressed his 
thoughts about it as follows: 
Conditions here are stretched at the highest level, as 
a result of the Russo-Turkish dispute. I believe that 
the matter will result in war •••• And this because 
45 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 605. 
46 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, June 7, 1853, cited in 
Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 970. 
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the fanaticism of the Turks has reached such a point that 
the Sultan is afaid of the question of retreat because of 
the possible disastrous consequences. I am trying to calm 
the minds of my faithful subjects •••• But at the same 
time I am convinced that Divine Providence has decided the 
enlargement of Greece. 47 
The need to increase and secure his power became increasingly 
urgent for Otho. 
In September 1853 the king called for elections be-
cause he feared the power of the opposition would diminish 
48 his popularity in the country. Very few people partici-
pated in the elections and the ge~eral public apathy caused 
I 
rumors that the king was preparing a coup ~· etat and ulti-
mate suppression of the Constitution. The day before the 
elections Wyse sent the following report to the Foreign Of-
fice: 
It is unnecessary to point out the consequences if such 
I (coup ~'etat) a movement is successful; suppression of 
all freedom of the press and of all publicity, personal 
liberty placed at the mercy of a party; of finances le-
vied, and applied at their caprice and for their pur-
poses; ••• the military occupation of th~ kingdom would 
be exclusively in the hands of the king. 4 
47 Ibid., 971. 
48 The Constitution had not really been enforced in 
Greece since Kolettes became Prime Minister in 1844 (see · 
Chapter I). Otho had nothing to fear- from opposition since 
he had done away with the Constitutionalists of 1843. Metaxas 
was sent to Constantinople as ambassador, Mavrokordatos to 
Paris and Trikoupis to London. So the leading politicians 
who could get elected were not even in Greece. For details 
of the 1853 elections see Petrakakos, History of Greece, 153-55, 
also Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 576-81. 
49 F.O. 32/207, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
September 27, 1853. 
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Wyse went on to urge to the Foreign Office that English poli-
cy and intentions in the Near East should be spelled out to 
the Government in Athens. 
Our best means of standing against Russian or other in-
fluences, is the just confidence we inspire that we shall 
always continue to in the cause of national liberty, good 
administration, public order, commerce and industry in 
a word Western civilization against Eastern barbarism. 
The least semblance even, of a departure from such a pol-
icy would be not only an infringement of our former en-
gagements, but I am quite convinced a manifest sacri-
fice of our most solid and important interests here, and 
would amount to little less than a wholesale transfer of 
the sympathies of a large body of this peo~le in our 
favour, to Russia or France on the other. 0 
Among other things, this dispatch of the British Minister 
reveals that although British Near Eastern policy paralleled 
French policy, British interests were naturally the primary 
objective of the Foreign Office. Besides the economic in-
51 
terests, which England had in Greece, it was also essen-
tial to develop a machinery, through the "English" party of 
course, of political control. All the talk of "liberty," 
"justice" and "western civilization" was not to be taken 
seriously for the purpose of the Foreign Office was to secure 
50 Ibid. 
51 The F.O. series for the years 1853-1857 contains 
numerous reports concerning British economic interests in 
Peloponese, and especially in Corinth. In many of these 
dispatches the Consul at Patras ask Wyse to use his influence 
with the Greek government to favor the interests of the Bri-
tish commerce. See Appendix 254-255. 
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and promote British interests and not to teach the world a 
lesson in liberalism. Greece was nothing more than a tool 
for England, at times a tool which was difficult to control 
for other Powers had a share of it. The main obstacle to 
exert British political control in Greece was the king. In 
1853, however, the king was left with no one major power to 
support his policy so at his moment of weakness it would be 
easier for the British government to intervene in Greek af-
fairs than in the past. 
Otho, however, did not bend as easily as the Foreign 
Office would have liked. Clarendon warned him three times 
in 1853 of the English determination to uphold the Ottoman 
52 
Empire's integrity but the king who was the main archi-
teet and supporter of the aggressive acts taking place on 
53 the frontiers against the Turks, chose to disregard them. 
In early October additional troops were being armed to be 
sent to the frontier and once again Paicos did not inform 
Rouen, Wyse and Nechet Bey about this matter. When ques-
tioned by Nechet Bey as to when the new troops were to be 
sent to the frontier, Paicos replied that he did not know 
and that he had to ask the Minister of war. Finally, when 
pressed for an explanation the Greek Minister of Foreign 
Affairs wrote to Hyse that, "as far as the marching of ad-
52 The last dispatch in A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos, 
Athens, September 14, 1853. 
53 Koutroumbas, The Revolution of ~, 29-30. 
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ditional troops to the frontier from Nauplia is in question 
his colleague, the Minister of War, informs him that a sin-
gle soldier has not quitted that fortress, a company only 
of artillery with four pieces of cannon left Athens within 
54 
these last few days to replace another at Lamia." The 
intelligence reports of Nechet Bey and the British Legation 
in Athens, however, indicated that "an Hetaeria is in full 
operation in Lamia and in communication, with sympathizers 
on both sides of the frontier, under the eyes of Greek au-
thorities and without any effectual means having been taken 
for their repression." 55 It was no secret to any one that 
ever since brigand chiefs were affiliated with the Court 
they were used as its weapon to manipulate events in domes-
56 
tic and foreign affairs. Wyse feared, as had lyons before 
him and many british statesmen before 1853, that brigandage 
in Greece was a threatening element to the stability and peace 
in the Provinces for it was bands of brigands who were con-
verted into revolutionaries and fought for an independence in 
54 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 7, 
1853. 
55 Ibid. 
56 \ About, Grece, 231-35. 
as defenders of the regime. They 
and were used as the private army 
Certain brigands were used 
exercised police functions 
of the king. 
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57 1821. · The king knew this just as well and this is the 
reason he liked to patronize chieftains. In November he ad-
dressed the following letter to his father: 
A few days ago I said to an elderly Epiriot who gives 
great significances to a prophetic book, The Good Angel, 
that we in the period of one year will be in Constanti-
nople. If this book determines time or not I do not 
know. But it is known to me ••• that a Bavarian is 
about to reign there. 58 
After the garrison from Nauplia moved to the frontier, Otho 
wrote to his brother Maximilian that he "was convinced that 
providence had decreed the expansion of Greece" and pointed 
the necessity for replacing the old weapons with new ones. 
Maximilian disapproved of Otho's activities and intentions, 
and Otho appealed to him again, saying "that it was the duty 
of all Christians in Europe to fight for their co-religionists 
59 
who were downtrodden by the Crescent." 
Otho determined to carry out his dream of a greater 
Greece even though his own relatives discouraged him from en-
gaging in acts which could endanger his throne. In February 
1854 Napoleon III wrote a letter to the king of Greece trying 
to discourage him from going too far with his plans to antago-
nize the Turks. 
57 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 26, 
1853. 
58 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, November 27, 1853, cited in 
Skandames, Kingdom 2f ~' 972-73. 
59 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho I• 191-92. 
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The recent attitude of Your Majesty's Government has 
shown me that its intentions are very different from 
what I expected. Instead of enli~htening Your Majesty's 
subjects on the situation, the Government has allowed 
them to be misled; and through the weakness and conni-
vance of the authorities, matters have come to such a 
point that the insurgents in Epirus are openly recruit-
ing supporters, not only among Your subjects, but even 
among Your troops. Under any conditions I would regret 
bitterly if Greece were to compromise her destiny by 
provoking disturbances in the Near East, but Y~ur Ma-
jesty will understand that today I should be forced to 
consider any attack directed against the Ottoman Empire 
as being directed against France herself. 60 
After Baron Forth-Rouen delivered Napoleon's letter to Otho, 
the king was taken by surprise never expecting such strong 
warning to come from France, a nation, unlike England, with 
which Greece had had fair relations for most years since its 
existence. The king answered Napoleon in a very touching 
letter pointing out that he could not conceive that French 
soldiers who once fought by the side of Greeks would now 
turn their guns against them. He went on to add that the 
crisis in the Near East was not to be blamed on the Crown 
of Greece and that even though there were sympathies in 
Greece for the Christian subjects of the Provinces, there 
was no attempt on the part of the kingdom to promote a re-
volt or engage in war against Turkey. 61 
60 Translation used here is from Bower & Bolitho, 
Otho I, 193-95. For the French and Greek texts see Petrakakos, 
History of Greece, 155-57. 
61 Ibid., Petrakakos, 157-60. 
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It has been argued that Otho was convinced that the 
expansion of the Greek kingdom would work not only to the 
advantage of his own country but also to that of the Western 
European countries as well. He felt that a greater Greece 
would be able to maintain the balance of power in the Near 
62 East by checking the Russian power. Otho did not enter-
tain an expansionist foreign policy because he was concerned 
with the problem of balance of power in the Near East. Among 
63 
other sources, the memoirs of Spiridon Pelikas, Minister 
of Justice during the Kriezes administration, unfold ihe full 
implications of the king's involvement in planning, trigger-
ing and supporting wholehear~edly the insurrection in 1854, 
for more reasons than that o£ his own egotistical goals. 
When the revolution ~roke out in Epirus, Soutsos, 
confident of Otho, informed the Ministerial Council which 
was convening with the king about the events in the Turkish 
Provinces. The matter of the insurrection was then opened 
for discussion by the ministers and all agreed to support it 
secretly but they agreed not to allow the Sublime Porte to 
become suspicious of the government's involvement. The king 
agreed that the meeting of the Ministerial Council was secret 
62 Donta, Crimean War, 80, has put forward this argument. 
62 
s. Pelikas, Apomnemoneumata tes Ypourgeias Spiridonos 
Pelika (Memoirs of the Ministry of Spiridon Pelika) {Athens, 
1893). 
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and he dismissed the council. 
All of us unhesitantly were waiting, as was natural and 
expected to return again to the Ministerial Council so 
that the matter can be determined and to set the grounds 
which we were supposed to keep in mind in order to con-
duct the manner of our activities. Unfortunately the 
King, distrustful as it seems, not unjustly of certain 
ministers did not give us the necessary information, if 
he had from Europe and from the outer Provinces. There-
fore as the public, neither did we at the beginning think 
that the King would have positive hopes either from France 
or Germany. Only after two or three months I learned from 
outside sources various data, which led me to believe that 
the insurrection was not genuine, but was instigated from 
within (the Court). 64 
This indicated that the king did not take the advice of the 
Powers in regard to his foreign policy and deliberately kept 
the Ministerial Council ignorant of the facts so one can only 
conclude that the greater part of responsibility for the 
Greek government's actions in the insurrectionary developments 
in Northern Greece lies with the Greek Court and Otho himself. 
Otho used the patriotic movement of the Greek people for his 
own goals. Otho ignored the interests of Greece and went 
ahead to side with the Russians and hoped that they would be 
victorious in the Crimean War so that he would benefit from 
their victory. In April 1854 he wrote to Tsar Nicholas: 
As a Christian and as King of Greece, I follow with the 
greatest interest everything Your Majesty wished to do 
in the final cause to protect in an effective manner the 
religious rights of the Eastern Church in Turkey to 
which belong the great majority of my subjects and to 
which will belong my children, if God gives me any, and 
in any case, the heirs to my throne. The decision which 
Your Majesty is to take in favour of the Christians who, 
pressed to drive out, grabbed the arms for the defence 
64 Ibid., 140. 
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of the Church and their homes, not a less noble and loyal 
manner by which Your Majesty has announced His eminent 
and firm will coming in aid to introduce a summit to all 
the wishes of these populations •••• And I do not act 
either to satisfy the general sentiment of the deepest 
acknowledgement in addressing Your Majesty my most sincere 
gratitude. 65 
This ~ulogy to Russia and devotion to the Tsar by Otho was 
naturally understandable since Russia was the only possible 
ally Greece could have which would approve its foreign policy. 
C. "Internal" and "External" Causes 
of the Insurrection 
As has already been stated there were a number of 
complex causes for the insurrection of 1854. From the study 
of the insurrection, its nature, its beginnings, and its di-
rection, it can be concluded that its causes were of two 
types, "Internal" and "External." In the "internal" causes 
can be included the social, economic, religious and political 
problems facing the Christian subjects of the Turkish Pro-
vinces who chose to join the revolution. In the "external" 
causes can be listed the foreign elements which were to be 
found in the insurrection, namely, the involvement of the 
king and the Greek government, and also the contribution of 
fanatic nationalists who took part in the insurrection but 
were not part of the community of Christians under Ottoman 
rule. 
65 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 160-62. 
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One of the most firm supporters of a Greek revolt 
against Turkey was the "Russian" party. Their newspaper 
Aion had been publishing severe criticisms of Turkey and 
-
eulogies of Russia ever since the Menshikov mission and 
in 1853 this newspaper was so blunt as to publish an arti-
cle which openly expressed hostility against the Turkish 
66 
government. The article was signed by P. Soutzo, a poet, 
and N. Bambas, professor of philosophy at the University of 
Athens. Wyse felt that it was an outrage that a public ser-
vant was allowed to write such an article against a friendly 
power. Naturally Nechet Bey went immediately to Wyse after 
he read the article and complained that the Greek government 
did not refute the article in the government press and took 
no action against Professor Bambas, the co-signer of the 
article. Wyse immediately brought this to the attention of 
the Greek Foreign Minister who promised to take appropriate 
67 
action in the matter. The relations between Greece and 
Turkey were on a steady decline in the Fall. The Sublime 
Porte had been hoping to avoid confrontation with Greece 
which would result if carried to extremes in a war, and a 
66 See F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
October 27, 1853. For the French translation of the Aion 
article see F.o. 32/208• X/Lo6972, 82-6. 
67 Paicos took action against Professor Bambas but 
the article was not censored to the satisfaction of the 
Turkish Charge d'Affaires or Wyse. See Ibid. 
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two-front war was an adventure the Sultan's government could 
do without. Nechet Bey wrote to Paicos on December 3rd ac-
cusing Greece of actively seeking deterioration of relations 
with the Sublime Porte. He stated that the Sublime Porte 
wanted to maintain good relations with Greece but the latter 
showed no effort of good-will by continuing to send troops 
68 
to the frontier. 
As the Turkish authorities felt threatened by the 
presence of the Greek troops in the frontier, Greek authori-
ties constantly complained about the mistreatment of Chris-
tians by the Ottoman authorities. It was only to be expec-
ted that the sympathies of the Greek Orthodox subjects with 
the Russian cause would create alarm among the Turks. On 
October 7th, three days after the announcement of Aion that 
the war between Russia and Turkey was under way, Lambros 
Beikos, an officer of the Greek army, entered Epirus with a 
company of three hundred men. This was an obvious sign that 
the Greek government had every intention of capitalizing on 
the Russo-Turkish war. Suleiman Bey Frasare, General Derven 
Aga of Epirus, was forced to gather two hundred men from the 
Turkish Provinces and five hundred irregulars from Albania 
to go after one of the Greek military leaders, Koutsonika, 
who was known to engage in revolutionary activity. The Greek 
68 A.Y.E. 1853, Nechet Bey to Paicos, Athens, 
December 3, 1853. 
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ambassador in Epirus upon receiving this news called on the 
Lieutenant Commander of Western Greece to concentrate his 
69 
troops in the frontier as "a display of strength." 
This movement caused great concern to the European 
community as well as to the governments of the involved par-
ties. The Greek government realizing the danger involved in 
the consequences, Anglo-French threat, of such activities 
sent to the frontier lieutenant Skylodemo to disperse the 
rebels, and immediately placed the blame for the entire in-
cident on the Nomarch (Governor) bf Aitolia and Akarnania 
for allowing the incident to take place. The Turkish au-
thorities having the full support and cooperation of the 
Allied Powers did not take the incident lightly especially 
when later another Greek revel, Theodore Ziakas entered 
70 Thessaly. 
Wyse sent the following report informing the Foreign 
Office of the incidents on the Frontier: 
This, however, is not the only instance, I regret to say 
of disposition on the part not only of the Government 
but of the Court to add to the unsatisfactory nature of 
the relations between the two governments. Neshid Bey 
complained to me a few days since that the lately appoin-
ted ministers had alone omitted him among their round of 
visits, and that on several occasions of late, their 
Majesties had passed him by, though 7 ~lose to them, with-out the honor of the usual salute. 
69 Donta, Crimean War, 62-63. 
70 The Ziakas movement gave rise to revolutionary 
societies in Thessaly, see Koutroumbas, The Revolution of 
~' 60, 70-2, also Donta, Crimean l1ar,~-4. --
71 F.O. 32/208, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, November 17, 1853. 
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Wyse advised Nechet Bey to communicate with the Greek Foreign 
Minister before he officially notified the Sublime Porte. 
Paicos was in a real dilemma. On the one hand he 
was overtly trying to prevent a war or revolution from break-
ing out for he feared the Anglo-French threats to Greece and 
on the other hand the Greek government was too deeply involved 
in the events on the Frontier and Provinces. In a dispatch 
to Trikoupes, Paicos expressed his fear that if Greece dared 
to engage in a conflict with Turkey, France and England would 
support the Sultan not only by their moral but their armed 
force as well. 72 
The majority of Greek statesmen had a difficult time 
understanding that the two Western Powers which contributed 
to their independence and fought for the creation of the 
Greek nation would fight to prevent that same country from 
expanding its borders and taking territories which, in their 
view, were rightfully Greek. The decision had to be made, 
however, whether Greece would follow a policy of expansion or 
stay neutral. The dilemma could only be resolved by Otho; 
the king chose to glorify his Crown. 73 
72 A.Y.E. 1853, Confidential, Paicos to Trikoupes, 
November 15, 1853. 
73 In December 1853 Otho chose to send ambassadors 
and other agents to foreign countries "without requiring 
the sanction of the Greek Chambers.'' This caused a good deal 
of concern at the Foreign Office and Clarendon instructed 
Wyse to inform Paicos of Her Majesty's government dissatis-
faction with the king's abuse of his powers. The concern of 
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The external causes of the Greek-Turkish war were 
reinforced by the internal causes which did not play as im-
portant a role in international politics but did contribute 
to the explanation of the beginnings of the revolution in 
the Provinces. One could easily understand why the repre-
sentatives of the Allied Powers would not admit the "inter-
nal" causes of the insurrection even if they were looking 
for them. Wyse denied any possibility of the existence of 
"internal" causes for an insurrection and in December he 
wrote: 
I do not perceive any immediate probability of such, 
[internal causes] nor do I think it at any rate time 
likely to make much way, unless originated or continued 
by the Greek Government or stimulated by reports of 
Russian success. 74 
This reflects to a great extent the official British govern-
mental attitude concerning the causes for the insurrection. 
They placed all emphasis on the influence and actions of the 
Greek Court and government, the "Russian" party, and the 
propaganda of both Greece and Russia concerning the condi-
tion of Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. All of 
Clarendon was not so much the abuse of power by the king, as 
the over-spending for civil and military maintenance. " ••• 
at a time, when the establishment both civil and military is 
kept up in Greece, is far too great for its revenue, any mea-
sures which entail unnecessary expense, can only be considered 
as exhibiting an absence of good faith towards their govern-
ments, who are still burdened with the debt of Greece." See 
A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, December 15, 1853. 
74 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 
17, 1853. 
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these are "external" causes which are applicable but only 
partially explain the reasons behind the insurrection. There 
was no place allowed for Greek Christian subjects of the Otto-
man Empire who did not want to be ruled by the Sublime Porte 
for religious and ethnic reasons, and Greeks living in Turkey 
or other Christians were mistreated or murdered many a time 
when there were strained relations between Greece and Turkey. 
Legation reports from the Northern Provinces and other accounts 
indicate that the events of 1854 were triggered partially by 
socio-economic, religious and ethnic causes. The pressures 
of the Turkish officials on the Christian subjects was one of 
the reasons many Greeks welcomed· the opportunity to strike 
75 back. One ~f the first villages to revolt was Radevishi. 
The reasons for this were, (1) there was jealousy among Al-
banians because Greeks from Radovichi were on the payroll of 
the Sublime Porte used as troops to maintain order in the Prov-
inces, 76 and (2) they objected to the heavy taxes imposed 
them by the Ottoman authorities. 77 upon 
The movement of Radovich! was known to the Greek au-
thorities and it was allowed to continue. What is astonish-
75 Koutroumbas, The Revolution of 1854, 24-5. 
76 Ibid. 
17 The General Derven Aga Suleiman Bey Frasare was 
pressuring the villagers of Radovichi to provide the neces-
sary funds for the salaries of 2,500 of his men. Zeine, an 
Albanian Turkish agent at Arta went to the villagers of Peta 
demanding money and food supplies. These abuses of the Turks 
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ing, however, is when the news reached Athens that the vil-
lagers of Radovichi took up arms against the Turks, there 
was a general enthusiasm all over Greece and the events were 
78 
compared in many minds to 1821. In the minds of many the 
time had arrived for the liberation of all Greek subjects and 
territory. 
79 
One Greek writer maintained that the insurrection 
was doomed to failure before it even began for lack of money 
needed to carry out a successful attack against the Turks. 
Despite an empty treasure in Greece the chieftains were urged 
to continue their venture against the Turks not only by the 
government sector but also by the private sector. When the 
Roumeliotes asked for a loan of 30,000 drachmas early in 
1854, the President of the National Bank of Greece, G. Stavrou, 
replied that he did not have the funds available but they 
should continue their strugRle against the Turks with his 
blessings. He clearly implied that the loan could and would 
could not be tolerated by the Greeks who knew that they had 
the mother country to rely in case they took arms against the 
Turks. See Kyriakides, Contemeorary Greeks, 639-40, also see 
for the Radovich! uprising A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) No. 18, Papako-
poulos to the Province of Valtos, January 16, 1854, also A.Y.E. 
1854 (4/1) No. 54, Skylodemos to the Earch of Valtos, January 
19, 1854, also A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) No. 557, A. Deoulas to the 
Ministry of the Interior, January 17, 1854. 
78 See Pelikas, Memoirs, 140-44. 
79 Takis J .. appas, "Agnosta Hartia gia ten Epanastase 
tou 1854" (Unknown Papers for the Revolution of 1854) 
Thessalika Chronica, Athens, 1965. 
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80 
become available to them in the near future. Such re-
assurances from the top in both private and public sectors 
left the insurgents confident that they had more than just 
the moral support of Greece. 
The greatest mistake the government for its part 
81 
could commit in the insurrection, as Metaxas pointed out, 
was to support such a movement (in Radovich!) after the Wes-
tern Powers had decided on a policy which would call for the 
82 
suppression of such a mission, and before the Russians 
83 
crossed the Danube. Nevertheless, the revolution of 1854 
began in Radovich! and it provided the spark needed to cause 
other Christians in the Northern Provinces to revolt. The 
spirit of 1821 lived among the leaders of the revolution 
since many of them had seen or participated in the War of 
Independence and others were sons of chieftains. Two of the 
most prominent leaders were Spyridon Karaiskakes and Demi-
84 
trios Grivas, the son of Lieutenant-General Theodore Grivas. 
80 Ibid., 643. 
81 Pelikas, Memoirs, 141. 
82 
"It is apprehended that in the event of movements 
in Servia, Macedonia or Epirus, England and France may be in-
duced to take coercive or precautionary measures by occupa-
tion or otherwise." See F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, November 1853. 
83 Pelikas, Memoirs, 141. 
84 Karaiskakes with 2,500 men seized the town of 
Arta and Grivas with 300 men took over Pente Pegadia and Peta of 
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on January 29 all the revolutionaries met at the villages of 
peta, Neochori and Kombote to organize new attacks against 
Arta. Karaiskakes delivered the following historic message 
to his men on January 30th: 
Greek! While dying my father cried: Redeem Athens! 
Leaving as the only inheritance to me his sword, he died. 
Taking the inheritance of my father and finding Athens 
free, the land of his birth is enslaved. • • • Oh people 
of Epirus! The flag of freedom I raised among us. Greeks! 
The second Turkish war is coming; the revolutionary flame 
has started and the holy spirit of freedom and faith has 
descended from heaven and is increasing the flames of the 
fire. Look at the Heptanesos (seven islands - - Ionian 
Islands) as a seven-headed serpent it hisses, Epirus is 
moving, Thessaly is shaking, Macedonia is stirring, Thrace 
is waiting; Coura~e, then Courage! During the first Tur-
kish war (that of Independence) the Greeks with 50,000 
soldiers defeated 500,000 men from Asia, Europe and Afri-
ca. Today autonomous Greeks, Epirotes, Thessaloi, Mace-
donians and Thracians, six million we are fighting a 
weak kingdom which is been fought at the Danube by multi-
numerous and threatening armies. • • • Forward. The 
cross on the one hand, the sword on the other •••• 
Freedom or death. This is the voice of 10 million Greeks, 
Serbians and Bulgarians in Europe and 4 million Greeks in 
Asia. 85 
It was apparent from this speech that the spirit, at least 
some of it, of 1821 was once again being recreated in 1854. 
In many ways 1854 was the year that many hoped to see bring 
Epirus. At the same time that Karaiskakes and Grivas were 
making advances other revolutionaries (Kitsos Tsavelas, 
Giannes Bagos, Giannes and Nicholas Stratos, Andreas and 
Demitri Iskos and George Barnakokes, all volunteers) entered 
into Turkish soil and began attacking Turkish villages. See 
Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 610-11, also Kyriakides, Con-
temporary Greeks, 640-3, also Koutroumbas, Revolution oy-f854, 
68. ---
85 Cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 611. 
, 
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the War of Independence to a full cycle and free all Greek 
christians from the Turks. 
The historian who relies solely on British and French 
sources for the causes of the insurrection can be mislead a 
great deal for Western European sources only reflect the par-
tial observations of Western Europeans primarily who did not 
have access to the Greek documents and were also under the 
influence of the political biases and policy of the Allied 
Po~vers. It was impossible, therefore, to come to the con-
elusion that any "internal" factors existed in the revolu-
tion if one does not review ~he Greek sources. A typical 
view of a contemporary Western European concerning the causes 
of the insurrection is that of the Scottish historian, George 
Finlay. "But in spite of Greek and Russian encouragement," 
he maintains, "the Christian subjects of the Sultan refused 
to take up arms the public administration was so bad in Greece, 
that independence offered few attractions when the result on 
the value would be subjection to Greek misgovernment." 86 
Even though the observations of Finlay - - a misehellene, 
hater of Greeks, as labelled by Greek historians - -are to 
a certain extent correct since not every Greek took up arms 
and marched to fight the Turks, there is ample evidence of 
a great number of people who joined and did so for they had 
political, economic, and social reasons. 87 
86 Finaly, History of Greece, 222. 
87 The wealthy Greeks did not join the revolution for 
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After Mehmet Fuad Pasha, former minister of foreign 
affairs (1852-53), who was entrusted by the Sultan with sup-
pressing the revolts in northern Greece, had published the 
88 
warning to all Christians who joined the insurrection, 
the Greeks of Epirus and Thessaly sent him the following 
message: 
To the brightest Fuad Effendi. We former ragiades etc. 
cursed by the Sultan, until yesterday were sitting on 
glass and nails and on our rahati (back) as you would 
say. And seeing that from the taxes on the value of 
products, from instalment taxes, from taxes on sheep, 
from taxes on trade, from fire taxes, from luxury taxes 
and from commerce taxes ••• not even saliva was left 
in our mouth. The irregular Turks of our territory 
and the Nizamledes sent by Ali Osman • • • have stripped 
us • • • · • They 1 11 sl'aughter us like goats. • • • There 
is no other way but to ask for help from our King Otho. 
Farewell till we meet at the Byzantium, if you haven't 
left there before we come. The Greeks of Epirus and 
Thessaly.89 
The Greek subjects of Thessaly and Epirus had fallen victims 
to a semi-feudal system of Turkish government which could not 
reform fast enough for the liberal and nationalist demands of 
the Greek people. The Tanzimat came to these Provinces in 
mid 1840's 90 and its effects were insignificant since, as 
it would mean risking their property for an ideal called 
"Greece." Ibid., 634. 
88 See below, page 132. 
89 Cited in Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 85. 
90 Saab, Crimean Alliance, 140. 
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91 
as Bailey maintains, it was not a radical reform program 
to satisfy the rebelling spirit of the Orthodox subjects of 
the Ottoman Empire. On June 2, 1853, a letter of the Bri-
tish Consul at Prevesa reported to his government that the 
christian subjects of Thessaly and Epirus were "oppressed 
by fiscal exations, and subjected to intolerable acts of 
violence and injustice. " 92 He further noted that . . . 
these people would readily take up arms in support of an in-
surrection against Turkey. In another report by Lord Strat-
ford on July 4, 1853, the Turkish authorities were charged 
with treating the Christian subjects with "cruelty, rapine 
93 
and murder." A "proclamation to all Greeks and Phil-
94 hellenists, believers of Christ," dated January 9, 1854, 
is not only a good indication of Greek propaganda before 
the insurrection of 1854 but it also serves as an example 
of Turkish tyranny and reflects the nationalist and liberal 
spirit of the Greek p"eople. Europe, at least Western Europe, 
had progressed economically, politically and socially. Greece 
and the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire were aware of 
91 Frank Edgar Bailey, British !_olic~ and the Turkish 
Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-
~ (New York, 1970), 228, maintains that the Tanzimat was 
only "a step away from the old autocratic feudal order." 
92 Sessions of March 13, 1854, Handard, 3rd series, 
cxxxi, 706. 
93 Ibid., 707. 
94 Saab, Crimean Alliance, 141. 
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this progress and compared their devastating condition to 
that of Western Europeans so they desired to abolish all 
form of oppression. 
Such were the internal causes of the revolution and 
it is really difficult to determine their weight in the en-
tire scheme of things. As they present themselves, the facts 
tend to incriminate the Greek government and especially the 
Greek Court for the insurrection of 1854, but this does not 
mean that the effect of the "internal" factors must be mini-
mized since it took the combination of both "external" and 
"internal" factors for the creation of what was intended to 
be the second War of Independence for Greece. 
CHAPTER IV 
WAR AND OCCUPATION 
A. War in Thessaly. Epirus and Chalcidice 
The Radovichi occurrences obviously created much ex-
citement not only among the Greeks but also among the Turkish 
and European governments. Turkey was always fearful of fac-
ing a two front war, one at the Danube and the other at the 
Greek frontier. The Sublime Porte knew that the enemy at the 
Danube was much too strong to be held back by the Turkish 
forces, so all troops had to be concentrated in the Russian 
front. Aware of their shortage of manpower the Ottoman au-
thorities wanted to end the revolution before it spread into 
a major war. Accordingly, they adopted severe measures in 
dealing with the Christians in order to discourage them from 
engaging in any adventurous revolutionary activities. 1 
On Febrnary 9, about one thousand men were sent to 
take Pente Pegadia (Five Wells) held by Greek insurgents. 
Pente Pegadia was a village between Arta and Janina which 
the rebels had taken along with Peta. It became one of the main 
headquarters for the insurgents. The Greeks forced the Turks 
1 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 75-7, also see Peli-
kas, Memoirs, 151. 
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to defend themselves from Arta. When the latter were unable 
to emerge victorious in their struggle, reinforcements were 
sent but they too failed to defeat the insurgents and re-
2 treated to Janina. The Greeks were left free to attack the 
neighboring Turkish villages and possibly take Arta, the vil-
lage still held by Turkish forces after the rebels unsuccess-
fully tried to capture it on February 12. 
Another attempt was made by the Turkish military for-
ces to send help to Arta, this time eight hundred men in addi-
tion to the seven hundred regulars and two hundred armed po-
lice. 5 Like the previous reinforcements these also met with 
defeat as they were stopped by the bands of Greek chieftains 
led by Rago, Strato and Karaoules. 
On February 16 the Greeks scored another victory 
against a group of three hundred Turks who attempted to res-
4 
cue those at Arta. In Epirus, at the village of Peta, the 
rebels defeated the T~rks as they had in Thessaly. Theodore 
5 Grivas with three hundred men scored a victory at Koutsoulio, 
and on February 28 he was a few miles outside Janina. In the 
2 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 13, 
1854, also see Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 151-
53. 
3 ~., Nomikos, 153. 
4 These Turks were carrying supplies and were captured 
by Nico Kaskares and his band. See Kyriakodes, Contemporary 
Greeks, 644. 
5 Wyse reports on March 5 that Grivas had increased 
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early days of March many villages fell into the hands of the 
Greeks and it seemed that the revolutionaries were successful 
in their task. After the outbreak of the insurrection the 
notables of Agrafa made the following announcement: 
Patriots, a cry had been poured in our hearing, that our 
Epirotes compatriots have taken arms asking for their free-
dom against the centuries long tyrant. Grab, therefore, 
fellow-patriots your arms, place your hand in your heart, 
••• imitate our predecessors, and cast your blood for 
the honor of religion, the honor of your freedom. 6 
Epirus came under the leadership of Kitsos Tsavelas, former 
Inspector General of the Greek army, who had left the military 
along with a number of others to join the revolution. Peta 
was the headquarters for the insurgents in Epirus and it was 
from where Tsavelas and Karaiskakes operated. In the eparchy 
of Janina Grivas and his son were in control and headed for 
the town of Janina. 
7 
Still other insurgent bands operated 
from Paramethia. 
The revolution· spread from Thessaly and Epirus to 
Macedonia where Ziakas with two hundred men from Lamia en-
tered into Turkish territory. 
They occupied the strategic position of Spileon and the 
passage between Melia and Krania in the area between 
his forces from three hundred to four hundred. 
Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 15, 1854. 
F.O. 32/215, 
6 Father Basilios Sioufas, E Epanastasis tou 1854 kai 
e Katastrophe tes Gralistes (The Revolution of 1854 and the 
Catastrope of Cralistes) Thessalika Chronika (Athens, 1965), 
464 
7 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 
Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 645,-afSo 
!ional Position o~ Greece, 156-57. 
68, 82• also see 
Nomikos, Inte~-
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Metsovo and Grevena. Ziakas' plan was to bar the crossing 
of Turkish troops from Epirus to Western Macedonia, and 
to unite the insugrection in Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia 
through Grevena. 
The reaction from the people of Greece to these sporadic up-
risings in the north was alarming. Many who were indoctrina-
ted in the beliefs of "religion" and "nation" took up arms and 
ran to the troubled Provinces feeling they had a holy mission 
to carry out. Wyse wrote that: 
Recruiting, I am informed, is going on in the open day 
and under the very eyes of the Government officials and 
local authorities, not only in Missolonghi, but in many 
other Provinces, even so far down as the Peloponesos. 
• • • A still more daring spirit is conspicuous at 
Athens. Four committees have been regularly formed and 
are in permanent sitting here, for the purpose of receiv-
ing subscriptions and enroling recruits, presided by Depu-
ties and others of authority in town, one of these immedi-
ately opposite Neshid Rey's house. Anot~er similarly or-
ganized for the same purpnse at Patras. 
It was not only the indoctrinated masses who applauded the 
revolts but the king as well. He wrote to his father when 
the Epirus uprising o~curred that the Christian subjects of 
Turkey were mistreated by the officials and they desired to 
free themselves from the Turkish yoke so they could join the 
mother country, Greece. He added that even though the up-
rising was not timed rightly for it broke out in the middle 
8 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 158 
9 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 
13, 1854. 
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it did, however, prove that it was not caused by Russia, as 
10 
the Western Powers suspected, but was indeed genuine. 
The Turkish authorities did not take any serious 
measures against the repression of Christian subjects in 
the Ottoman Empire until after the Tsar announced that the 
war against Turkey was fought on behalf of the "repressed 
11 
brothers." Fuad Effendi, the former minister of Foreign 
Affairs, who became commissioner extraordinary in charge of 
12 
all operation in Thessaly and Epirus, was entering Prevesa 
with three thousand men as T. Grivas and N. Zervas were mak-
ing advances toward Janina. Fuad Effendi landed with three 
war ships accompanied by a British frigate, an obvious indi-
cation that Great Britain had taken the role of an advisor 
13 
to Turkey in military operations. Seinel Pasha, who was 
assigned as General Dervend in Thessaly and Epirus was sent 
to Volos with one thousand five hundred to two thousand five 
14 hundred men on two steamers which were also escorted by 
10 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, January 29, 1954, cited 
in Skandames, Kingdom~ Otho, 973-74. 
11 Koutroumbas, Revolution ~ 1854, 82. 
12 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 159. 
13 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 614. 
14 Ibid., Koutroumbas, 83. 
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a British and a French steamers. 15 The Turks also sent troops 
by land to stop the spreading of the insurrection. Fuad Pasha 
published a proclamation holding forth a general amnesty for 
all those who were willing to return to their duty and effec-
16 
tive protection to the peaceable and well disposed. The 
publication read as follows: 
Though you were staying in your homes inside our borders, 
men came ••• and destroyed our lands. Those who desire 
to remain under the authority of the Sultan, Kotsombasedes 
ect. disassociate yourselves from the insurgents and come 
with me. (1) Those who did not participate in this stir-
ing of events.will be treated kindly by our Sultan. (3) 
Those who remain armed will be punished and with a differ-
ent treatment. (4) Villages which did not accept the rev-
olution, will be paid by other villages who did. (5) Those, 
Greeks by any chance caught, brigands amonst the residents 
will not be tolerated and will immediately be punished. 17 
On March 1st Lieutenant General A. Hatzi-Petros, an aide de 
camp of Otho, entered Thessaly with five hundred men. Another 
aide de camp of Otho, Lieutenant General Dimitris Tsames 
Karatasos, also joined the revolution which of course was con-
verted into a full scale war after the Turkish troops from 
Constantinople had arrived in the Provinces. Dimitrios or 
Tsames Karatasos, son of Athanasios Karatasos, fought with 
15 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 162. 
16 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, March 17, 
1854. 
17 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 85. 
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his father in Macedonia and other parts of Greece during the 
War of Independence. 18 Many observers in Greece believed 
that the revolutionaries had a good start and the chances of 
a Turkish victory were slim since they needed their forces 
to hold back the Russians. Wyse explained the situation to 
the Foreign Office as follows: 
In Greece the impression is, that the force as yet sent 
is too feeble, to stop the current, and that even twice 
that number would still be inadequate to oppose any ef-
fective resistance to a movement which they believe will 
become before another month, Pan hellenic. The passage 
of volunteers from the border-provinces, is every day in-
creasing, nourished by these h9pes and reports of a con-
stant succession of victories. 19 
The Turkish offensive, however, began to build up gradually 
as more help from France and England came to assist them in 
fighting the Russians. General Grivas suffered a defeat on 
March 23rd at Metsouo by Abdi Pasha, who commanded two thou-
20 
sand five hundred men. Grivas retreated to Peta with the 
other chiefs and after a long battle with the Turks, which 
21 
the Greek insurgents lost they dispersed and this marked 
the end of the revolutionary effort in Epirus. Abdi Pasha 
in conjunction with "Fuad Effendi, followed up his (Abdi 
18 See Athanasios A. Angelopoulos, Dimitrios Tsamis 
Karatasos, XVII, Balkan Studies, 49-51. 
19 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 17, 
1854. 
20 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 615-16. 
21 Osman Pasha launched the attack on Peta on April 26. 
See Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 175-77. 
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Pasha's) victory by taking Pente Pigadia, and reopening the 
22 
communications between Arta and Ioannina [Janina]." 
Thessaly also was ready to Turkish hands as a force of three 
thousand men stationed at Almiro were determined to put an 
end to the advances of Papakosta at Platanon. Even though 
the forces of Papakosta proved to be much more effective in 
holding back the Turks than Grivas' forces, the internal dis-
putes among the chiefs resulted in the general weakness of 
23 
the movement. Disputes among the chiefs were not, however, 
the only cause which lost the war ·for the Greeks. One of the 
worst loses suffered by the rebels was at Volo. By March 30th 
six thousand Egyptians and a French steamer, "Heron,'' came to 
the aid of the Turks and for all practical purposes the under-
taking was well on the way to being crushed under such mili-
24 
tary power. 
The next important battle was fought on May 10 at 
Kalambaka. Before this battle took place, Soutso, Minister 
of War, gave orders on his own accord without consulting with 
the Minister of Justice, Pelikas, that prisoners from Chalcide 
should be allowed to go free so that they may join the insur-
rection. 25 The Kalambaka battle between Hadji-Petro and 
22 F.o. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 27, 
1854. 
23 For the Platanon Battle see Koutroumbas, Revolu-
tion of 1854, 94-9. 
24 Ibid., 99-101. 
25 Pelikas refused to pardon the prisoners as the 
other ministers wished. See Pelikas, Memoirs, 147-49. 
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Selim Pasha marked the height of insurgent. victories in the 
North. 26 The Macedonian revolts were inspired by those of 
Epirus and The.ssaly but started late in March. 
The two men responsible for organizing the Macedonian 
movement were N. Filaretos and Tsames Karatasos. The griev-
ance the Christians of Macedonia had against the Turks was 
about land which was granted to them by the Turkish tourt but 
was not obtained by them. 27 A Secret revolutionary group of 
three hundred and ten men organized by the two Greek chiefs, 
and on March 23rd Filaretos started from north Euboia to Pelio. 
By the end of the month the effort was completely demolished 
by a combination of factors. (1) Filaretos felt that the peo-
ple of Pelio were not ready for revolution and war, (2) dis-
putes among the insurgent leaders, and (3) one Demitrios Gab-
riel announced everywhere that "ten thousand British were 
28 
coming to Prevesa to punish the rebels," which obviously 
scared everyone involved in the insurrection. 
The revolts in the Provinces were unsuccessful for a 
variety of reasons. One of them, the most important, was 
26 For details see Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 
145-52. 
27 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 227. 
28 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 101-03, also 
Kordatos, Ibid., 621-42, uses many sources to cover the 
Macedonian-revolt. 
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that Turkey had the support of Western Europe whereas Greece 
had only Russian moral support during the entire affair. The 
Foreign Office instructed Wyse on March 23rd. that: 
If it should turn out that the Greek troops have violated 
the Turkish territory, in the name of Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment, strongly to protest against the act and the un-
worthy attempt of the Greek Government to accuse the Turk-
ish troops (of crossing the Greek frontier). 29 
The Greek Court and the expansionists in the government would 
not listen to threats of the Allied Powers. When the Turks 
captured Chrone Nasdeke at the Rattle of Perivolia, of Volos, 
they found on him documents incriminating the Greek government 
in the revolution. They immediately sent these documents to 
Constantinople as official evidence of Greek government's ag-
30 gression against Turkey. This caused the Turks and their 
allies to become even more serious and determined in their 
efforts to extinguish the revolution. Great Britain and France 
warned that the conduct of the Greek Court and government and, 
especially, the king and Oueen, had brought the two Powers to 
the point where they were seriously considering breaking off 
diplomatic relations. They further warned, "that the coasts 
of Greece would be blockaded, Greek commerce put an end to, 
31 
and that ulterior measures would then be determined on." 
1854. 
1854. 
29 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 7, 
30 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 100. 
31 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 14, 
Rouen and Wyse addressed a note to Paicos on April 11th 
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Paicos and the Court were not about to give in to demands of 
the Allied Powers as long as they knew that the insurrection 
still had a chance of accomplishing something. Furthermore, 
it was too late to pull out and stop everything as though 
nothing had happened. The people burned with nationalism, 
the king was more determined than ever to give full support 
to the movement until it was successful, and the press kept 
the war propaganda stronger than ever before. 
There were other factors, however, besides pressure 
from the Allied Powers which resulted in the failure of Greeks 
to capture the Turkish Provinces. First, there was no fully 
organized effort on behalf of the Greek government to engage 
in war. The authorities in Greece allowed the revolt to occur, 
supported it morally and materially, but as a result of Bri-
tish and French threats and pressure the Greek government aban-
doned the effort of the insurgents while it was still flourish-
ing. If there was more determination on the part of the king 
and those in government who supported the revolution of 1854, 
a greater effort could have been made to risk everything in 
order to win the designated Turkish Provinces. 
There was also still another factor which has already 
been mentioned, namely, disputes among the leaders of the in-
surgents which made the movement very weak in its internal 
warning him that the Naval Forces of France and England were 
instructed to visit Greek ships even on Greek waters, which 
were suspected of carrying arms and munition. See F.L. 32/ 
216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 26, 1854. 
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organization. The following letter of Grivas to Georgandas 
reveals much about internal feuds among the chiefs: 
After the battle of historic fame at Metsovo, of which I 
send you the description and plan today, seeing the great-
est conspiracies and treacheries existing against me on 
the part of my companions in arms, I was compelled to re-
treat from thence and take the direction of Thessaly. On 
my arrival there I found the same divisions prevailing be-
tween the different chiefs, and I came to the resolution 
to remain quiet in Agrapha, until I could come to some 
understanding with the Government of His Majesty. • 
The struggle which we have undertaken is great; it is 
higher than that of 1821, in as much as we aim at the 
restoration of the Greek Empire. But such a struggle re-
quires union, subordination, order, primary means in abun-
dance, and a Commander in Chief, otherwise there is an 
end to all hope. The Government ought either at 
once to take up the struggle appointing publicly the pro-
per persons to a regular army at a regular pay or let us 
sit down quietly at home, so that we may not be the causes 
of destruction of our fellow Christians. 32 
Considering these elements, Anglo-French opposition, no organ-
ized Greek governmental support to the revolutionaries and in-
ternal feuds among the chiefs, the movement which ambitiously 
began as a repeat of 1821 ended in failure. All this much to 
the disgrace and devastation of the people who in the name of 
religion and nation had taken up arms to free themselves from 
the backward Ottoman Empire. 
32 F.O. 32/217, Grivas to Georgandas, Agrapha, April 
2, 1854, also see "Moniteur Universe!" (No. 132), May 12, 
1854. 
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B. Rupture of Greek-Turkish Relations 
and Anglo-French Reaction to the Insurrection 
Western Europe was convinced that there was a defi-
nite connection between the Russo-Turkish disputes and the 
Greek uprisings in 1854. There can be little doubt that 
fragile relations between Russia and Turkey provided a strong 
reason for the Greeks to go through with an uprising in the 
south-western front of the Ottoman Empire since it would have 
been necessary for the Turks to concentrate their forces on 
the northern front. That the insurgents were taking direct 
orders from the Russians was untrue. Nesselrode made an 
announcement on March 18 dispelling all such accusations. 
He stated that the Tsar sympathized with Greece and with the 
Christians who were trying to free themselves from the Turk-
ish yoke, as they had once before in 1821. 33 There was lit-
tle doubt in the minds of Western Europeans, however, that 
the Greek revolts were indeed used by the Russians as strate-
gic tools of distraction against the Turks. During the month 
of January the reports received at the Foreign Office were 
mostly about the widespread propaganda influence of Aion, the 
"Russian" party newspaper. The press propaganda received more 
attention than the real causes of the revolution, so obviously 
33 See T.E. Evagelidos, Historia tou Othonos Basileos 
tes Hellados, 1832-1862 (History of Otho King of Greece, 1832-
1862) (Athens, 1893~49-50. 
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the British government and British public opinion were influ-
enced by what were in many respects the effects of the insur-
rection and further the pro-Russian Greek newspaper Aion which 
had primarily the following only of those who sympathized with 
34 the "Russian" party. 
In February, Wyse sent a report to his government ex-
pressing his fears of Russian influences in Greece and he 
linked the uprising on the frontier entirely to this influ-
ence. According to him when Kornilov visited Athens in 1854, 
he charged that the present ministry had radical pro-Russian 
elements which were dominant in the government and that the 
Foreign Minister allowed Greek government officials to con-
tribute money for the Megali Idea. Further, Colonel Soutso 
deliberately substituted old officers of the_army with young 
pro-Russian ones who favored Russian interests. Wyse went on 
to write: 
The simple impression of the whole case (however it may 
be disguised is thus: a Russian government prepared to 
take advantage under Russian protection, for purposes of 
aggrandisement, of any contingency which in the course 
of events may chance to arise. Should such a contin-
gency occur, should war for instance, become inevitable 
and be followed by any decided success on the part of 
Russia, or insurrectionary movements sufficiently seri-
ous in the Turkish Provinces contiguous to Greece, I am 35 persuaded it would be a signal for the general movement. 
34 See F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
January 17, 1854, also F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, January 27, 1854. 
35 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, Febru-
ary 7, 1854. 
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The Greek embassy in London also reported the apprehensions of 
36 
the Foreign Office concerning Russian involvement in Greece, 
but until February 9th there was no implication by the British 
government that the insurrectionary movements in the Provinces 
37 involved the Greek Court. 
Russian influence and anti-Turkish sentiments in Greece 
caused concern to all European representatives at Athens. Baron 
de Thile, the Prussian minister at Athens, visited the king on 
one occasion after an anti-Turkish demonstration by the univer-
sity students and a number of Greek soldiers which took place 
in Athens. The Baron pointed out to the king the political 
danger of such demonstrations and expressed his disapproval 
of such events. 38 Finally, upon the suggestion of Wyse, the 
representatives of the four European Powers - - England, France, 
Austria and Prussia - - decided to send a collective note to 
the Greek government asking that it not get involved in the 
insurrection and that it remain in a position of neutrality. 
Paicos was warned that, "not only was the tranquility of the 
country endangered, but the King's liberty of action, his 
36 A.Y.E. 1854 (No.3), Trikoupis to Paicos, London, 
January 19, 1854, also (No.5), Trikoupis to Paicos, London, 
February 6, 1854. 
37 A.Y.E. 1854 (No. 9), Trikoupis to Paicos, London, 
February 9, 1854. 
38 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 
10, 1854. 
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39 
rights and person, and perhaps the dynasty." This came as 
a shock to Otho, not so much because he and his throne were 
threatened as a result of this court's involvement in the in-
surrection, but because the Prussian and Austrian representa-
tives signed this warning. 
The four ministers who sent Paicos the warning about 
Greek government involvement in the insurrection advised Nechet 
Bey on diplomatic matters and gave him their full support. 
Upon the a~vice of Wyse, Nechet Bey, wrote to Paicos to pro-
test "against the incursions of armed men into Ottoman terri-
tory and accused Athens of not having done anything to stop 
40 
these hostile activities." Paicos replied that he was doing 
everything he could but the nation simply did not possess the 
necessary military force needed to intervene in the uprising 
taking place in the Turkish Provinces. 41 
Nechet Bey felt that Paicos was not complying with 
the requests of the Sublime Porte so he went once again to 
Wyse and Rouen for advice. They suggested that another note 
of warning should be sent to Paicos signed by the four Euro-
pean representatives. Baron Leykam, representative of Austria, 
and Baron de Thile did not sign the note. As they explained, 
39 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 
13, 1854. 
40 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 230. 
41 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 
16, 1854. 
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they did not have the proper authorization from their govern-
42 
ments to do so. After the note was sent, Wyse and Paicos 
visited the king so they could get Otho's verbal commitment 
that Greece would follow a non-aggressive policy towards 
Turkey. The representatives took the opportunity to warn 
Otho that general war would have dangerous consequences for 
43 
his throne. In order to be on the safe side, Wyse, Strat-
ford Canning and Sir Henry Ward, the Lord High Commissioner 
of the Ionian Islands, "thought it necessary to use part of 
the British fleet stationed in the Mediterrenean," for any 
44 
unexpected developments in Greece. Instructions were also 
sent from London and Paris empowering the British and French 
ministers to order a blockade of the Greek capital, if they 
thought it necessary. 45 
Lord Clarendon took further steps to instruct Wyse to 
relay the British government's disappointment with Athens and 
with Paicos' refusal to conform to Nechet Bey's requests. 
Twenty-four hours before a final telegram was sent to Paicos 
with a list of demands by the Turkish Charge d'Affaires in 
42 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 
16, 1854. 
43 Donta, Crimean War, 90-1. 
44 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 232-34. 
45 Ibid., 242. 
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in Athens Clarendon wrote the following letter to Wyse: 
You will inform Mr. Paicos that as friendly advice has 
not been wanting but has been disregarded as the conniv-
ance of the Greek Court and Government with the hostile 
movement against Turkey is now beyond question, and as 
Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the 
French are determined that their policy shall not be thus 
thwarted; the Greek Government must be prepared for the 
consequences of its own acts. If these consequences 
should be to endanger the throne and future welfare of 
Greece, the responsibility will rest upon the Greek mini-
sters who have shown themselves to be ignorant or care-
less of the true interests of their own country. 46 
On March 7th Nechet Bey sent a telegram to Paicos with the 
following list of demands: (1) The officers who took part in 
. 
the uprising should be punished after trial in a Greek court 
of law, (2) those officials who helped to rouse the people 
against the neighboring state should be punished, (3) those 
in the political circle (in government) should be penalized 
if they contributed to the insurrection in any manner what-
ever, (4) Aion and other government newspapers should be regu-
lated so that they do not excite the public mind with propa-
ganda in favor of the revolution, and finally: 
(5) to give assurance to the Sublime Porte that an inves-
tigation will be conducted to find the officer who opened 
the prisons of Chalcida and armed the criminals, and in 
conclusion, if after forty-eight hours until the setting 
of the sun of Tuesday 9 March, the Greek government has 
not granted a satisfactory answer to the demands of the 
Porte, he (Nechet Bey) is forced to ask for his passport 
as well as those of the entire personnel of the embassy. 
46 Mavrokordatos Archive 008,873, Clarendon to Wyse, 
Foreign Office, March 6, 1854. 
47 Evagelides, Otho, 550. 
47 
r 
145 
The time had come for the king to make a decision which would 
either mean blockade and suffering of the consequences for 
the Greek people or to take that daring step towards the re-
alization of the Megali Idea and ignore the Turkish demands. 
In reality, at least in the reality as seen through 
the eyes of Pelikas, the king wanted to fulfill his dream but 
at the same time he was afraid of the numerous warnings from 
Western Europe. In his memoirs Pelikas writes. 
In the morning, the postponed Consular meeting took place 
before the King. The opinion not to give a hint that the 
Greek government was at fault prevailed. The necessity 
to buy time because the opportunity would be uncomparably 
better for us, when the Russian army had made advances, 
was clear. • With this spirit we examined one by one 
of Nechet Bey's demands and we thought, which one we 
should give an answer to. When we came to the resigna-
tion of the Professors, we said, that this sacrifice 
should be made for the good of the nation and the rest 
of the Ministers agreed. But the King with a certain 
emotion said: How! to start dismissing my personnel? 
Never! Paicos suggested, and we all approved, to pre-
sent the answer tomorrow to the Parliament, as they do 
in all Constitutional States in order to gain support 
of the nation, and to appear to Turkey and to the Western 
Powers united and that of one will is the government and 
the nation. • • The next day (after the secret meet-
ing concerning the drafting of the answer to Nechet Bey) 
we returned. Paicos had worked with the King, who had 
kept the plans. We stayed almost to midnight, but the 
plans were not sent to us, when we received an announce-
ment from the four ministers bringing to the attention 
of the government, the announcement of Nechet Bey for 
its serious results. Because we announced during the 
day, that we rejected the requests of Nechet Bey, the 
ambassadors hurried then to make their announcement. 48 
On March 10 Nechet Bey announced the rupture of Greek-Turkish 
relations and left Athens. The Sublime Porte began to exile 
48 Pelikas, Memoirs, 157-60. 
146 
Greek residents of the Ottoman Empire as soon as relations 
broke off. All commercial relations were also broken between 
the two countries and the Sultan did not allow ships with the 
Greek flag to sail into Turkish ports and also ordered all the 
49 Greek diplomats in Turkey to leave. 
The four Powers were quick to express their displeasure, 
as Pelikas pointed out above, to the Greek government's answer 
to Nechet Bey and naturally blamed Greece for the rupture of 
50 
relations. Wyse went so far as to say that: 
Mr. Paicos' note to Nechet Bey which like so many other 
similar communications seem only to have in view to drive 
the Sublime Porte to a declaration of hostilities which 
would rescue this government from disgrace of any longer 
maintaining this ignoble hypocrisy, but which at the same 
time would give the signal of a national war, inviting 
every class and person, however, objecting to the present 
conduct of the government in the disastrous struggle. 51 
Even though Greece tried to defend its position in the recent 
interruption of relations with the Sublime Porte the fact re-
mained that both Greek court and government were expecting 
such an outcome and many of them, perhaps most, were happy 
with the interruption of relations with a country which they 
49 A.Y.E. 1854, (4/ld) see file labeled as Diakopai 
Sheseon Hellados-Turkias (Interruption of Greek-Turkish Rela-
tions), Also A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) Fuad Pasha. 
50 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 256. 
51 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 17, 
1854. 
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never regarded as friendly. Pelikas wrote, that the morning 
after Nechet Bey left the Oueen expressed her enthusiasm of 
52 
the affair and that of her husband. 
The month of April brought a renewed tide of diploma-
tic opposition by the Western Powers against Greece. Baron 
de Thile visited the palace at the request of the king after 
the interruption of relations with the Sublime Porte. In-
stead of trying to cover up or blame the Turks for the recent 
events Otho and Amalia told the Prussian minister that the 
king of Greece was not at liberty to retreat. The reason for 
this as Wyse reported to the Foreign Office was that: 
He [Otho] had received the divine mission to liberate the 
Christian races from the yoke of the Mohammedan and that 
mission he was bound to answer, and must at every venture 
fulfill. • • The Baron de Thile considers all further 
effort fruitless and looks with dismay on the probable 
results to their Majesties personally and the Dynasty 
from the course now pursued. 53 
The Bavarian as well as the Austrian Court was very much dis-
pleased with the recent events in Greece and with the king's 
position in the entire affair. 
Austria was especially concerned with the uprising 
in the Turkish Provinces, perhaps as much as France and Eng-
land for there was a real threat that the revolution could 
52 Pelikas, Memoirs, 162-63. 
53 F.O. 32/216, Wuse to Clarendon, Athens, April 1, 
1854. 
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spread to Montenegro. Since the Greeks were an ethnic minor-
ity and were revolting in the name of nation and religion the 
rest of the Balkan people could sympathize with their struggle. 
count Buol cooperated closely, therefore, with Clarendon and 
Drouyn de Lhuys. He sent a war vessel to Prevessa on April 
21, and he was ready to cooperate militarily with the Turks 
54 in suppressing an unexpected uprising at Montenegro. Bri-
tain and France were ready to take more radical steps against 
Greece. Five days before the Allied Powers warned Paicos that 
they were also considering interruption of relations with 
Greece, Clarendon instructed Wyse to inform the Greek govern-
ment that he felt Nechet Bey's demands were fair and moderate. 
Further, the British government was greatly disappointed with 
Paicos' decision to reject the Turkish demands. The Greek 
government's answer to Nechet Bey was evasive and unsatisfac-
tory. Clarendon went on to write: 
That the so-called national movement to which their Majes-
ties and the Greek Government affected to yield, has been 
created and stimulated by the Court and Government, that 
its subject was to excite the peaceable Christian subjects 
of the Porte to revolt, that the Court and Government of 
Greece were therefore deliberately aiding the cause of the 
Emperor of Russia, with whom England and France are at war, 
and in injuring the Sultan, whose cause England and France 
are pledged to support, and that these being acts of direct 
hostility against two of the Protecting Powers, the King 55 
and Queen of Greece must be prepared for the consequences. 
54 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 259-60. 
55 Mavrokordatos Archive, 008,888, No. 39, Clarendon 
to Wyse, Foreign Office, April 8, 1854. 
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Matters appeared very critical for Greece. ·If Great Britain 
decided once again to blockade the ports of Greece she would 
have French military naval support and the moral support of 
the entire European community. In 1850 Palmerston's blockade 
of Pireaus was opposed by every government in Europe and by 
most politicians in Europe including most British. 56 The 
case, however, was not the same in 1854. No nation, including 
Russia which was the only country which approved of the Greek 
uprising, would come to the rescue of the young nation. The 
philhellinism of the Europeans no longer existed at the level 
it had during the War of Independence, so if the Allied Powers 
took measures against Greece they would have the approval of 
European public opinion. The government in Athens knew very 
well that its international position was weak and having no 
allies on its side who were ready to support her, Greece had 
necessarily to conform with the demands of the Western Powers. 
Reports from the Greek embassy in London to Paicos 
indicated that it was absolutely necessary for Greece to 
declare neutrality or suffer an Allied occupation. Two days 
after Clarendon's dispatch of April 18th to Wyse, Trikoupis 
informed Athens that a meeting took place in London between 
Clarendon and the French minister there. They decided that 
56 Parliamentary opinion was against the blockade of 
1850. In 1854 the Greek insurrection, however, was severely 
criticized. See sessions of March 13, 1854, Hansard, 3rd 
series, CXXXI, 704-52. 
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their governments should order their representatives in Con-
stantinople to prevent the Sublime Porte from declaring war 
against Greece, but for the present "to seize the ports of 
Greece as a payment for the borrowed loans to these (England 
57 
and France).'' When Wyse visited Paicos on the 13th the 
latter knew of the intentions of the Allied Powers so he was 
prepared to answer to the warnings and threats of Wyse with 
excuses and justifications for_the present position of Greece. 
The Greek foreign minister did not attempt to conceal the 
role of his government in the uprisings, and even confirmed 
that Greece had indeed purchased the Russian ships at Trieste 
58 for 120,000 florins. 
On April 11, Forth-Rouen and Wyse informed Paicos 
that any ships flying the Greek flag would be searched for 
arms and munitions, and if such are among the cargo of the 
ships they would be confiscated. Furthermore, the two repre-
sentatives warned that the Russian ships purchased by Greece 
for purposes of war would "be stopped and detained by the 
English and French naval forces" if they were to be put to 
59 
use against Turkey. Paicos realized that the worst was 
yet to come. He wrote to Mavrokordatos in Paris and asked 
57 A.Y.E. 1854 (18/3), Trikoupis to Paicos, London, 
April 10, 1854. 
58 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 14, 
1854. 
59 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 26, 
1854. 
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him to appeal to Drouyn de Lhuys and Thouvenel in order to 
review the situation in Greece. The Prime Minister felt that 
the threats from the French and British were unjustified since 
Greece, after all, did try to arrive at a compromise with the 
demands of Nechet Bey but the latter chose to break relations 
with the Greek government instead of working out the differ-
60 
ences. 
But how could France compromise her Near Eastern in-
terests for the sake of Greece? The compromise had to be made 
by Otho for he was in no position ·to do otherwise. Instead of 
softening his position, however, the king was more determined 
than ever to carry out his expansionist foreign policy. He 
was convinced that the revolution would be successful and 
that the Western Powers would then have to recognize that 
their interests were with a greater Greece and not with a 
weak Turkey. The Queen went even further: 
What can the Western Powers do to us, the Queen added, 
they'll take over Athens? Let them come; See here, we 
leave them our palace; we won't touch anything. If they 
wish to stay here we are moving to Thessaly. They'll 
prevent our ships from sailing? See here, Divine Provi-
dence is helping us; ••• they'll take a few of our war 
ships and will not allow us to move toward the sea? 
••• they will not tie our hands and feet and then say 
to the Turks: ''Come and kill them." But they will burn 
a few of our cities or our ships? In the revolution of 
1821 also they burned but Greece rebuilt, the damage is 
only material. 61 
60 Mavrokordatos Archive, 008-897, Paicos to Mavro-
kordatos, Athens, April 30, 1854. 
61 Pelikas, Memoirs, 166. 
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The only experience Greece had of a blockade was that of 1850, 
and it was primarily the commercial class which suffered more 
than any other class. The economy in general was also effec-
ted, however, since the commercial class was one of the stron-
gest economic sectors of Greece. The king only experienced 
humiliation of a political and moral nature not of the economic 
stress which did his people. 
In face of the threats and warnings of the Western Po-
wers the Greek Ministerial Council was divided, some fully sup-
porting the foreign policy of Otho, others too afraid to follow 
extreme measures which could lead to damaging results for the 
welfare of the nation. Two of the ministers, Pelikas and Provel-
gios, who were realistic enough to forsee the consequences of 
the Megali Idea policy asked Otho to accept their resignation 
as a means of protest and disapproval of the present course 
followed by Greece. 62 Not even protests from his own minis-
ters, however, were sufficiently strong to change the king's 
plans. 
The British and French ministers at Athens realized 
that if the pro-Russian ministry was dismissed by Otho and 
was substituted by "English" and "French" politicians, then 
possibly the king would be persuaded, if not forced, through 
the influence of the two Western Protecting Powers to give 
up his policy of expansionism. In a meeting with the repre-
sentatives of Austria, Prussia and Bavaria, who tried to per-
62 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 663-64. 
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suade the king to change the course of his actions, Otho 
flatly rejected the idea of change of ministry. All the 
ministers of the four Western Powers admitted that even if 
there was to be a change of government "it would be impos-
sible • to find anyone in the present state of affairs, 
to accept such an arrangement, or if they did, there was no 
63 
one, after former experience, who could trust His Majesty." 
On April 21, Wyse informed the Foreign Office that the king 
of Greece ignored the advice not only of the Allied Powers 
but also of the Germanic Powers and ~'still insists on be-
lieving the Russian promises." 64 Otho was not so much sold 
on Russian promises, however, as he was on the Megali Idea. 
At one point after the Greek-Turkish break of relations he 
wanted to lead an expedition to Thessaly and to proceed on 
with an army to Constantinople. He was persuaded, however, 
not to carry out such a mission by his ministers, especially 
65 by Pelikas and Provelgios. Under such leadership it was 
inevitable that an occupation was the next calamity that 
Greece would suffer. 
c. The Occupation of Greece 
On April 9, the four European Powers - - England, 
France, Austria and Prussia - - signed a protocol at Vienna 
63 F.O. 32/216, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, April 21, 1854. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 646 
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66 laying down the measures to be taken concerning Greece. 
There was disagreement between the French foreign minister 
and Clarendon as to how the occupation of Greece should be 
handled. Drouyn de Lhuys feared that a blockade at Piraeus 
such as that of 1850 would create panic and chaos in the main-
land whereas a blockade in Thessaly and Epirus was more prac-
tical under the circumstances since there were the areas of 
trouble. Clarendon opposed this proposition because he feared 
that an Anglo-French blockade in Epirus and Thessaly would 
stimulate more uprisings which could possibly spread as far 
67 
as Constantinople. 
The Germanic Powers on the other hand which were sym-
pathetic to Otho and were deeply concerned about the effects 
an occupation would have on his throne voiced their opinions 
against both Clarendon's and Drouyn de Lhuys' plans of occupa-
tion. Franz Josef wrote to Maximilian: 
I will willingly give you the promise that, whatever re-
sults the war might have, I would not permit any agree-
ment which would be against the continued existence of 
the kingdom of Greece under the Bavarian Dynasty. I would 
even enlist my good services with England and France so 
that these Powers could express their opinions and act ac-
cordingly. I would look upon it as a political advantage, 68 
if Greece were to find her supporters in the Germanic Powers. 
Otho was fortunate in that he still had some protection for his 
throne from the Germanic Powers •. As he was aware of this he 
66 Donta, Crimean War, 122-23. 
67 A.Y.E. 1854 (18/3), Trikoupis to Paicos, London, 
April 10, 1854. 
68 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho !, 198-99. 
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acted as the absolute monarch which he was from 1837 to 1843. 
on May 2, he ordered the chambers closed by royal ordinance. 
Pelikas immediately protested this act. Other politicians 
also protested for they felt that at times of crises, as the 
one Greece was suffering, there was a need to maintain the 
69 Chambers in session. The king argued that the government 
was in need of funds so he thought that by closing the cham-
hers he would save money from the salaries of senators. The 
reason behind Otho's act, however, was the fear that "the 
senate might take some hostile act l.eading to the fall of 
70 
the Cabinet." 
The Allied Powers (France ~nd England) decided to use 
the payments due by Greece to the Protecting Powers for the 
guaranteed loan as an excuse to justify legally their occupa-
tion of Greece. Wyse addressed a note to the Greek govern-
ment on May lOth stating that: 
Her Majesty's Government will no longer allow the reve-
nues of Greece, the first proceeds of which should by 
Treaty be appropriated to the payment of the charges of 
the Greek loans, to be diverted from that object and 
applied to the promotion of schemes in the interest of 
a Power with which they are at war; and that if it per-
sists in its present misguided policy the Greek Govern-
ment must not be surprised if measures are taken by Eng-
land and France ••• to control the receipts and expen-
ditures of the Greek ex-chequer, and to deprive the Greek 
Government of these pecuniary resources which are so wan-
tonly misapplied. 71 
69 Pelikas, Memoirs, 199-201. 
70 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 273. 
71 Cited in Levandis, Greek Foreign Debt, 50. 
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Rouen sent a similar note to Paicos stating the rights of 
French interference in Greek Affairs since Greece had not 
been capable of discharging her obligations to the French 
72 government. Drouyn de Lhuys was even more severe with 
the Greek government than Clarendon. He warned Paicos that 
Greek war ships should not sail in the open sea, and if any 
of them violated this warning they would be subject to con-
73 
fiscation by French naval forces. 
On May 13, French and British war ships entered the 
port of Piraeus. The next day Wyse and Rouen sent an ulti-
matum to the Greek government. When Otho realized that his 
throne was at stake he gave up his current policy and pubic-
ly declared the neutrality of Greece in the conflict between 
74 
the Allied Powers and Russia. All the advice and warnings 
from the European leaders concerning a possible Anglo-French 
occupation in the event Greece antagonized Turkey were insuf-
ficient to persuade the king to change his policy. He was 
so blinded by the enthusiasm of the Megali Idea that only a 
foreign invasion could make him realize the stupidity of his 
foreign policy. As a result of the irresponsible conduct of 
the Greek monarch and of the British and French who were 
ready to occupy any country that would stand in the way of 
72 Le Moniteur Universal {No. 134), May 14, 1854. 
73 Donta, Crimean War, 127-28. 
74 F.O. 32/217, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, May 27, 
1854. 
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their political, economic and strategic interests, the people 
of "little Greece" suffered a three-year long invasion. 
Hith the declaration of neutrality came the fall of 
the pro-"Russian" ministry as the Allied Powers had wished 
and Alexander Mavrokordatos was summoned by the king on May 
75 
16, to form a new ministry. The new administration an-
nounced shortly after it took power the position of Greece 
in relation to the Western European Powers: 
We feel the dreadful position of Greece in which the 
nation's matters are found. Commerce was eliminated 
from the hands of thousands of businessmen, navigation 
was condemned to idleness, and other dangers threatened 
the nation, abandoned to the disfavor of the Great Po-
wers. • • His Majesty our King, respecting in his 
fatherly concern these sufferings and dangers he con-
sented to the two naval Powers, England and France, com-
plete neutrality because from this the dangers are pre-
vented and the benefits, we were being deprived of, are 
being recovered. We respect as no one else the kind 
sympathy of the Greeks for our brothers in whose for-
tune are concerned the Great Powers. 76 
The new cabinet was made up of members of the "English" and 
"French" parties \-lho were against the policy of expansionism 
and were not puppets of the Crown as were previous ministers 
ever since Kolettes. As a result of the change of ministry, 
and of course the Anglo-French occupation, the king's power 
75 A. Mavrokordatos, President of the Council and 
Minister of Finance, Riga Palamides, Minister of the Interior, 
Admiral Canaris, Minister of Marine, P. Argyropoulos, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, General Kalergis, Minister of War, Calli-
gas, Minister of Justice, and Psylas, Minister of Religion and 
Public Instruction. 
76 Cited in Kordatos, Modern Gre~, III, 648. 
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was substantially diminished. If it was not for the powerful 
influence of the Germanic Powers who had not yet committed 
themselves in the Crimean War, 77 the king of Greece would 
have been forced to abdicate. Baron de Thile received in-
structions from his government to protect the king's rights 
78 
against any possible abuses of the Occupying Powers. The 
king of Prussia was very disappointed to hear of the Anglo-
French occupation of Greece and was mostly worried about Otho's 
future when he wrote Maximilian that the kingdom of Greece was 
dearly regarded by him. Otho's father, Ludwig, further wrote 
that he opposed the sinister plans of the Protecting Powers 
with regards to Greece and that their recent occupation was 
illegal and would never be recognized by his kingdon. He 
noted that: 
A state which has been brought into existence by Three 
should be devasted by Two, secondly, that the creation 
of the Three shall be accepted and represented in the 
European family of States. In the same way "we" will 
only recognize the disintegration of the state of Hellas 
by the general decision of all. European Monarchs: but 
we can guarantee immediately that we shall not recognize 
such a beginning. This is my proposal. 79 
Even though Otho still had the German support, the occupying 
forces made his position very difficult in the realm. He 
17 For the ambivalant attitude of the Hapsburg Empire 
in the Crimean War, see B. Jelavich, The Hapsburg Empire in 
European Affairs, 1814-1918 (Chicago, 1969), 69-79. Also see 
Paul W. Schroedor, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean Har 
(Cornell University, 1972), 143-231. ------
78 Donta, Crimean War, 134-35. 
19 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho !• 200, also see 
Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 978-79. 
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began retreating to the wishes of Wyse and Rauen on matters 
of policy and of government personnel. One of the matters in 
which the two representatives of England and France came to 
sharp opposition with the king of Greece was about the appoint-
ment of General Kalergis as Minister of War. Kalergis was 
80 
exiled to England where he had met Napoleon III and had be-
come a very close friend of his. When the occupation began 
Kalergis, as well as the other members of the Ministerial 
Council, was forced upon the king. At first Wyse objected to 
the Kalergis appointment because he feared that the General 
was a radical pro-"French" politician and could present prob-
lems to the British interests in Greece. Rouen, however, in-
sisted that Kalergis be retained in the ministry and the 
81 French minister's wish was fulfilled. 
The removal of the king's pro-Russian advisors was 
another desired goal of Wyse and Rouen which was achieved 
82 
with the occupation. 
Before the ministry would accept office they required the 
retirement of General Spiro Millos, General Mamouris, Gen-
eral Gardiakotti Grivas and General Molokotroni, Grand 
Marechal, from their post of aides de camp to His Majesty. 
This post is more than honorary in this country. It allows 
8° Kalergis took part in the September Revolution of 
1843 and was one of the most hated enemies of Otho. 
81 Donta, Crimean War, 135-36. Kalergis wanted to re-
place Otho with a French Prince and this presented a direct 
threat to Otho but also an indirect threat to Great Britain, 
see Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 650. 
82 Donta, Crimean War, 137-38. 
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continual and easy access to the royal ear; these generals 
have been recently charged with the special task of sup-
porting the insurrection and generals, Spiro Millos, 
Mamouris and Kolokotronis, have been the zealous and un-
scrupulous abettors and chief leaders under Russian aus-
pices of the whole intrigue. 83 
Kalergis was instrumental in many schemes to degrade Otho for 
reasons of revenge and for political reasons as well. As long 
as he had the French Legation's support, Kalergis was ready to 
display his powers with unlimited selfishness and disregard 
for the humiliation of Greece which the Occupying Powers were 
responsible for and he was an instru~ent of their plans. "The 
conspicuous role," writes Donta, "which the French dramatized 
with Rouen as its leader, allowed Kalergis, since Mavrokordatos 
had not yet arrived from Paris, to become, in the protection 
of the French, all powerful." 84 The king and Greece itself 
were further humiliated by the continuous displays of French 
military strength which Admiral Tinan, 85 head of French occu-
pation forces, was so anxious to parade in the streets of 
86 Athens and even in front of the gates of Otho's palace. 
83 F.O. 32/217, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, June 12, 1854. 
84 Donta, Crimean War, 139. 
85 In March 1854 Admiral Tinal warned the Greeks of 
Thessaly that France was committed to help defend the Turkish 
soil and that they, the Thessaloi, should not aid the revolu-
tionaries. See Georgiou, "Thessaly Insurrection of 1854," 740. 
86 Dragoumes, Recollections, 192. 
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Such abuses by the French and General Kalergis forced 
Otho to call quickly for Mavrokordatos' return to Athens. Th~ 
new administration had been declared in the middle of May but 
the new Prime Minister was not in Greece to lead the govern-
ment. After he received a letter from the king on May 27th, 
87 
requesting that he form and lead the new ministry, Mavro-
kordatos responded that he preferred to serve as ambassador 
to Paris. The reason for the decline of the king's request 
by the minister was that he wanted to be certain that Otho 
understood clearly that there would"be no pro-French favori-
tism played by Mavrokordatos, and he further wished to clari-
fy the king's position toward the future government of Greece. 
The king wrote to Mavrokordatos once again persuading him to 
return to Athens by the middle of July. 89 
The new Prime Minister was sworn-in on the morning of 
July 29, and took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held 
by Argyropoulos who became the Minister of Finance, since 
May 16. Otho assured the new Prime Minister of the coopera-
8 7 Mavrokordatos Archives 008,909, Otho to Mavrokor-
datos, Athens, May 27, 1854. 
88 Donta, Crimean War, 141. Otho had sent an offi-
cial dispatch to Mavrokordatos on May 16 ordering him to be-
come Prime Minister, see Mavrokordatos Archives 008,911, Otho 
to Mavrokordatos, Athens, May 16, 1854. 
89 Mavrokordatos owed the sum of 50,000 dr. in debts 
to French lenders which had to be paid by the Greek govern-
ment if he wished to be allowed to leave Paris. This delayed 
his return to Greece. See Petrakakos, ~istory of Greece, 163, 
also Koutroumbas, Revolution ~ 1854, 158-59. 
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90 
tion of the Court in both domestic and foreign affairs, so 
there were no problems to be expected since no antagonism 
between court and government would exist. Otho, however, was 
used to being an absolute ruler and his sense of the word "co-
operation" did not mean subordination to the Occupying Powers, 
as Rouen and Wyse thought. 
Before Mavrokordatos was sworn-in he met with the rep-
resentatives of the Allied Powers on July 23rd to discuss what 
they thought "ought to be the policy of the government before 
91 he formally accepted off~ce.'' The king was informed by 
Mavrokordatos that it was his intention to schedule such a 
meeting with Rouen and Wyse and Otho had approved, but not 
without expressing his discontent with both representatives. 
Rouen wrote to Drouyn de Lhuys that, "the king's insistence 
in forcing the new ministers to protest against the Anglo-
French occupation, had produced a very bad impression on pub-
lie opinion and he has given reasons concerning the steady 
willingness of this Prince to keep his promises opposite 
France and England.'' 92 Wyse also wrote to his government 
that Rouen denied that there were any grounds for the impres-
sions which had taken possession of the king. He also main-
9° F.O. 32/219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 31, 
1854. 
91 F.O. 32/219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 27, 
1854. 
92 Gr~ce 68 (No. 87), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, 
June 7, 1854. 
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tained that the policy carried out by both the French and 
British Legations in Athens was straight forward and could 
be summarized in two categories, (A) the observance of Greek 
neutrality and (B) a radical political change in system for 
the future. Wyse went on to write: 
With regard to the second object we held in view, a radi-
cal change of the whole system. • • • There was no one 
department of government which did not need the largest 
and most sweeping reforms. Each of these would in turn 
demand and receive his most careful attention. Elections 
were to be made free, finance rescued from ruin, corrup-
tion repressed, good faith and national credit restored. 
In seconding all these desirable ameliorations, our two 
governments had but one policy, as one purpose, the per-
manent happiness and security of Greece. 93 
If one reads beyond all the fine things Wyse and Rouen had 
in mind for Greece, it is obvious that political and financial 
control were the objectives strived for by both France and 
England. The occupying Powers were promising freedom from 
the bonds of absolutism, the restoration of the principles 
of the constitution and stability, economic and political, 
for Greece while their naval forces occupied Greece thus 
denying her independence. Furthermore, Wyse and Rouen, wished 
to eliminate the powers of the king and give those powers not 
to the poeple of Greece but to their respective countries. 
What is worse than the hypocrisy of the Occupying Powers is 
the fact that the Greeks believed in the myth that the Pro-
tecting Powers would really help their nation to achieve its 
goals, whether they would be national expansion, as in the 
93 Ibid. 
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case of the "Russian" party, internal reform as was the case 
with the "English" party or both as the followers of the 
"French'' party believed. 
One of the immediate concerns of the Allied Powers 
was the restoration of Greek-Turkish relations and the end 
of all traces of the revolution in the Provinces. In order 
to be successful in their task the complete cooperation of 
court and government were essential. Monsieur Guerin, French 
Consul at Syra, was selected by Rouen to represent France in 
Lamia where negotiations were to open in order to end hostili-
ties and restore relations between Greece and the Sublime 
Porte. Merlin, vice consul at Athens, was the British rep-
94 
resentative and Colonel Pakenor represented the Greeks. 
The Greek ministry and especially General Kalergis worked with 
the British and French representatives to insure the end of 
the insurrection and the end of brigandage so further hostili-
ties with the Sublime Porte might be prevented. Most of the 
94 Professor Georgiou, Thessaly Insurrection of 1854, 
maintains that the Thessaly undertaking was terminated pri-
marily due to the intervention of the Allied Powers and es-
pecially France when M. Guerin was sent to Lamia in June. 
See Georgiou, 740-45. Colonel Pakonor was sent to disband 
the large force which Hadji-Petros commanded in Thessaly. 
According to Wyse 10,000 men were led by Hadji-Petro who 
fought his last battle against the Turks on June 6. See 
F.O. 32/217, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 7, 1854. Also 
see Koutroumbas, Revolution £l 1854, 166-68. 
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chiefs of Greek insurrectionary bands were out of Turkish 
95 
territory by the middle of June. Rouen reported to the 
Quai d'Orsay on June 7th, that, 
Theodore Grivas, Tsavellas, Ragos and a great number of 
officers returned to Greece already, in order to declare 
submission to the government. Epirus may regard such time 
as very peaceable. The defeat of the Greeks in Skoulikar-
gia provoked the last blow in the revolution of that Pro-
vince. 96 
Grivas, as well as other leaders of the insurrection promised 
to support the new ministry even though it was in fact a 
97 
"ministry of occupation." One o~ the immediate consequences 
of the Anglo-French occupation was the political division ere-
ated among politicians as well as the public. There was a 
sharp division between those who supported the Anglo-French 
intervention in Greece and those who were Russian supporters. 
The division was even sharper when the king became the spokes-
man against Anglo-French occupation and Kalergis the spokes-
man of the occupying forces. In June the Minister of War went 
so far as to defend the foreign troops to a group of Greek 
army officers who had been outspoken about the abuses of the 
98 
French in Piraeus and in Athens. 
95 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 17, 1854. 
96 Grece 68 (No. 87), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, 
June 7, 1854. 
97 Grivas was considered suspicious by the new adminis-
tration and was not trusted by the ministers. See Koutroumbas, 
Revolution of 1854, 178. For the retreat of the chiefs see F.O. 
32/218, \-JysetOCTarendon, Athens, June 17, 1854, also Mavrokor-
datos Archive 008, 916, Grivas to Louka, May 26, 1854. 
98 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 27, 1854. 
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Public opinion was an important concern of both Wyse 
and Rouen. In the beginning of the occupation Wyse believed 
that the people of Greece were thrilled to see foreign troops 
99 
on their soil. By the middle of August, however, he was 
very concerned about the rising of anti-French and anti-Brit-
ish attitudes among the Greeks. Wyse was convinced that the 
attacks of the Greek press against the foreign troops at 
Pireaus were in the interest of the Russians and the "Russian" 
party as well as the Camarilla. He wrote to Clarendon that 
there was little that he and Rouen could do to control the 
slanderous remarks of the press because it had the support 
of the entire government behind it. He went on to write that: 
The chief of these organs here are the Aion and the Elpis; 
the Aion the old supporter of Russian policy and proceed-
ings and no\v of the Court; and the Elpis the newly sti-
pended advocate of the same party, at times repeating in 
its columns the very language of the Palace, and even of 
the Queen. 100 
Wyse was correct in maintaining that the press shared the 
nationalism of the court and the "Russian" party but it also 
reflected the nationalist sentiments of the public which wished 
nothing more than the defeat of Turkey and her Western Allies 
who were occupying Greek soil. 
99 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 7, 1854. 
100 F.O. 32/220, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
August 22, 1854. 
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Besides the blow to their independence shattered by 
the Powers who helped to create the nation of Greece, the 
occupied subjects fell victims to a physical disaster brought 
by the occupation forces. One of the worst cases of cholera 
ever to hit Greece was responsible for the lives of thousands 
in a very short period. A French ship carrying soldiers from 
Crimea came to the port of Piraeus in early June. A number of 
men carrying the deadly disease were taken off the ship to be 
hospitalized in a temporary hospital set up by the occupying 
forces. This was the beginning of a disaster which claimed, 
it is estimated, seven thousand lives in Piraeus and thi.rty 
101 thousand in Athens. A panic hit the country as people 
began leaving their property and loved ones to escape death. 
In Piraeus only sixty families were left after a few days of 
the spreading of the disease. Dragoumes who was fortunate to 
live through this catastrophe describes it in the following 
manner: 
After a short while the streets were converted to deserts, 
the working shops shut down, inside the houses all voices 
were morbid and the town from one end to the other became 
quiet from the infinite lack of people; only the sound of 
your own footsteps ascended to your and it roused 
your fright. Here and there you'd meet a man slow-walk-
ing alone with a face of wonder and lividness •••• 
Laws, police, hospitals, doctors, everything and everyone 
had been paralyzed by fear and'death. 102 
101 Fotiades, The Exile, 227. 
102 Dragoumes, Recollections, II, 197-98. 
, 
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The disease spread as far as the islands when many people who 
carried it tried to escape the horror of Athens and Piraeus 
103 before they died. Due to the cholera the occupying for-
ces asked to be allowed to relocate at Patesia (an area out-
side Athens which was not contaminated), but their request 
was flatly denied by the Prime Minister who threatened to 
104 
resign if the Anglo-French troops relocated. 
Mavrokordatos was only trying to prevent the disease 
from spreading any more than it already had, but apparently 
his denial of the forces' removal was received in bad faith 
by the French Admiral de Tinan. The Admiral chose to create 
a major incident and once again displayed his authority to 
the devastated Greek nation. When the Minister of Justice, 
P. Bargoles, recalled the alternate district attorneys of 
Patras and Nauplia and proceeded to promote the Justice of 
the Peace of Piraeus, Admiral Tinan accused the minister of 
being a Russophile and even threatened him personally that 
action would be taken to have him removed from office. In 
view of such direct intervention by officials of the Occupy-
ing Powers in the affairs of the Greek state, Mavrokordatos 
could only vigorously protest to Wyse and Rouen and insist 
103 Fotiades, The Exile, 297-98 
104 Evagelides, Otho, 572-79, also Kyriakides, Con-
temporary Greeks, 672-73-.---
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for an immediate settlement. Realizing the impact such an 
affair could have on the public mind and the European com-
munity after the press picked it up, the two representatives 
105 
settled it immediately. Direct and indirect interven-
tion in Greek state affairs by the Allied Powers was what 
Greece could expect under the circumstances. It was ~he 
price that Greece had to pay for the foolishness of a na-
tionalist-expansionist foreign policy pursued by an irres-
ponsible monarch and a pro-Russian and royalist cabinet. 
D. Restoration of Greek-Turkish Relations 
and the Treaty of Kalinja 
The occupation of Greece by the two Western Protect-
ing Powers was illega~ for it violated the treaty of 1832 
which guaranteed Greece its independence. Just as the Brit-
ish blockade of 1850 was illegal because France and Russia 
had not been informed of it until after it took place, simi-
larly 1854 Franco-British occupation was illegal because 
Russia, the third Protecting Power, did not consent to the 
actions of the other two Protecting Powers. 
For most Greeks as well as those sympathetic to 
Greece it was expected that the occupation like the blockade 
of 1850 would be a temporary affair, but more than eight 
months had passed since the Franco-British naval forces lan-
ded in Piraeus and there was no sign that they would be leav-
lOS Evangelides, Ibid., 579-81. 
, 
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ing. In an attempt to justify the continuing Anglo-French 
occupation of Greece Wyse wrote the following dispatch to 
the Foreign Minister of Great Britain: 
The "occupation" '"as designed to secure Turkey from law-
less aggression, and to establish good government in 
Greece. The Frontier is tranquil, but good government 
has only commenced. The most important organic laws, 
respecting Electoral and Municipal Reforms, the Regula-
tion of the Press, the liberalizing of the tariff, the 
reorganization of Education, the reconstruction of the 
army, the ensuring the independence and purity of the 
bench, the revival of Commerce, the development of In-
dustry, the reestablishment of friendly relations, based 
on commercial and extradition treaties, with Turkey, have 
all to pass. The purification of every Department of 
Administration from the corru~tion and incapacity in 
which the old system had flung them, has to be effected. 
If the facts supported these claims of the British minister 
perhaps the Greek historians would regard the period of the 
occupation as one of the greatest in Modern Greece. But how 
can any "occupation" of one nation by another, no matter what 
the good intentions of the Occupying Powers are, be benefic!-
ary to the occupied people when it is a recognized fact by 
all those politically conscious that the first guiding prin-
ciple of all nations is their own national self-interests. 
In spite Wyse's theoretical jargon which was only intended, 
as was pointed out above, to judtify an occupation of a 
helpless country, the issue of immediate concern to both 
ministers of the Allied Powers in Greece was the restoration 
of Greek-Turkish relations. The occupying forces would never 
106 F.O. 32/227 (No. 7), Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
January 17, 1855. 
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leave Piraeus if relations between Greece and Turkey re-
mained broken. In an interview which took place at St. 
cloud between the Emperor Napoleon III and Mavrokordatos 
before the latter became Prime Minister, Napoleon expressed 
his determination to have Greece observe neutrality towards 
Turkey. He told Mavrokordatos that the king of Greece and 
the government must reestablish relations with the Sublime 
Porte otherwise, if the king intended to adopt another con-
duct, "he (Napoleon) should not only retain the force of 
5,000 men now in Greece but if necessary increase it to 
10,000 or even 20,000, until it was sufficient to accomplish 
107 
this object." The restoration of relations with Turkey 
was Mavrokordatos' desired goal who believed that Greek ex-
pansion was a dream for the present and a policy only for 
the distant future. 
Early in August the Prime Minister took the first 
steps to open negotiations with the Sultan's government. He 
communicated with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and proposed 
to send M. Barozzi, ex-consul at Andrianople, to represent 
108 Greece in Constantinople. During this time Mavrokordatos 
also took measures to end brigandage in the Greek-Turkish 
107 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 8, 
1853. 
108 F.O. 32/219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, August 11, 
1854. 
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frontiers realizing that the presence of this element in Greece 
presented a threat to the Ottoman Empire and could affect the 
Greek government's attempts to restore relations with Turkey. 
Furthermore, the new administration made efforts to restore 
109 
Ottoman property plundered by the insurgents. 
In the first conference which was held in Constantinople 
between the representatives of England, France, Greece and Tur-
key, the Sublime Porte expressed its enthusiasm with the Mav-
rokordatos government and was pleased with his proposal of a 
commercial treaty between Greece and Turkey. Reshid Pasha, 
the Turkish representative at the conference, however, contin-
ued to press for "the recognition for the principle of indem-
nity," which meant that an already economically weak Greece 
would have to pay for damaRes it never committed directly 
110 
since it never declared war on Turkey. Stratford de 
Redcliffe, who was just as anxious as Napoleon and Mavrokor-
datos to have Greek-Turkish relations normalized again, was 
more concerned with the security of the Greek-Turkish fron-
tiers than anything else for he feared that the threat of a 
109 F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 
11, 1854, also F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, Septem-
ber 7, 1854. 
110 Mavrokordatos Archive 008,971, Barozze to Mavro-
kordatos, Constantinople, September 28, 1854, also F.O. 32/221, 
Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 27, 1854. 
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nationalist revolt could change the character of the Eastern 
Ouest ion. The Greeks on the other hand hoped to gain in com-
mercial and navigational benefits from the Treaty. So the 
problem was to draw up such a compromise settlement which 
would satisfy all parties involved. Stratford wrote to Wyse 
on this matter that: 
It is essential to have the bases of the commercial treaty 
in a more intelligible and definite form. Turkey is se-
curing to Greece the advantages desirable from commerce 
and navigation with the Imperial territories is entitled 
to have its tranquility guaranteed on the score of abuses 
in protection, and other matte~s of intercommunication 
between the two countries so delicately circumstanced 
towards each other. 111 
Stratford de Redcliffe accused Mavrokordatos of delaying the 
conclusion of the Treaty by not conforming to the stated wishes 
of the Sublime Porte,.namely, the guarantees of security and 
the principle of indemnity. 112 By early December the Greek 
Prime Minister was persuaded by Rouen and Wyse to meet the 
demands of the Sublime Porte so that the treaty could be worked 
113 
out. 
One of the major objections which the Greek government 
had concerning the procedure for the treaty negotiations before 
111 F.O. 32/222, Private, Stratford de Redcliffe to Wyse, 
Constantinople, November 29, 1854. 
112 Barozze informed Mavrokordatos that Stratford de 
Redcliffe was a philhellene and "hoped for a great future for 
our country'' but that he wanted things his way. Mavrokordatos 
Archive 008,971, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, 
September 28, 1854. 
113 
F.O. 32/222, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 7, 
1854. 
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the substance of the treaty began to be negotiated was the 
demand of the Sublime Porte that Mavrokordatos should send 
to Constantinople an Envoy Extraordinary who was to beg par-
don on behalf of the king of Greece, for what had happened 
in Epirua, Thessaly and Chalcidice. This seemed an outrag-
eous demand to the Greek Court as well as to many supporters 
of Otho who felt that by fulfilling such a demand Greece would 
be admitting the king's involvement in the revolution. It was 
not only a humiliating act against the king but also against 
the honor of the Greek nation. 
Immediately the Greek press attacked the Sublime Porte 
and its Allies for making such a demand on an occupied country. 
The following article was published in Elpis (Hope) in early 
January. 
That neither Mr. Mavrokordatos, nor any other minister of 
Greece will ever consent to such humiliation, is to us 
quite certain. We are only sorry to see that Mr. Mavro-
kordatos, who has sufficient perspicacity, did not long 
ago forsee that which we so long repeated; that as long 
as the war shall continue between the Western Powers and 
Russia, the reestablishment of our relations is an idle 
fancy. Since the Governments interested, in order to 
justify before the public opinion of Europe the measures 
taken against Greece, qualified the last struggle of the 
Christians in Turkey and the part which Greece took there-
in, as a Russian Movement; ••• the hatred against Russia, 
inspired the Belligerent Powers, as well as those who re-
main neutral, with the desire of humiliating her, and orig-114 inated also the idea, that every Greek was a spy of Russia. 
Mavrokordatos' position was that of the middle man who was con-
tinuously pressured by Rouen and Wyse on the one hand and Otho 
114 ELPIS (No. 788), Athens, January 1, 1855. 
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on the other to carry out contradictory policies. 
At the beginning of his appointment the Prime Minister 
seemed to please the king because he checked the power of 
Kalergis. Otho believed that Mavrokordatos would not be the 
sort of puppet to Wyse and Rouen that Kalergis was and, fur-
thermore, the king was convinced that the new Prime Minister 
would be devoted to the Crown. The good relationship that 
existed between the king and Mavrokordatos in July was re-
placed by antagonism in September. The reason for this, pri-
marily, was the fact that the French and British representa-
tives' pressure in Athens kept the new administration as far 
from the king's influence as was possible. In a letter to 
Francis Joseph, Otho complained that he had entrusted his 
Prime Minister the full cooperation of the Court but as he 
put it: 
Mavrokordatos was not able though until today to live up 
to my hopes, with which we supported him ••• The foreign 
intervention in the internal affairs of the country which 
is based on the strength of the foreign forces stationed 
near the capital, prevent him in his actions. • I beg 
you then, as is the interest of the independence of Greece, 
that you take a stand and declare, that it is time to 
finally put an end to the occupation. 115 
Opposition to Mavrokordatos came not only from the king but 
from faithful ministers to the king whose devotion to Otho 
exceeded their devotion to their parties. Riga Palamides, 
115 Otho to Francis Josef, Athens, September 1, 1854. 
Cited in Skandames, Kingdom £i Otho, 980-81. 
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Minister of the Interior, and Christides, Minister of Finance, 
were two of the most prominent political figures who turned 
against the Prime Minister, thereby, creating a schism within 
the administration. Consequently, the polarization of the 
two opposing forces, the Anglo-French on the one side and the 
royalists on the other, was becoming greater and the power of 
Mavrokordatos was diminishing. 
On December 12, Riga Palamides wrote a letter to Fuad 
Pasha cautioning him and his government against the intentions 
116 
of Greek Prime Minister who happened to be a Phanariot. 
He warned Fuad Pasha that Mavrokordatos should not be trusted 
in so far as the negotiations for the restoration of Greek-
117 
Turkish conflict were concerned. When the British repre-
sentative in Athens discovered that Palamides had warned Fuad 
Pasha about Mavrokordatos' intentions and that Christides in 
collaboration with the Minister of the Interior were waging 
war on the Prime Minister he felt that the entire affair was 
the scheme of the Crown. He wrote to Clarendon that: 
116 . Phanariotes came from a section in Constantinople 
and many of them worked in the Greek or Turkish government. 
They were well off and many took part in the War of Indepen-
dence. The Turks viewed them with suspicion. 
117 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,043, Secret and Confi-
dential, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, January 3, 
1855. 
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Mr. Christides' opinions are well known, and his late al-
liance with Riga Palamides and Gardiakotte Grivas is based 
on the hopes of giving them early effect. He would not 
venture on such a course, however, without the countenance 
of the Court, no more than the Court would show such coun-
tenance, unless they witnessed the intimacy of M. Chris-
tides with the French Legation, and entertained the pre-
sumption, that no control had been exercifrH over his de-
signs, or such control had been in vain. 
The Mavrokordatos administration was made up of politicians 
affiliated with both "French" and "English" parties and be-
cause the occupying forces had one policy in the Near East it 
was assumed that these two parties would hold the same. Even 
though this assumption holds true ·to a large extent for the 
consensus on the foreign policy of the Mavrokordatos minis-
try, the same did not hold true for any other measures. Fur-
thermore, Mavrokordatos was a member of the "English" party 
which those who belon~ed to the "French" had traditionally 
opposed. But the feuds that were developing among the mem-
bers of the ministry were not due simply to party differences 
but to basic differences between support of the Crown which 
to many meant support of Greece or support of the Occupying 
Forces. And it was primarily the king who was behind such 
a movement, for the obvious reasons, and not as much the 
French Legation as Wyse emphasizes. 
Palamides and Christides charged that Mavrokordatos 
and the Allied Powers were responsible for stalling the treaty 
118 F.o. 32/227, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
January 24, 1855. 
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with the Sublime Porte and by so doing they were responsible 
for the economic loss suffered by the Greek commerce and navi-
119 gation. Barozze, however, gained the confidence of the 
representatives of England, France and Turkey in Constantinople 
and he made considerable progress in the negotiations. 120 
By early May the Greek Court and the two Western Powers agreed 
to a large extent on the terms of the treaty between Greece 
and the Ottoman Empire. Upon the advice of France and England, 
Andreas Koundouriotes was appointed Minister to Constantinople 
and Riza-Halel Bey, Minister at Athens. The treaty, which took 
almost a year to be worked out, was signed at Kalinja on May 
27th 1855, by Koundouriotes and Fuad Pasha. The title of the 
treaty was "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the King-
dom of Greece and the.Ottoman Empire" and some of the key ar-
ticles in it are listed below: 
Article I. "The subjects of His Majesty the King of Greece 
and those of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, can in each of 
the two States, exercise reciprocally commerce by land and by 
sea, with total freedom and security." 
119 F.O! 32/227, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 
14, 1855. 
120 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,051, Barozze to Mavro-
kordatos, Constantinople, January 27, 1855. It was fortunate 
for Mavrokordatos that the Sublime Porte did not take the 
propaganda letter of R. Palamides ~eriously and continued the 
negotiations in good faith, see Mavrokordatos Archive 009,043, 
Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, January 20, 1855. 
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Article II. "The subjects of each party in the contract will 
be exempt in the state of the other from all conscription and 
from all military service on land or sea, of whatever nature 
it may be." 
Article IV. "The merchant ships, of the two High parties con-
tracted, whether they are empty or carrying a cargo of mer-
chandise or other articles of whatever type will navigate in 
complete freedom and security, under their own flag in the 
seas and waters of either country." 
Article VIII. "The war vessels of each Power which meet ships 
belonging to the merchant marine of the other, will allow 
these to freely continue their route and even aid them in case 
of need." 
Article XII. "The subjects of one and the other Power can 
freely buy and trade in any part of the two respective states 
merchandise bought from foreign countries without being sub-
ject to various dues. " . . 
Article XIX, "It is agreed that no war ship can provide and 
arm in the ports and the shores of either of the high contrac-
121 
ted parties." 
After Koundouriotes was appointed Minister at Constantinople 
Fuad Pasha expressed his governments full confidence in Mavro-
kordatos, see A.Y.E. 1855, 19/1 (No. 71, Koundouriotes to 
Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, April 24, 1855. 
121 For the full text in Turkish, Greek and French see 
,. 
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This treaty which normalized commercial and navigational rela-
tions between the Sublime Porte and Greece lasted until 1897 
when Greece made another attempt to bring the Megali Idea into 
122 
reality, and after the resolution of that conflict it was 
123 
modif1ed and it lasted until 1923. 
France and England, and especially Stratford de Red-
cliffe, believed that they had achieved a major diplomatic 
victory by the negotiation of and success of this treaty and 
Redcliffe wrote to the Greek Prime Minister after the treaty 
124 
was signed to express his satis~action with its results. 
Greece was also pleased with the establishment of the treaty. 
On June 8th, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate passed 
125 the treaty and issued it henceforth as a law of the nation. 
A.Y.E. 1855 a.a.k/H. This treaty is also in British and 
Foreign State Papers, LVI, 1381-89, also in G. Moradounghian, 
ed., Recueil d'actes internationaux del' empire Ottoman, II· 
(Paris, 1897-1903),-437-44. 
122 See F. Tatsios, "The Megali Idea and the Greek-
Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on 
Greek Irredentism; 1866-1897," Ph.D. Dissertation, University 
of Columbia, 1973. 
123 Donta, Crimean War, 144. 
124 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,088, Stratford de 
Redcliffe to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, June 9, 1855. 
125 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,087, The Treaty and 
the Resolution of the Chambers and Senate are included. 
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Wyse felt that the Treaty placed the relations of 
Greece "with Turkey, on a far surer and clearer foundation, 
than they were before and ••• it will much facilitate, it 
is to be hoped, for the future, the maintainance of peace 
126 
and order between the two countries. " The people who 
benefited most were those in commerce for during the year of 
disrupted relations with Turkey they suffered greatly and as 
a result the Greek economy also deteriorated considerably. 
As Wyse remarked in a note appraising the Treaty: 
Its (the Treaty's) immediate ~esults to the commercial 
interests of this country are incalculable. Mr. Consul 
Wilkinson states it to me, to be his conviction that had 
the state of interruption and exclusion, consequent on 
the breaking up of diplomatic relations between Greece 
and Turkey been allowed to continue, it necessarily would 
have been been had not overtures for the present Treaty 
been made throu·gh this Legation and the Embassy in Con-
stantinople, there is little doubt, that Greek commerce 
would have suffered a disturbance very little different 
from general bankruptcy and ruin. 127 
In spite of the general approval and enthusiasm concerning 
the Treaty there was some opposition by the press under the 
control of Riga Palamides, C. Levides, Soutso and Christides, 
all well known royalists who were opposed to Mavrokordatos 
and the Anglo-French attempts to restore Greek Turkish rela-
128 
tions. Otho and his followers did not care so much about 
126 F.O. 32/230, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 17, 
1855. 
1Z7 Ibid. 
128 F.O. 32/230, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 17, 
1855. 
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the fact that the economy of Greece benefited from the Treaty 
as they could only see that the Treaty was the result of Anglo-
French collaboration with Mavrokordatos, and the Sublime Porte 
representing the defeat of the court's foreign policy. 
r 
CHAPTER V 
THE PROLONGED OCCUPATION, 1854-1857 
A. Otho's Expansionist Foreign Policy 
After the Declaration of Neutrality 
One of the questions which scholars of modern Greek 
history and the Eastern Ouestion are concerned with is the 
long and illegal Franco-British occupation of Greece. Why 
did the Anglo-French naval forces ~tay in Greece almost a 
year after the Treaty of Paris was signed? What was the 
purpose behind the prolonged occupation? It is clear why 
troops had to be sent to Greece in May 1854 but the ques-
tion of why these troops stayed there for such a long per-
iod of time has not been dealt with in detail by historians. 
To answer these questions the factors of economic and poli-
tical control of Greece by the Western Powers as well as a 
persistent expansionist, pro-Russian in many respects, 
1 
foreign policy of Otho will be examined in this final chapter. 
1 There is only one work which deals with the role of 
Greece in the Crimean War, that of Domna Donta, Crimean War. 
This study focuses on the years 1853-1854, from the beginning 
of the Menshikov Mission to the beginning of the Mavrokordatos 
administration. It does not cover the entire history of the 
occupation and its consequences. Another recent study on the 
Greek-Turkish war of 1854 is that of Dimitri Koutroumbas, Revo-
lution of 1854. This is a study focusing mostly on the Thessaly 
revolt of 1854 and does not go beyond that year. Other works on 
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Otho's foreign policy was responsi~le for the occupa-
tion of 1854 and its devastating economic, political and sccial 
consequences. Yet some of the most prominent Gr~ek historianu 
have vigorously defended that foreign policy. Kyriakides writas 
the folloldng: 
The policy of Otho was the national policy, indoubtably then 
it was the duty of the Greek people to observe this stand, 
which it observed; if it was not benefited, if it was harme~, 
this is irrelevant; its stand, its past, its history, this 
was the policy sketched and this was what King had to fol-· 
low having in conscience his national mission. 2 
Another historian eulo~izes the policy of the Greek Court in 
the following manner: 
This policy not rightfully, was characterized as exclusivaly 
dynastic policy. It was a policy which the people wanted. 
• • • ' As much as it looked Russian on the surface as from 
the facts that policy, the responsibility from which the 
Crown courageously resumed, was Greek policy. 3 
Another Greek historian who favored that policy of the Cou=t 
characterized the Oueen as brave and patriotic and sympathized 
with the difficult problems facing Otho and Amalia. According 
to Filaretos, the king and Oueen were determined "in the ful-
4 fillment of the country's duty." 
the Othonian period such as Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, Trifonas 
Evagelides, Otho, and other works mentioned throughout this 
study have not dealt ldth the diplomatic aspects of the period 
1854 to 1857 nor have they covered the consequences of the occu-
pation. Driault's Histoire Diplomatique is the only work which 
briefly covers the diplomatic relations of Greece and the Great 
Powers beyond 1854 but it fails to tie in the domestic politi-
cal scene. 
2 Kyraikides, Contemporary Greek~, I, 674. 
3 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 224-25 
4 
Philaretos, Foreign Rule, 103-04. 
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Undoubtedly nationalist and royalist favoritism has 
prevailed in the interpretations of those historians at the 
expense of historical objectivity. But if for the sake of 
this so-called "historical objectivity'' such motives as na-
tionalism and royalism are set aside, the policy of the Greek 
Court turns out to be very unrealistic and harmful, in the 
light of the deplorable condition of the Greek nation and 
also the Near Eastern policy of the Western Powers. 
Otho and Amalia vainly pursued a dream of expansion-
ism since the Kolettes administration reintroduced the Megali 
~ to the Greek people. The king and queen sought the op-
portunity since the Mousouros Incident to antagonize the Otto-
man Empire and to have an open conflict with the Turks in hope 
of gaining the Turkish Provinces north of the Greek frontier. 
During the Holy Places controversy the Greek Court prepared 
the people through its propaganda to be ready to face the 
Turkish enemy in war. And before the Menshikov Mission had 
finally been declared a failure Otho had started supporting 
the insurrection in the Provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. 
The foreign policy of the Megali Idea which began as 
a dream for Otho and Amalia during the Kolettes administra-
tion was on its way of becoming a reality in 1853, at least 
as far as many Greeks were concerned. It was clearly a de-
ception, however, for the king and·many government officials 
to believe that Greece could expand its frontiers when the 
Great Powers were all against such a measure. One wonders, 
"" 
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therefore, if it was wise of Otho and Amalia to risk the des-
tructive consequences of an Algo-French occupation, which las-
ted from May 1854 to February 1857, for a dream that could 
never come true under the circumstances of 1854. It was a 
greater wonder, however, that the royal couple pursued the 
dream of the Megali Idea even after Greece was occupied by 
the foreign forces. Indeed, it was true that the Greek Court 
never changed the foreign policy which was handed to it by 
Kolettes, until the force of the Occupying Powers fell so 
great upon Greece as to make certain that the policy of ex-
pansionism would not be repeated. 
A few days after the king announced the neutrality of 
Greece in the Crimean War the British Legation in Athens in-
formed the Foreign Office of secret Court support to the in-
surgents. Wyse wrote to Clarendon concerning the king's co-
vert attempts to continue the insurrection. 
At Athens cart ldads of powder and other ammunition con-
tinued to be conveyed with secrecy, for the purpose of 
being formed into cartridges to the different stores. 
At the Piraeus, a considerable quantity of powder was 
transmitted to the government magazine there by superior 
·orders for the purpose, it would seem, of being embarked 
covertly. • On the 25th inst. a body of 300 armed 
volunteers were collected together at Argos by the Deputy 
of that place, who had received 20,000 drachmas from Athens 
for the purpose, and a short time afterwards they started 
for the frontier. 5 
5 F.o. 32/217, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, May 31, 1854. 
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This report of the British Le~ation in Athens indica-
ted that the king and a great number of sympathizers of the 
insurrection were determined to continue the struggle against 
the Turks even after the king's official declaration of Greek 
neutrality. Otho never really made the transition from the 
Megali Idea policy to a course which called for internal de-
velopment and economic growth. Rouen reported to his govern-
ment after the occupation took place that the king had not 
accepted the full implications of his neutrality declaration 
and that Otho wished to present his position in the European 
6 
community as a victim of the Occupying Powers. Wyse also 
hinted the same thing to Clarendon when he wrote that if Otho 
had accepted the terms of neutrality he would not have any 
objections to the changes of his Russophile advisors who were 
7 
all connected with the developments of the insurrection. 
Such an attitude of the king gave cause to the Allied Powers 
to suspect Otho of Russophilism and as long as such suspicions 
existed and the Crimean War continued there was no chance that 
the occupation of Piraeus would be ended. 
6 Grece 68 (No. 90), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, 
June 17, 1854. 
7 F.O. 32/217, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
June 12, 1854. 
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Only two weeks after the declaration of neutrality 
Otho wrote to his father: 
I would prefer undoubtedly instead of retreating in the 
supremacy of force, to attack Turkey and with bravity 
(palikaria) to bring through and to win the goal, which 
I designed. • • • I retreat with difficulty when the 
cession of a certain thing is attempted with impudence 
and with repression. 8 
The king meant every word he wrote. Incidents which revealed 
his support to the Megali Idea policy occurred almost as soon 
as the Allied forces had landed on Piraeus. 
On June 25, a senator and a doctor by the name of 
Tasseos left Piraeus with ammunition and money in order to 
renew the aggression in Pelio, a village in the Province of 
Thessaly. Tasseos was captured by a French agent, however, 
9 before he reached his destination. According to the intel-
ligence information of the British Legation in Athens: 
This attempt has been got up at the instigation of the 
"Russian" and Court party here, that it has been aided 
by funds and ammunition supplied by them, that among the 
chief agents in the matter are not only persons directly 
connected with the late administration, but also persons 
at this moment in the immediate service of His Majesty 
and in constant communication with him, and that a por-
tion of these funds was supplied by the Directors of the 
National Bank. 10 
After the Tasseos incident it was doscovered that the queen 
of Greece was personally involved in a scheme concerning 
8 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, June 3, 1854. Cited in 
Skandames, Kingdom~ Otho, 977. 
9 Koutroumbas, Revolution £i ~, 162. 
10 I F.O. 32 219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 17, 
1854. 
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another insurrection to take place in Crete. Apparently, 
Amalia had received 140,000 roubles from Russia for the pur-
pose of exciting an uprising in Crete. Various individuals in 
Greece who shared the dream of national expansion with the 
court gave another 70,000 drachmas to the Queen. A group of 
three hundred Cretans then assembled outside of Athens ready 
to depart for Crete at about the same time that a new minis-
11 
try was forming. The insurrection never took place in 
crete because General Kalergis who was supposedly sent to 
Paris in order to bring back arms for the Cretans did not 
return to the island with the ammunition. Even though noth-
ing became of the queen's attempt to start a Cretan insurrec-
tion, it did not help the position of Greece at all because 
the Allied intelligence found out about the scheme. 
The Occupying Powers' concern was not limited to the 
. 
expansionist plans of Otho and Amalia but extended to the 
press propaganda, to the political groups which were pro-
Russian and wanted to see a Greater Greece, and to the var-
ious Hetairias (secret organizations) whose goal was to free 
all the Greeks from the Ottoman Empire by raising money, arms 
and recruiting volunteers. Both Wyse and Rouen knew that the 
insurrection had public support and both representatives felt 
that their job was to prevent any further excitement among 
11 F.O. 32/219, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, July 22, 1854. 
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the public which could lead to renewed Greek-Turkish hostilities. 
There were two means through which a great deal of propa-
ganda against the Turks was carried out. The first was the 
press which continuously attacked the Allied Powers for illeg-
ally occupying Greece while at the same time it supported the 
king and the insurrection. The second was the local govern-
ment officials who by virtue of their position had an enormous 
influence on the public mind. Most government officials through-
out Greece were appointed before the Mavrokordatos ministry of 
1854 and therefore were pro-Russian. So even though the cen-
tral government had changed, the majority of government offi-
cials had remained the same and they continued to propagate 
war against Turkey even after May 1854. 
The two papers which engaged in editorial attacks 
against the occupying Powers and were both sympathetic to 
12 Russia and to Otho were the Aion and Elpis. By the middle 
of August, after the cholera had broken out, these two papers 
were waging such a verbal war on the Occupying Powers that 
Rouen demanded that Mavrokordatos take positive action against 
the editors responsible. Mavrokordatos was not at liberty to 
carry out every demand the French and British representatives 
12 There were other papers which were against the 
Allied Powers. Panhellenium ran an article after the occupa-
tion questioning its legality. See Moniteur Universe!, June 
19, 1854. 
\, 
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had to make for he had the force of the Crown checking his 
13 powers constantly. As a result of the Prime Minister's 
failure to act upon the command of the French minister, a 
group of forty men were sent from Piraeus to Athens on Septem-
her 21, by the order of Admiral Tinan to smash the printing 
presses of the Aion, close the office of Elpis and place under 
arrest the editors of the two newspapers, John Philimon and 
constantine Levides. 
14 Wyse maintained and, undoubtedly, so 
did Rouen that: 
The real object (of the press) was to establish such a 
state of opinion and feeling in the Provinces and espec-
ially in the frontier, as regarded both Russia and Western 
Powers, no matter by what means, as should render it prac-
ticable the first opportunity to resume the late system of 
excitement and aggression, and furnish them with minds and 
men as well as funds and ammunition, entirely for the in-
vasion of the Turkish Provinces. 15 
There was a certain element of truth in this observation but 
it was no justification to destroy the property of the Greek 
newspapers and to illegally arrest the two editors. The vio-
lation of Greek independence first occured in May by the Anglo-
French invasion of Greece. Then private property violations 
13 F.O. 32/220, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, September 13, 1854. 
14 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 672, Kordatos, 
Modern Greece, III, 653, also see F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Claren-
don, Athens, September 22, 1854. 
15 F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 
27, 1854. 
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in Greece by foreign troops and finally the violation of the 
citizens' freedom guaranteed by the Constitution was executed 
all in the name of the national interests of the Occupying 
Powers. 
The French and the British felt that by the destruc-
tion of the opposition press they would win over the public 
to their side but as in the case of the 1850 British blockade 
this did not happen. Instead, the people turned Russophile 
16 
more than ever before and this only increased Wyse's and 
Rauen's irritation. It seemed that the germ of Russophilism 
which began to spread ever since 1850 kept spreading beyond 
control and one of the reasons for this, besides the course 
of events and the press propaganda, was the influence on the 
public mind which the local government authorities exercised. 
The government authorities and most people who sym-
pathized with the insurgents believed that the Anglo-French 
occupation as well ai the Mavrokordatos ministry, which was 
publicly known as the "Ministry of occupation," were only 
temporary. Many Greeks thought that since the blockade of 
1850 did not last long by the same token the occupation of 
1854 would be terminated quickly. As Wyse informed his gov-
ernment in early September: 
The authorities, mostly placed in their situation by a 
pro-Russian Ministry, are still nourished with the false 
hope that all present men and measures are temporary, 
16 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 554. 
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that the incursions on Turkey are only suspended, that the 
German Powers will compel!, at least by diplomacy the two 
Allied Powers to withdraw their troops from Greece, that 
the King thus free from further control, will once more 
resume his ancient Counsellors, with whom he has never 
ceased to communicate and that the "status quo ante" will 
be reestablished triumphantly and without difficulty. 17 
This line of thought was also shared by Rouen and both repre-
sentatives of the Occupying Powers were pressing Mavrokordatos 
to adopt strict measures against Rusophilism. The Prime Mini-
ster could not do so in the open and directly because to fight 
Russophilism would mean attacking the Court and the king him-
self. He came to the point where he could no longer be torn 
by the two forces of the Western Powers on the one side and 
the Court on the other, so he threatened to resign if he was 
not left alone to run the government his own way. 18 
In a personal visit to the Prime Minister by Wyse and 
Rouen, the two representatives listed a number of complaints, 
all tied to the issue of Russophilism and the government's 
failure to repress it. Mavrokordatos told the two ministers 
that: 
He was occupied in devising remedy to the evil, (spread 
of Russophilism) by a change in the Municipal Law itself, 
but until this could be brought to bear, he much feared 
he could not accomplish what he felt, as well as we, 
(Rouen, Wyse), was every way so desirable. I admitted 
the reasoning of Mr. Mavrokordatos as far as it went, but 
I regretted it did not go further. 19 · 
17 F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 
7, 1854. 
18 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 233. 
19 F.o. 32/221, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, November 12, 1854. 
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The Prime Minister further indicated "that it was much easier 
20 
to make or accept these suggestions, then to give them effect." 
Besides the issue of Russophilism in the Court, in the press 
and in public offices, there was an even more serious matter 
which attracted the attention of the Allied Powers in Greece, 
namely, brigandage. This was an old problem which always wor-
ried the Turks for it presented a threat to their Christian 
occupied Provinces. Brigandage was also Palmerston's concern 
from 1844 to 1851 and it received criticism from the French 
who like the British were determined to defend the integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire. After Otho declared Greek neutrality 
in May 1854, the Turkish authorities in the Greek-populated 
Provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia took advantage 
of their superior position, since they were aided by Anglo-
French forces, and began mistreating and even murdering 
Christians in the Provinces to avenge the acts of Greek in-
surgents. 21 As a result of the Turkish mistreatment of 
Christians and the intensive hunt for the Greek insurgents 
the latter were forced to become brigands in order to sur-
22 
vive. The problem of Brigandage after the end of the 
20 Ibid. 
21 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 176-80. 
22 There were 8,000 Epirotes, 6,000 Thessaloi, 2,000 
Cretans, Hydraens, Maniates and others, see Ibid., 178. 
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Greek insurrection of 1854 was partially the result therefore 
of Turkish determination to mistreat and eliminate Greek in-
surgents in the Provinces. 
By November 1854, only a few months after the occupa-
tion, brigandage was steadily increasing not only in the Turk-
ish Provinces where the Greek revolts took place, but on the 
Greek-Turkish frontiers and throughout the entire country of 
Greece making life for the inhabitants as well as the govern-
ment in Athens increasingly difficult. The European embassies 
informed the Greek government that they regarded brigandage 
in Greece as an obstacle to their Near Eastern policy and an 
advantage to the Russians. 23 Wyse who was the most severe 
critic of the rising brigandage went to the Greek Prime Minis-
ter and once again asked for his cooperation to repress this 
dangerous phenomenon. Mavrokordatos could do very little 
against the brigands for as Wyse noted in one of his dispatches 
to Clarendon, "there appears to be no Law in the Greek Code, 
sufficiently effective, to meet such a state of disorder. 
" 24 
. . . Even if there was a law against brigandage Mavro-
kordatos could not wage an open and total campaign to suppress 
the brigands because the pro-Russian elements in the country 
and many others who sympathized with the Court's Megali Idea 
23 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./1), Confidential, Potles to 
Trikoupis, Athens, September 22, 1855. 
24 F.O. 32/222, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, November 
27, 1854. 
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policy would be against such a measure. Furthermore, the 
Prime Minister knew very well that Otho and his Court would 
greatly disapprove of brigands' repression since the king 
himself supported brigandage morally and in many cases ma-
terially. 
The Greek Court put the blame on Kalergis for the 
rise of brigandage even though the Minister of War did more 
than his share to cooperate with the Occupying Powers in 
suppressing brigandage. As Wyse's report indicates Kalergis 
was eager to suppress brigandage: 
When General Kalergis mentioned to His Majesty a few days 
since that he was ready to take the most energetic course 
which could be desired to put down this growing calamity, 
the Queen opposed the difficulty which was to be expected 
from the Chambers and the Constitution, and on General 
Kalergis proposing an appeal to the country - - "Never," 
was her answer, "as long as the occupation troops of the 
Allied Powers remained here." 25 
As far as the Western Powers were concerned brigandage was 
born and maintained as part of the Greek Court's policy. I 
mentioned above that under the Kolettes administration the 
government patronized brigand chieftains who were indeed con-
sidered as soldiers who would someday liberate all of the 
Greeks from Turkish oppression. The king viewed brigands in 
the same respect since after all it was the contribution of 
the Klefts and Armatoloi who helped to liberate the Greeks 
in 1821. In so far as England and France were concerned 
25 F.O. 32/228, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 4, 
1855. 
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Greek brigands were a Christian army when they crossed over 
26 
to the Ottoman territory and that presented a threat to 
the peaceful coexistence of the two neighboring states and 
more importantly brigandage served to the Russian advantage 
under the present circumstances. 27 
There was apprehension among the Allied Powers that 
the ''Russian" party in collaboration with the Greek Camarilla 
were planning renewed hostilities with Turkey so this ex-
plained their unwillingness to cooperate with Wyse and Rouen 
in suppressing brigandage. When the two representatives dis-
covered that there were funds in the king's name at the Na-
tiona! Bank of Greece which were to be used as the king wished, 
their suspicion about the king's intentions were confirmed. 
This prompted Wyse to accuse Otho of still following the same 
policy currently as he had before the Allied occupation. He 
wrote to Clarendon: 
••• such an attitude on the part of their Majesties and 
Court, as shall unmistakably discourage, in those who 
boast of their implicit obedience to their wishes, that 
continued hostility, sometimes open, sometimes concealed, 
against the government and the policy of the Western Po-
wers which thwarts their effects, and proclaims to the 
country that the protection granted to Russia Partisan-
ship is not extinct and that the opportunity is not perhaps 
distant when it may again be called, under roaal auspices, 
and with hope of better issue, into action. 2 
27 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./A), No. 129, Note Verbal, Athens, 
August 12, 1855. 
28 F.o~ 32/229, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 5, 1855. 
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The Greek government tried to do its best to convince the 
Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay that effective measures 
29 had been adopted to deal with the problem of brigandage. 
Britain and France were convinced otherwise. Walewski ex-
pressed his discontent with brigandage in Greece to M. Roque, 
Minister at Paris, after he had been informed of a certain 
case of brigandage in the village of Micali. Roque defended 
the Greek government as he reassured the French Foreign Minis-
ter that the authorities were doing their best to repress the 
existing menace. 30 It was useless to defend, however, acts 
which were taking place out in the open. By the spring of 
1855 the problem was so severe that the Allies were forced 
to guard the roads between Athens and Piraeus in order to 
safeguard their own troops. 31 
Admittedly some of those engaged in bands of brigan-
dage were out to rob anyone but there was a number of ex-
insurgents who were condemned by the Greek government for 
taking part in the revolution. According to British intel-
ligence reports certain brigands in Boetia wanted full amnesty 
29 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./A), No. 203, Potles to Tri-
koupes, Athens, October 15, 1855. (Potles was foreign minis-
ter under the Boulgaris administration, see below section C.) 
30 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 259, Confidential, Roques 
to Potles, Paris, October 14, 1855. 
31 Bower & Bolitho, ~ !, 203. 
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and they claimed that brigandage was the means they used to 
32 
attain their goal. In a letter to Boulgaris, President of 
the Council, the Boetia Brigands revealed their former plans 
of using brigandage as a means of creating the fall of the 
Mavrokordatos ministry so that they would be granted amnesty 
when a new ministry would come into power. They warned the 
Boulgaris administration, however, "that if the Ministers 
should persist in neglecting them, and not grant the amnesty 
in question they would act henceforth as real brigands. 
The Western Allies would never have agreed with the 
Greek government to grant amnesty to the insurgents and of 
course the Sublime Porte would flatly reject any such measure 
in dealing with the rebels. The Turks, however, were anxious 
to put an end to this problem and Fuad Pasha met in a con-
ference with the Greek Prime Minister at Constantinople and 
34 discussed a possible procedure for ending brigandage. 
The Sublime Porte was preoccupied with the war in 
Crimea and had larger problems than the settlement of brigan-
dage in Greece. It could not afford, however, to allow this 
32 F.O. 32/233, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, November 20, 1855. In the same report Wyse wrote 
that a group of brigands was caught and held for the abduc-
tion of the French Captain Bertrand at Piraeus. 
33 Ibid. 
34 A.Y.E. 1855 (19/1), Np. 35, Confidential, Koun-
douriotes to Syivergos, Constantinople, October 10, 1855. 
33 
" 
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menace to grow at the expense of more uprisings in its Prov-
inces. A quick settlement of this problem was sought, there-
fore. and in the first months of 1856 the real efforts to end 
brigandage began. On January 8, it was announced in the 
Moniteur Grec that the Minister of War. L. Smolenctz had 
drawn up several articles calling for the order of the Greek 
government to participate actively in the repression of brigan-
dage in mainland Greece as well as in the Provinces. These 
articles were later to be adopted into law since no law existed 
against brigandage as was known in Greece. 35 
Two months after the Moniteur Grec announced the govern-
ment's legal repression of brigandage, a treaty between Greece 
and the Sublime Porte was signed at Kalinja which called for 
36 
the two countries' cooperation to suppress brigandage. By 
the conclusion of this treaty it can be argued that techni-
cally Greece and Turkey were back on stable and friendly rela-
tions which were only·to be disturbed again in the Cretan in-
surrection of 1866-1869. 37 
35 Moniteur Grec, Athens, January 8, 1856, No. 30382. 
in F.O. 32/239. 
36 The Treaty was ratified 3 June 1856, signed 8 April, 
1856. See Noradoughian. Recueil d'actes interna tionaux. II, 
90, 93, also see British and Foreign State Papers, LVI, 1389-
1391. 
37 See D. Donta, Greece and the Great Powers, 1863-
1875 (Thessalonike, 1966). 
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B. The Fall of the Mavrokordatos Ministry 
Ever since the "ministry of occupation" came to power, 
a political struggle began between the king and the Mavrokor-
datos administration. For the first time after a period of 
over twenty years of absolute rule the Bavarian dynasty in 
Greece was forced by France and England to share power with 
a ministry under their control. 
At first Otho believed that Mavrokordatos would be 
able to check the abusive influence of the occupying Powers 
in Greek internal and foreign affairs, and he also hoped that 
the Prime Minister would control the hostile acts of Kalergis 
{Minister of War), which the king thought were directed 
against him personally. As was pointed out in the last sec-
tion, the Prime Minister had made it clear to Otho that he 
would have liked to rule constitutionally with as little 
foreign influence as possible. To run a "ministry of occupa-
tion" without the influence of the Occupying Powers, and to 
administer in a country which was ruled by an absolute monarch 
for as long as it had existed was an impossibility. Mavrokor-
datos was pulled by two opposing forces - - the Monarchy and 
the Allied Powers - - constantly until he got to a point where 
he was totally ineffective in so far as exercising his own 
will in matters of government. During the first few months 
of the "ministry of occupation" Havrokordatos enjoyed the con-
fidence of the king as well as that of Western Europe. The 
declaration of neutrality, the change of ministries and the 
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new administration's attempts to restore relations with the 
sublime Porte were all positive signs of good faith on the 
part of Greece toward the Allied Powers. Of course it took 
an armed force at Piraeus to win the good faith of Greece, but 
the important factor was that Greece won the confidence of 
both Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys. When Greece requested to 
resume possession of the three Russian frigates purchased by 
38 
the Kriezes administration, but detained in Dalmatia, both 
Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys consented to the Greek govern-
39 
ment's request. 
The Anglo-French Powers were also determined to main-
tain good relations with Otho and several months after the oc-
cupation even the king of Greece was optimistic about the 
friendly course of Greek foreign relations. "The Emperor of 
the French," he wrote to Ludwig, "expressed himself very friendly 
towards me and Greece, ••• Clarendon wrote confidentially a 
while ago to the British ambassador here the following: 'I wish 
as Otho will allow us to be his friends, and he will never have 
the least cause to regret this.' You see from this that our 
38 A.Y.E. 1855 (99/1), No. 107, Trikoupis to Argyropou-
los, London, June 25, 1854. 
39 Greece was also allowed to regain possession arms 
and ammunition detained at Malta and Corfu. See A.Y.E. 1855 
(99/1), Clarendon to Trikoupis, Foreign Office, July 5, 1854, 
also A.Y.E. 1855 (99/1), No. 145, Trikoupis to Mavrokordatos, 
London, September 9, 1854. 
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40 
foreign relations have improved." On the surface it 
appeared that Greece was finally following a policy paral-
lel to that of France and England but there was indeed a 
power struggle between the Greek Court and the Allied Powers 
for political domination in Greek internal and foreign af-
fairs. As the Greek Legation in Paris informed Mavrokordatos, 
the main concern of France and England was the consolidation 
41 
of Turkey and the reestablishment of equilibrium in Europe. 
Greece, ever since the crisis of the Holy Places, had sided 
with Russia and its foreign policy was an obstacle to the 
plans and policy of Western Europe in the Near East. Even 
after the "ministry of occupation" had come in control, 
42 Clarendon could call Greece "a misgoverned country." No 
matter how much effort went into trying to convince the Wes-
tern Powers that Mavrokordatos had good intentions and that 
he was ready to cooperate willfully with them, 
43 
it was dif-
ficult to win their total confidence as long as they knew 
that the Bavarian dynasty in Greece was pro-Russian and would 
never give up their hopes of territorial expansion. 
4o Otho to Ludwig, Athens, February 4, 1855. Cited in 
Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 986-87. 
41 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 776, Roque to Mavrokordatos, 
Paris, August 2, 1854. 
42 Ibid. 
43 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./A), Confidential, Argyropoulos 
to Roques, Athens, July 9, 1855. 
F' 
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Otho wanted to rule by himself and he knew that some-
how he had to remove the "ministry of occupation" and replace 
it with a Court ministry if he was to start drawing power away 
from the hands of Wyse and Rouen. Alone the king could not 
achieve such a political victory. He had to use diplomatic 
means and make use of his influence in the German Courts. In 
September 1854 he wrote to Frances Joseph the following letter 
complaining about the intervention of the Occupying Powers in 
the state affairs of his kingdom: 
The condition of Greece, unfortunately, instead of improv-
ing, is continuously deteriorating. He (Mavrokordatos) 
feels it also but is unable to improve it. The foreign 
intervention in the internal affairs of the country, which 
is based on the strength of the foreign troops near the 
capital, prevent him, in his actions. You can understand 
with how much difficulty the prolongation of the occupation 
is connected. And I resort to your mediation for the re-
moval of the occupation. 44 
The Austrian emperor answered that he would be glad to use his 
influence in the French Court on behalf of Greece but he felt 
that the possibility of renewed hostilities in the Turkish 
Provinces by the Greeks was highly likely to reoccur so he 
thought that for the time being the occupation served a pur-
45 pose. 
Otho was determine to have the influence of Wyse and 
Rouen diminished as much as possible and would not give up 
44 Otho to Francis Joseph, Athens, September 1, 1854. 
Cited in Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 980-81. 
45 Ibid. 
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trying to fulfill this goal. As was mentioned in the previous 
section, the "ministry of occupation'' was divided among ex-
tremists like Christides and Palamides, who were royalists and 
opposed actions Mavrokordatos had taken after the French and 
British Legations' consultation in Athens, and Kalergis with 
Rouen and Wyse behind him who went out of his way to please 
46 
the Occupying Forces. Kalergis was a personal friend of 
47 Napoleon III and, apparently, the Emperor of the French was 
very pleased with the work and position of General Kalergis in 
the Greek government. 48 
The Minister of War took advantage of the fact that he 
49 
had powerful friends and became very obnoxious towards the king. 
Otho waited for the opportunity to arrive so he could dismiss 
Kalergis. This opportunity came in July 1855. There was a 
scandal involving the Minister of War and the wife of P. Pely-
giannis, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1849 during the Kriezes 
administration. This scandal received much publicity in the 
anti-Western press and was used by the queen to degrade Kalergis 
46 On June lOth Kalergis treated the troops and other 
British and French officials to a dinner at the Parthenon which 
was converted into a restaurant to accomodate the invading 
forces. Fotiades, The Exile, 224. 
47 See Karolides, History of the Greeks, IV, 530-31. 
48 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 164. 
49 He would go to the palace to get the king's signa-
ture and he would ask that the orders be signed without delay, 
Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 656. 
206 
and diminish his power hopefully resulting in his downfall. 
After the king requested the resignation of the Minister, 
Mavrokordatos promised on July 26 that in forty-eight hours 
he would have Kalergis' resignation at the palace. Instead 
of a resignation delivered by the Prime Minister, Otho re-
ceived a visit from Mercier, the French representative who 
replaced Forth-Rouen, and Wyse who had come for an explana-
51 
tion of the king's actions. The two ambassadors asked 
Otho not to take any affirmative action until they had time 
to contact their governments. On September 2, Otho was in-
50 
formed that both France and Britain were against the Kalergis 
dismissal for they did not know of anyone who could replace 
52 him as Minister of War. The king declared, however, that 
all services between the Court and the Ministry of War were 
stopped and he would not sign any ordinances drawn by that 
ministry as long as Kalergis was in charge. All this chaos 
was devised by the Court to lead only to one thing, the fall 
of the ''ministry of occupation" thus Otho's political triumph. 
In this respect Otho was successful for he had the help of the 
German Courts. 
The Mavrokordatos administration would have fallen, 
however, even if a scandal involving one of his ministers had 
5° Fotiades, The Exile, 238-40. 
51 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 658. 
52 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 169. 
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not occurred. First, there was factional division in the minis-
try, second, it was an administration set up in an emergency 
situation and under foreign force and finally, it represented 
the will of two opposing sides, the Crown and the Allied Powers. 
Mavrokordatos could not rule between such forces and had become 
very weak. As Wyse observed: 
If Mr. Mavrokordatos does not make up his mind to more ex-
plicitness, determination and activity, he may as long find 
himself placed in a position before the King on the one side 
and the public (he implies the Allied Powers) on the other 
which will leave him no choice between permanent acquiscence 
or a sudden retreat. 53 
The Prime Minister could not openly oppose the King's policy 
and obey orders given by the foreign invaders, but when the 
French and British asked for cooperation this is precisely what 
they had in mind. Both Mercier and Wyse felt that Mavrokordatos 
was becoming gradually weak and was unable to make government 
decisions. 
In September the Greek Prime Minister went to see the 
British ambassador to discuss the difficulties of his adminis-
tration. At the meeting Mavrokordatos stated that before he 
left Paris he was assured by Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Cowley 
that there would be no change in the Greek dynasty or the re-
moval of the king as long as the interests of the Allied Powers 
are not damaged by Greece. Further, he understood his position 
as that of a mediator between the king and the Powers. 
53 F.O~ 32/229, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 5, 1855. 
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••• in that sense he understood his mission, and was 
desirous to give effect to it legally and constitutionally. 
But he found here little either of Law or Constitution. 
He would conceive of two kinds of governments a constitu-
tion frankly carried out, or a despotism; but not a despo-
tism under the forms of a constitution. • • • That is the 
present state of Greece and with that difficulty he has to 
contend. The government as it is now cannot act and can-
not go on. 54 
Wyse of course placed all the blame for the weakness of the 
Mavrokordatos administration on the king but the Allied forces 
with their continuous demands on the Prime Minister, as Otho 
pointed out above, were also responsible for this phenomenon. 
In the final analysis the Court was in many respects 
more desirous to end Mavrokordatos than the Allied Powers who 
merely regretted his weak position. The members of the Chamber, 
all appointed by the king, waged a war on the Mavrokordatos 
administration using as an excuse the Kalergis scandal. The 
press and public servants alike, all directed by the Court, 
also turned against the "ministry of occupation." In a dis-
patch from the British Legation in Athens Wyse summarized what 
he considered the main causes of Mavrokordatos' fall from power: 
All these circumstances combined leave no doubt of a common 
hostility, and concerted movement against M. Mavrokordatos. 
But this would be of little moment if M. Mavrokordatos were 
another man, or had long since, or would even now adopt 
another policy; the conspiracy might easily be defeated if 
he did not also continue to conspire himself. Such, however, 
is, unfortunately, not the case. His first step was a mis-
take. He attempted to unite the character of a minister 
54 F.O. 32/231, Most Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, September 4, 185s:--
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chosen deliberately by the king, with that of a minister 
selected by the Allied Powers. He has had his eye fixed 
on the chances of the future, instead of the necessities 
of the present; he had been consulting the stronger side 
and more permanent authority, whilst he should have acted 
without reference to either. • • 55 
Under such strenuous political circumstances it would have 
been difficult for any Prime Minister to retain the necessary 
unity and strength of the administration to run the government 
efficiently and without encountering the sorts of problems 
which were responsible for the fall of the Mavrokordatos minis-
try. A much greater force had to intervene to bring about this 
fall, however, than merely the wish of the king of Greece. 
Francis Joseph, finally, bent to the wishes of his cousin, Otho, 
and used his influence to have Britain and France discontinue 
56 
their support of Mavrokordatos. Otho had used well the only 
weapon left to his disposal, diplomacy, after the Anglo-French 
occupation. He knew that as long as the British and the French 
needed the support of Austria and the Prussian neutrality com-
mitment in the war against Russia, he could use his influence 
with the Germanic nation to pressure the Allied Powers to re-
move General Kalergis and of course along with him the entire 
"ministry of occupation." lvyse wrote concerning the near-fall 
of the "ministry of occupation": 
55 F.O. 32/231, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, September 8, 1855. 
56 Kordatcs, Modern Greece, III, 658. 
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The first impression produced will be one of triumph in 
the Russian and German pro-Russian party here, and abroad; 
the assurance already given in the journals that the King, 
at the instance of Austria and Bavaria, has been restored 
to all his prerogatives and rights, and the Russian and 
anti-Western propagandism emanating from the Court, under 
the inspiration of the Russian Legation, and extending by 
the instrumentality by the German Camarilla and German 
Diplomacy, to all parts of the country, and to ~~st and 
East, will acquire for the moment fresh force. 
It had taken two months for the Germanic Powers (Prussia, 
Bavaria and Austria) to persuade Napoleon to withdraw his 
58 
support from Kalergis but finally they succeeded. After 
the "ministry of occupation'' had fallen from power the French 
government still regarded the ousting of General Kalergis by 
59 Otho as "a victory of the Russian party over Western politics.'' 
The emperor failed to view the situation as a struggle for 
power between the king of Greece and the continuous interfer-
ence in Greek domestic affairs by the Western Powers. Both 
the British and the French refused to accept Otho's schemes of 
Greek expansionism i~ isolation. As far as they were concerned 
there was a real connection between any Greek plans for expan-
sion and Russian ambitions. 
57 F.O. 32/231, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
September 29, 1855. 
58 Fotiades, The Exile, 239-240. 
59 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 259, Confidential, Roques 
to Potles, Paris, October 14, 1855. 
211 
On September 27, Mavrokordatos handed in the resigna-
tion of the entire ministry to the king for to remain after 
the forced resignation of Kalergis would have created antago-
nisms with the French. 60 So the first victory of the Greek 
Camarilla was achieved with the resignation of a ministry 
which was forced upon Greece by the British and the French. 
For Mavrokordatos, September 27, was to be the last day of 
his long political career which was to a great extent damaged 
in 1844 as well as 1855 by a petty .Bavarian Prince who be-
lieved himself to be more of a Greek nationalist than the 
Greeks themselves. 
c. The Boulgaris Administration 
The man who was chosen to replace Mavrokordatos was 
61 Demitris Boulgaris. The new Prime Minister was born into 
a wealthy family in the island of Hydra and was known among 
the political circles in Athens for his despotic character. 
His father had worked for the Turkish armada and Boulgaris 
60 See Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 990-91, ·also A.R. 
Rangabes, Apomnemoneumata (Memoirs) III, (Athens, 1894), 319. 
61 The new ministry was sworn in on October 4, 1855 
with Trikoupis as President of the Council and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, however, he did not accept the position and 
Boulgaris who was originally chosen for the position of Minis-
ter of the Interior became Prime Minister. 
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like Kolettes had come under the influence of Turkish customs. 
One of the reasons that Otho selected him to serve as Prime 
Minister was because he had remained faithful to the monarchy 
in 1843 and had not participated in the revolution of the Con-
stitutionalists. 
Even though Greek historians have not dealt extensively 
with the Roulgaris administration and one historian even goes 
as far as to ascertain that the Boulgaris government did not 
63 
face serious foreign difficulties, it will be seen in this 
section that the problems of Greece with the Foreign Powers 
increased and tensions were not absent until the establishment 
of the Financial Commission of 1857. 
The Greek Legation in Paris informed the government in 
Athens, that, ''Monsieur Walewski at the news has reiterated 
the assurance that any hostile disposition did not exist on 
the part of France toward the King or against the new Cabinet. 
II 64 
. . . The Rritish"were not as pleased as the French ap-
peared to be about the change of ministries. Wyse speculated 
that: 
62 Fotiades, The Exile, 240-41, Also see Kordatos, 
Moaern Greece, III, 658-59. 
63 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 235. 
64 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 254, Roque to Sylvergos, 
Paris, October 11, 1855. 
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The object of this ministry, will be to detach the French 
from the English Lep,ation, to divide the Ministers, and, 
as they hope, the governments, and the means for this will 
be the distribution and displacements, without scruple, of 
office a malignant and treacherous press, in which, in 
France, as well as here, the most unbounded devotion to 
France and French Party and French interests will be pro-
fessed. England, if not calumniated, will be kept in the 
background, and an intimate union attempted to be brought 
about between the French partisans so called, and the Rus-
sian, in this country to the exclusion always of England, 
so as at length to bring her to the isolated position in 
which they formally stood. In a word, it will be the sys-
tem of M. Coletti on a larger and more vicious scale, and 
in more critical circumstances, again succeeding to the 
fatal moderation of M. Mavrokordatos, 65 
Given this observation of the British ambassador in Athens, it 
can be seen why the British government was so apprehensive 
about ending the occupation. Every victory which the Crown 
scored the Allied Powers considered not as Greek but a Russian 
victory. Every time British policy and actions were attacked 
or intercepted in Greece, the Foreign Office considered it as 
a victory of the French or the Russians. Both England and 
France believed that tpe causes of the Greek insurrection 
against the Turks in 1854 were the product of Russian propa-
ganda or Greek propaganda inspired by Russia. They also main-
tained throughout the period of the Crimean War that any act 
by the Greeks against the Turks or their Allies was an act 
executed on behalf of Russia, or at least to her benefit 
against the interests of France and England. 
On account of these assumptions entertained by the 
Allied Powers and, especially, Great Britain the removal of 
65 F.O. 32/231, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, September 29, 1855. 
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the foreign troops from Piraeus was a distant goal. In October 
Trikoupis, the representative in London, informed his govern-
ment that the Western Powers were just as suspicious of Greek 
policy in the Near East a year and a half after the declara-
tion of neutrality as they were during the months of the revo-
lution. "The allies," he wrote to Potles, "do not deny, that 
the neutrality is actually maintained, but they regard this 
as an act of necessary supervision, and that our Court is al-
66 
ways pro-Russian." After the "ministry of occupation" took 
power in May 1854, Otho had the opportunity to abandon the 
policy of irredentism and direct the country to a policy of 
pe~ceful coexistence with Turkey and emphasize internal growth 
and economic reform. Instead he continued to pursue a dream 
which Kolettes passed on to him and he prayed that the British 
and French would loose in the Crimean War so he could utilize 
his plans for expansion. As the British representative at 
Athens observed about the Greek royal plans for expansion: 
It is the state of "reverie" in which Her Majesty the 
Queen admits herself to be until some success of Russia, 
some check of the Allies, some outbreak among the Chris-
tian races of the Ottoman Empire may present the oppor-
tunity to convert the "reverie" into project, and the 
project, if possible, into a "fait accompli." This is 
the great end of the existing policy. It may hold our 
hope to Greek vanity or Bavarian ambition, but it is not 
a state of confidence in us, nor of peace and good faith 
towards their Turkish neighbors. 67 
66 A.Y.E. 1855, 18/1, Private and Confidential, Tri-
koupis to Potles, London, October 21, 1855. 
67 F.O. 32/232, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 6, 
1855. 
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Wyse and Mercier began to attack the new administration as 
soon as it was formed and on October 1, in an interview at 
the Palace both representatives openly charged that the con-
stitution in Greece was continuously violated and the coun-
68 
try was misgoverned. Otho felt that it was not the place 
of Wyse or Mercier to criticize the administration and sov-
ereignty of Greece, and he strongly considered such obnoxious 
criticisms as foreign intervention in the Greek internal af-
fairs. Furthermore, he believed that the Treaty of 1832, which 
guaranteed Greece its independence as a State to be ruled by 
one monarch, was violated by inconsiderate remarks of the 
French and British ministers. 
When the ministry presented a draft to the king con-
cerning the question of neutrality Otho requested that the 
paragraph referring to the advantages which Greek neutrality 
brought to the commercial and political stability of Greece 
6"9 
should be modified. The king would not admit to his coun-
try that his foreign policy in 1853-1854, before the occupa-
tion, was very costly to the nation, and this only irritated 
relations between Greece and Western Europe. But Otho did 
not stop infuriating the Allied Powers with his denial that 
he had embraced the Megali Idea foreign policy. After the 
interview with Wyse and Mercier, the king decided to visit 
68 Bower & Bolitho, Ot~ f, 206-07. 
69 F.O. 32/232, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, November 13, 1855. 
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the Russian Church in Athens, an act which was intended to 
openly allow the world to know that he never regretted sup-
porting the struggle against the Turks. The Greek press re-
ported that the king's visit to the Russian Church was not 
planned but happened by chance. The Western Powers did not 
believe this story. The British intelligence in Greece in-
formed the Foreign Office that: 
The King not only did not come to the Russian Church as 
pretended by chance, but the visit was arranged two days 
before, and communications were held between a member of 
the Russian Legation and a strong Russian partisan in com-
munication with the Court. • The Russian clergy here, 
the singers, and the Russian Legation were all present, 
and the members of the Legation were in their evening dress, 
and the Charge d'Affaires of the Legation, M. Persiany, 
were the Grand Cordon of the Saviour. The prayers actually 
said were closed I understand with the Docology • 
which prayers in the Russian Church are followed, by prayers 
for the Imperial family nomination, and in time of war, with 
prayers for the success of their arms. At these prayers the 
King was present. 70 
The king could afford to display his apathy toward the occupying 
Powers since he had the support of the Germanic Powers and his 
popularity in Greece had risen decisively as a result of the 
occupation. Many among the public viewed Otho as a hero, for 
he embraced the Greek national cause, and because of this, 
France and England humiliated him and the nation. As in 1850, 
the popularity of the Crown increased again during the occupa-
tion, and with the help of the German Courts, Otho was actually 
in a much stronger position than he appeared to his contempor-
aries. 
70 F.O. 32/233, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 4, 
1855. 
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After the first success of eliminating the influence 
of the Occupying Powers in Greece by causing the Mavrokordatos 
resignation, the king worked on another scheme which the Greek 
politicians had used before, namely, the dissolution of the 
Franco-British Legation coalition in Greece which antagonized 
the Court. The government press began a press war against 
England while it praised Napoleon III. Wyse interpreted the 
king's attempts to undermine British foreign policy in the fol-
lowing manner: 
Its real purpose is the propagation of Russian opinions 
and the maintainance of the present system of government 
under the collar of German sympathy and protection, gui-
ded by the Camarilla and its diplomatic supporters here, 
and the means to be taken are flattery to France and hos-
tility to England, if not between the Legations, at least 
between those who affect the designations of French and 
English partisans, and thus creating mistrust between the 
ministers, and if they can, between their governments, and 
allowing free scope to the King and his supporters for the 
exercise of their arbitrary power. 71 
Though the Greek Court's scheme was to divide the Franco-Brit-
ish coalition and to undermine British foreign policy in Greece 
by presenting the goals of the Foreign Office as contradictory 
and damaging to French interests in Greece, the king had always 
been much more favorable to France than to Great Britain. 
France and Russia had not shown as much interest in Greece 
since they became its Protectors as had Great Britain. Even 
during the Kolettes administration when the French Legation 
71 F.O. 32/233, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 4, 
1855. 
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exercised much influence in the government Great Britain~ rep-
resented by Lord Edmond Lyons, in Athens, went to extremes in 
order to assume the protagonist role in Greek internal affairs. 
The result of Britain's struggles to become the dominant Pro-
tecting Power in Greece during the 1840's resulted in the block-
ade of 1850. Such measures were never adopted by France and 
Russia towards Greece although they were equal partners in the 
Protectorate. There was much more contempt, therefore, in the 
Greek Court as well as the nation for Great Britain than for 
either of the other two Protecting. Powers. 
In March 1855 when Otho wrote to his father to com-
plain about the Occupying Powers in Athens, he stressed that 
the Emperor Napoleon and his Minister in Greece were much 
friendlier towards him and his Court than the British govern-
ment. 72 In the effort of drawing France away from England 
and breaking their coalition Otho had help from Austria. The 
following dispatch clearly indicates that the Greek scheme to 
break the Anglo-French coalition was part of a larger scheme 
worked out by the Germanic Powers: 
••• Baron Prokesch (Austrian minister in Athens) had in-
formed the King, that he was enabled to assure him directly 
from His Majesty, the Emperor Napoleon, (for who he, Mr. 
Prokesch, had the greatest admiration) that he entertained 
for him, the King, the greatest sympathy; that the time was 
approaching when the two governments of France and England 
would be very probably obliged to relax or dissolve their 
72 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, March 16, 1855. Cited in 
Skandames, Kingdom ££ Otho, 991-92. 
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union; that already France was drawing closer to Austria, 
and that Austria on her part becoming much more satisfied 
with France and proportionally dissatisfied with England; 
that the result of these new relations would be soon felt 
in Greece. 73 
Mercier, the French Charge d'Affaires in Athens upon hearing 
this news flatly denied that the insinuations of Baron Prokesch 
were based on facts and praised the Anglo-French alliance. 74 
The Austrians did not stop protecting the Bavarian Dynasty in 
Greece whether they had the support of the French or not. 
Baron Prokesch after conferring with the king and queen an-
nounced that Otho had fallen victim to bursts of national 
feeling in Greece against Turkey so he could not be blamed 
for the events of the uprising of 1854. Furthermore, Prokesch 
communicated these observations to the Austrian government 
with the implication that the two Western Powers are unjus-
75 
tified in occupying Greece. 
The press played an important role in the scheme to 
shatter Anglo-French relations for the benefit of the Germanic 
Powers and the Bavarian dynasty in Greece. Elpis (Hope), the 
newspaper edited and published by C. Levides, whom in the fall 
of 1854, the French troops had arrested, continued to publish 
73 F.O. 32/233, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
December 19, 1855. 
74 Ibid. 
75 I F.O •. 32 239, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 26, 
1856. 
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articles with the intention of creating an Anglo-French rivalry 
in Greece such as the one which existed during the administra-
tion of Kolettes. 
King Otho understood his mission in the East, not such as 
the convention of London considered it to be, when it 
formed a kingdom of a span's length, but such as Western 
Diplomacy should have considered it, had it looked upon 
the Greek Kingdom, as a political structure and not as a 
mite bestowed by Christian charity. 
Concerning France the paper took a different attitude. 
The French Nation has generous sentiments, and does not 
measure politics with the mere yard of its manufactures: 
it became great by pursuing a generous policy and not a 
policy of "the yard." 76 
A number of other papers 77 also tried to do the same sort of 
thing as Eplis, and there was little doubt that behind them 
78 
were the officers of the Greek Court and the "Russian" party. 
All the efforts, however, on the part of the king, the 
press and the Austrians, to flatter the government of France 
and to create some kind of friction between the French and 
British Legations in Athens did not help at all the situation 
of Greece at the Paris Peace Conference. The Greek government 
wished that it should have a representative at the Paris Peace 
76 Elpis, No. 833, December 21, 1855. 
7 7 F.O. 32/239, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 6, 
1856, also F.O. 32/239, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, January 8, 
1856. 
78 Anexartetos, No. 253, Athens, January 14, 1856, 
(a court paper) published an article pointing out the dilemma 
facing the Wes~ern Powers in regards to the Eastern Question. 
The conclusion arrived in the article was that the Christians 
of the Ottoman Empire would eventually win their cause for 
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Conference, if not for any other reason, than the termination 
of the Franco-British occupation which had already lasted for 
79 
two years. Alexander Rangabes, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs from February 1856 to February 1857, had made extra-
ordinary efforts to have his country represented in Paris but 
the French and British governments argued that Greece did not 
participate in the Crimean War therefore could not be among 
the participants at the Conference. 8° Count Alexand~r Walewski, 
the French Foreign Minister, informed the Greek Charge d'Affaires 
in Paris that his country would not be represented in the Peace 
Conference and that she would not even be consulted concerning 
the privileges of the Christian subjects living under the Otto-
81 
man rule. 
Turkey is getting weaker and Christians and Muslims cannot co-
exist equally in the same state. The Crimean War only helped 
the Christian subjects of Turkey but weaken the Ottoman State 
which was wrongly supported by the Western Powers. 
79 When Alexander Rangabes was notified by the Prime 
Minister that the king chose him as the new minister for 
Foreign Affairs he went to Otho and explained that he could 
not accept the position for he and Wyse had "bad relationship." 
The king and queen insisted, however, that Rangabes should ac-
cept the ministry so the former yielded to the wishes of the 
Crown. See Rangabes, Memoirs, III, 325-29. 
80 Laskaris, History £i Greece, 411. Trikoupis 
ported to the Greek government that Greece was excluded 
the Conference before Rangabes became Foreign Minister. 
A.Y.E. 1856, No. 33, Confidential, Trikoupis to Potles, 
February 21, 1856. 
81 Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 411. 
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At the peace negotiations Baron Rrunnow, who along 
with Count Orlov represented Russia, brought up the subject 
of the Franco-British occupation. The Allied Powers main-
tained that there was a need to keep the troops in Greece as 
the situation of brigandage had not been totally resolved and 
there were still incidents on the Greek-Turkish frontier caused 
by Greek radical nationalists who still hoped to liberate the 
Provinces of Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia from the Ottoman 
82 
Empire. Furthermore, the British and French representatives 
stated that there was still an excitement for war among the 
Greek people and under such conditions they argued the presence 
of the Franco-British troops was necessary to insure tranquility 
in that country. The Germanic Powers, Austria, Bavaria and 
Prussia, revealed the same concern about the occupation of 
Greece as had the Tsar's representatives, but neither the French 
nor the British wished to go into any detailed discussion con-
. 
cerning the future status of Greece in relation to the Protect-
ing Powers. 
The failure of Greece to be admitted to negotiations 
was not only due to the fact that Greece was an insignificant 
state in the European community, but ~lso beca~se there was an 
ideological conflict between the irredentist policy of Otho and 
the guarantee of Ottoman integrity by the Western Powers at the 
82 A.Y.E. 1856 (18/1), No. 70, Trikoupis to Rangabes, 
London, April 20, 1856. 
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Paris Peace Conference. Furthermore, that Greece was a Pro-
tectorate of France, England and Russia placed her a step below 
the other European nations which were recognized as totally 
autonomous and independent from the other European Powers. 
The Greek Government intended to address a formal "pro-
test to the different Courts of Europe, against the declara-
tion respecting Greece at the Conference at Paris," hut in-
stead it "decided on presenting a Memorial or Note containing 
various propositions to the Legations of their Protecting Po-
wers at Athens." 84 Seeing that there was no hope of gaining 
any concessions at the Conference, the Greek Government deci-
ded to address a note to the Legations of the Occupying Powers 
in Athens in order to persuade them to reconsider removing 
their forces from Piraeus. Rangabes stated in the note that 
his government had friendly intentions toward the Ottoman 
State and the Western Powers and tried to reassure Wyse and 
Mercier that there would be no repetition of hostile actions 
85 
towards Turkey on the part of the Greeks. Neither repre-
sentative trusted the words of the Greek Foreign Minister for 
83 Markezines, Political History, I, 234-36. 
84 F.O. 32/241, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, May 28, 1856. 
85 F.O. 32/242, Rangabes to Mercier, Athens, May 21, 
1856 
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they were convinced that the Greek government was not in the 
hands of the Counsul but under the absolute control of the 
king. On this matter Wyse added the following report to the 
Foreign Office: 
We had deliberately and officially informed him that we 
should withdraw from all intervention either as to mea-
sures, or men in his administration, but that consider-
ing he had absorbed all the governing powers into his 
own hands, reduced the Constitution to a shadow, and was 
to all intents and effects an absolute monarch, we should 
be directed in our future relations towards him, by reali-
ties, and not by names, and placing the responsibility on 
him solely, and not his ministers or the Nation, for the 
future proceedings of his government. 86 
The French were similarly convinced that the king's intentions 
and policy could not be trusted as they maintained "that there 
was always in Greece much sympathy for Russia, much covetous-
ness concealed in the Turkish Provinces." 87 The occupation 
would be retained therefore until both Britain and France de-
cided that an administration was running the country which was 
trustworthy and reliab~e by the Western Powers. Wyse viewed 
with serious suspicion certain changes that had taken place in 
the Boulgaris ministry and this was the primary reason for the 
rejection by both Protecting Powers to lift the occupation. 
"The truth is," Wyse wrote, "the whole object had in view for 
some time past, is to constitute a ministry partly, of daring 
partisans, partly of insignificant men, or whom the Court in 
86 F.o. 32/242, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 18, 1856. 
87 Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 412-13. 
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case of need, can implicitly rely. This has now been nearly 
88 
accomplished." Unless some type of political influence 
could be exerted in the government in Athens by the Occupying 
Powers they would not consider leaving. The Germanic Powers 
w~re too weak to challenge the policy and actions of the two 
Powers in Greece and Russia had just finished a conflict with 
the Western Powers over the Near Eastern Question and the new 
Russian Tsar, Alexander II, was not about to antagonize either 
89 France or England by opposing their occupation of Greece. 
The British and the French, to a certain degree, were 
more afraid of Russian influence in Greece than of new attacks 
by Greek insurgents against Turkey. The complaints of the 
Western Powers that Greece was misgoverned and that there was 
still a fear of renewed hostilities in the Provinces were all 
used as justification to maintain their military and naval 
forces in Piraeus. They would remain until a pro-British and 
pro-French government was in power in Athens. Before the 
Kolettes administration, Lyons, in a conversation with Prokesch 
had unfolded the British way of thinking about her Protectorate 
88 F.O. 32/243, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 22, 1856. 
89 Russia would only go as far as to commit herself ver-
bally to aid Greece as one of the Protecting Powers. "Baron 
Brunnow assured those present (at the Conference) that Russia 
would associate itself in improving the state of affairs in 
Greece." Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 286. 
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in the Near Fast - - a view that later applied to France as well. 
A really independent Greece is an absurdity. Greece, is 
either Russian or English and, since she must not be Russian, 
she must be English. I cannot see that there is any doubt 
about that; no man in his senses would doubt it. England's 
role is outlined in these words - - be sure that she will 
carry it out and she will smash every obstacle that she 
meets in her way. It is not a Tory or a Whig question; it 
is a national question. The King is not on our side, there-
fore he is Russian - - but, mark you, we have not made a 90 
kingdom out of Greece in order to create a Russian Province. 
This attitude did not change in the course of fifteen years that 
had lapsed since Lyons had stated his country's position toward 
Greece. When in 1856 Britain and France proposed that Greece 
had to undergo reforms and improvements before the troops were 
ordered out of the country Russia could very well understand 
that such propositions were only intended to control Greek poli-
tics and finances. This is clearly revealed in a dispatch sent 
to Clarendon from Wyse: 
As Russian Diplomacy seems to be much shocked at the pre-
sent moment at the language held hy the British and French 
Governments in referring to the state of Greece, and the 
pressing necessity which exists in the common interests 
of the three Powers, and of Europe, to provide means for 
its reform and improvement, your Lordship may perhaps not 
think it inopportune to recall to the recollection of its 
agents, who appear to have conveniently forgotten the fact, 
what was the language, (and it is to be pronounced the con-
victions of the Russian Government as to the state of this 
country, the conduct of the Sovereign and the duty imposed 
upon the Protecting Powers to such and obtain effective 
redress on former occasions, but especially in 1843, prev-
ious to the establishment of the Constitution, a period 
which they are constantly impressing on us, (As a reason 
for the suppression of the Constitution) as one, compared 91 
to the present, of progress, order, purity and prosperity. 
90 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho f, 106-07. 
91 F.o. 32/244, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, August 12, 
1856. 
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The threat of Russophilism in Greece by the Court, the eovern-
ment and the people was indeed a much ereater problem for the 
two Western Powers than was the threat of a nationalist upris-
ing and not until some type of Franco-British control had been 
established in Greece to prevent a Russian influence in that 
country would the occupation be removed. 
D. Economic Interests of England and France 
in Greece and the Ending of the Occupation 
On 3 February 1853, Wyse sent a sixty-eight page dis-
patch to his government concerning: (A) the corrupt government 
of Greece, (B) the injustices practiced on all levels of gov-
ernment against the people, (C) the gross mismanagement of the 
finances of the country by the authorities. The passage below 
summarizes the major problems of the Greek government: 
One of the crying evils of the Greek system is a machinery 
out of all proportion to the population and purpose •• 
unhappily in a country like this with no manufacture, little 
agriculture, the professions crowded, and government em-
ployment the only resource, the task especially under the 
patronage of a Camarilla, is comparatively easy. 
Ministers are too involved in the inequity themselves, too 
unprotected by public or parliamentary opinion, and too 
dependent on the caprices of the King or rather of those 
who rule him, to think seriously of check or correction of 
this abuse. • • • The presentation of a budget is an an-
nual comedy; and Representative government itself rendered 
in the eyes of the country (in accomplishment of the long 
nourished desire of Court and Camarilla) an object of mis-
trust and contempt. 92 
92 F.O. 32/205, No. 10, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 
February 3, 1853. 
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Another contemporary of Wyse, a French journalist, Edmond About, 
visited Greece and made the same observations about the politi-
cal, economic and social condition of the country as Wyse. 
"Every minister," he wrote, "is ready to do anything in order 
to retain his post. They think of nothing else there-
fore but to retain their seat and to benefit as best their in-
93 
fluence can be exerted from circumstances." The system of 
government was indeed antiquated and there were no efforts 
made to improve the economic or political conditions in the 
country. Even some of the more conservative Greek historians 
who sympathize with the Crown admit the serious problems in 
the economy and the governmental system. Conditions in Greece 
seem even more deplorable when viewed by contemporaries such 
as Wyse or About who were exposed to the liberal political 
systems of France and England, or when viewed by modern his-
torians or politicians who have been exposed to progressive 
movements of socialism and communism. 94 
One of the accounts concerning the political, economic 
and social conditions of Greece under the Bavarian Dynasty 
written by a contemporary, Professor S.I. Tzivanopoulos, shows 
93 \ About, Grece, 153. 
94 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, Fotiades, The Exile, 
T. Bournas, Historia tes Neoteras Helladas (History-of Modern 
Greece) (Athens, 1974r;-G. Zevgos, Syntome Melete tes Neoel-
linikes Historias (A Short Study of Modern Greek History) 
(Athens), N. G •. Svoronos, Episkopesi tes Neoellinikes Historias 
(A Survey of Modern Greek History) (Athens, 1976), all look to 
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that Greece had indeed made very slow progress since its es-
tablishment as an independent nation. The observations of 
Professor Socrates I. Tzivanlpoulos, who wrote under the dyn-
asty of king George I (1863-1913), are very similar to those 
of Wyse and About. He criticized Otho for using the Guaran-
teed Loan of 60 million francs to surround himself and the 
Court with luxuries instead of using the money, as it was in-
95 
tended, "for public works, and relieving the distress." 
Every aspect of Greek society was suffering from a disadvan-
tage of one kind or another. The army was an institution 
greatly abused by the Bavarian Dynasty and the Greek politi-
cians. 
Under the plea of preparing the means for the realization 
of the "Grande Id~e" it was gradually increased to about 
10,000 men, and swallowed 8,000,000 drachmas out of a bud-
get estimated at 24,000,000. The organization and disci-
pline did not increase in proportion to the numbers and 
expenditure, for this army was freely used not to main-
tain order, but to work the constitution and the result 
was an army of po~iticians. 96 
The municipal organization of the country was equally devas-
tating. 
We see that ahove 60,000,000 of drachmas of national pro-
duce have been wasted in the last 30 years, without any 
attempt being made to improve the internal condition of 
the Othonian period as an era of absolutism guided by the 
principles of corruption and adventurous imperialism. 
95 Tzivanopoulos, Condition of Greece, 4. 
96 
.!.E..!i. ' 2 6 • 
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the country. The demarchs neglect all local business; 
and the people are powerless to do anything for themselves. 
No steps have been taken till now by the demarchs to make 
roads, to build a hospital, or establish a school; to open 
new markets for the improvement of agriculture, or to ex-
tend commercial enterprise. But the majority of them be-
ing obliged to act as subordinates to the Eparchs, and as 
agents of the central administration, became petty tyrants 
and offered a direct impediment to all material progress 
of the country. 97 
The businessman, the farmer, the worker, were all neglected by 
the Bavarian Dynasty in Greece and the only point of attention 
for Otho was the territories of Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia. 
He wanted to expand for his own glory and rejected reform and 
development in a country which needed it the most. 
Even though it is generally agreed among twentieth-
century historians as it was agreed among contemporaries of 
the Othonian era that the Bavarian Dynasty in Greece made 
slow progress for the country, there are opposing views on 
this matter and one that deserves the attention of the his-
torian is that of Alexander Rizo Rangabes. The ex-foreign 
minister, unlike Professor Tzivanopoulos, takes a different 
line of argument and holds that Greece actually started from 
point zero in 1832 when it joined the community of European 
nations and it made enormous progress in just a thirty year 
period under Otho. lle concludes that the question for Greece 
is not internal development at all but territorial expansion. 
"It is not," he writes, "it will be agreed her example that 
97 Ibid., 30. 
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European diplomacy has a right to invoke, when denouncing that 
Christians of the East as incapable of self government, in 
order to evade the solution of the 'Eastern Question,' and to 
98 prolong the impossible existence of Turkey." The work of 
Rangabes cannot be taken too seriously for it was written as 
propaganda tool. 99 It does, however, represent the nation-
alist point of view typical of those who embraced the Megali 
Idea in the nineteenth as well as the twentieth centuries. 
The two works, by Rangabes and Tzivanopoulos, outline the 
dichotomy that existed in the Greek public mind; the approach 
of Rangabes had its origin and derived its momentum from the 
Kolettes-Otho dictatorship, whereas the Tsivanopoulos approach 
explains the ''English," and more specifically the Mavrokordatos 
plan for the present and future condition of Greece. 
This gap in opposing policies in Greece had to be 
filled as far as France. and England were concerned if they 
were to prevent_Russia from having the dominant role in Greece. 
Since it became-impossible to influence the politics in Greece 
through the ministry it became necessary to find another means 
of control, namely, financial. 
98 Rangabes, Greece, 102. 
99 The work was first published in France under the 
title Ca Turkie .£.!:!. La Grece. Hhen it was published in English 
Rangabes was serving as representative of Greece in Washington, 
D.C. in 1867. 
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Throughout the Crimean War period up to the time of 
evacuation in February 1857 the Occupying Powers were con-
stantly pressing Greece to meet its financial obligations 
towards them. In December 1854 the Greek government passed 
a law which gave it authorization to raise 5,000,000 drachmas 
loan. Upon receiving this news the Foreign Office objected 
on the grounds that Greece had first to pay the interest on 
the 60 million francs loan before attempting to raise another 
loan. Wyse had informed Paicos in January 1854, that although 
there was no measure of opposition in Article 6 of the Treaty 
of 1832 prohibiting the raising of any loan which the Greek 
government felt it needed, he was surprised to find out that 
a loan was considered to be raised at a time when there was 
attempt on the part of Greece to discharge its former financial 
obligations towards the Protecting Powers. He went on to 
state that: 
• • • when the Kirig and Kingdom of Greece had bound them-
selves by that Treaty to see that the actual receipts of 
the Greek Treasury should ''be devoted first of all to the 
payment of the interest and sinking fund for~he-repay­
ment of th~ loan and that they should not be employed for 
any other purpose until those payments should have been 
completely secured for the current year,'' and when not 
withstanding no such payments, with one slight exemption, 
from deficiency of funds or other causes had been made, I 
thought it singular and said so that a new engagement 
should be contemplated (this being the position of the 
old) or, at all events, without consulting with the Credi-
tors or their representatives here. 100 
lOO A.Y.E. 1853, 8/1, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, 
January 5, 1854. 
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Since Greece was obligated by the Treaty to discharge its 
financial obligations to its Protectors first before trying 
to raise any other loans she found that the Great Powers 
could reject her proposals for new loans if they were not 
satisfied with the political establishment in Greece. 101 
In 1854 the question of interest to be paid on the 60,000,000 
francs loan came up again, primarily for political reasons, 
even though the "ministry of occupation" was in control in 
Athens. In September Mavrokordatos informed the three Powers 
that the Greek government could not meet the payments on the 
interest of the 60 million francs loan. Persiany, the Rus-
sian Charge d'Affaires in Athens, responded mildly stating 
102 
that he would inform his government on the matter. The 
reply of the British representative was not nearly as sympa-
103 
thetic as that of Persiany or even Forth-Rouen. 
The practical disregard shown by former Ministers of 
Finance to these undeniable claims, by not only not 
liquidating, but not even attempting to liquidate or 
even to nottfy the Protecting Powers, their inability 
to liquidate the smallest portion of these demands, was 
only equalled by the insolent indifference to official 
101 A.Y.E. 1853, 8/1, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, January 
5, 1854. 
102 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Persiany to Mavrokordatos, 
Athens, September 11, 1854. 
103 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Forth-Rouen to Mavrokordatos, 
Athens, September 15, 1854. 
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duty and public opinion, by which through a puerile arti-
fice, they annually paraded in the budget a certain sum, 
professedly destined for such an object, but of which, as 
no portion found its way into the Treasuries of the Pro-
tecting Powers, it is only charitable to suppose that it 
was never levied, or was diverted from its legitimate des-
tination at least other state purposes. This with the 
clumsy annual mystification for the purpose of nominally 
swelling the return of receipts to some semblance of equal-
ity with Expenditure, • • . naturally produced in the whvle 
government a disgraceful negligence of the public resources, 
and what was far worse, a fatal disregard to the most sac-
red public and private engagements. 104 
After the long lecture on economics by Wyse, the British govern-
ment agreed, as had the other two Protecting Powers, "not to 
press the Greek government, at the present moment, for payment 
of the interest on the loan guaranteed by the Protecting Po-
wers," but that Greece should make genuine efforts for regular 
105 payment of the interest. As long as the "ministry of oc-
cupation" was in power the Western Powers would not pressure 
Greece as such to meet its financial obligations. Once Otho 
removed that ministry, however, the Occupying Powers could no 
longer rely on political influence in Greece, so it became 
essential for them to start again asking for the delayed pay-
menta on the loan and ultimately to set up a system of finan-
cial control. 
The Boulgaris administration unsuccessfully asked to 
be included in the Paris Peace Conference. Furthermore, the 
104 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Wyse to Mavrokordatos, Athens 
October 28, 1854. 
105 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Clarendon to Wyse, Foreign 
Office, October 9, 1854. 
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Allies did not desire to end the occupation. After Rangabes 
failed to gain any representation for his country in the Peace 
Conference, he began working towards the goal of removing the 
foreign troops from Piraeus. In an interview with Wyse and 
Hercier, the Greek foreign minister openly requested that the 
occupying forces be removed from Greece, but both representa-
106 
tives instantly rejected his request. The reply of Wyse 
and Mercier was allowed by Rangabes to be published in the 
press in order to excite anti-western sentiment among the 
public. Part of the published reply is as follows: 
• that their governments did not see with satisfac-
tion appointed into office men well known as professed 
enemies of Turkey; that brigandage continued to distress 
the country, and that the Greek government neglected to 
carry into operation such changes and reforms as were 
calculated to promote the internal welfare of the country; 
that the object of the occupation had not been to inter-
fere with the internal government of the Kingdom •• 
But as the object of the occupation was to impede, on the 
part of Greece, the disturbance of the Ottoman Provinces 
on the frontier that the Powers, however, desirous they 
may be to remove their troops,still they cannot do so 
until sufficient guarantee shall be given by the Greek 
government, that Turkey shall remain unmolested on the 
part of Greece. 107 
This publication naturally aroused great excitement among the 
Greeks who had been occupied for a period of over two years 
but the reaction of the Western Powers to this article was 
also very bitter and immediately Wyse sent a dispatch to 
106 F.O. 32/243, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 9, 
1856. 
107 ELPIS, No. 858, Athens, June 23, 1856. 
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Rangabes complaining that secret diplomatic talks were allowed 
to be publicized in the press for the sole purpose of exciting 
108 
the public mind. Rangabes gained support from the public 
by exposing the Occupying Powers for their refusal to lift the 
troops from Piraeus, but neither France nor England would be 
persuaded by Greek public opinion in their policy towards Greece. 
The concept of systematic financial control in Greece, 
which was implicit in the Treaty of 1832, appeared an inescap-
able resort for the Western Powers. Article 12, paragraph 6 
of the Treaty gave the right to the Protecting Powers to col-
lect their money first, before the department of Finance had 
fulfilled any other financial obligations. Wyse who was famil-
iar with this article of the Treaty was the first to suggest 
that the three Protecting Powers of Greece should set up a 
Financial Commission which would provide them with the inter-
est of the guaranteed loan. 
It seems, therefore to me, incontestable that the represen-
tatives of the Three Powers, in the exercise of their 
strict right, all in discharge of their duty, not only are 
authorized under international convention but are required 
by the position to which this question has arrived, to in-
quire, why it is the Treasury is not in a position to meet 
this debt, ••• and what remedies are to be applied to 
check these causes, and to bring the pecuniary condition 
of this kingdom into such order, as will enable it to ful-
fill (even in part) its obligations. • • The first step 
then starting from these premises, which I venture to sub-
mit to your Lordship, is a "Commission of Inquiry" into 
"the state of the Greek Finances." 109 
108 F.O. 32/243, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, July 9, 1856. 
109 F.O. 32/243, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 12, 
1856. 
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Wyse, as well as Britain and France, expressed the desire to 
collect their payments on the interest from Greece but also 
to improve and reform the financial state of the country. 
In June 1856, the British Parliament brought to dis-
cussion once again the poor and corrupt financial administra-
tion of Greece and attempted to justify the prolonged occupa-
tion as a result of Greek unwillingness to cooperate with the 
Western Powers and thinking who had not followed the Consti-
tution of 1843. 
If the Greek Government had properly managed its financial 
affairs th~re would have been ample means to meet all the 
charges upon it. It had failed to do so; the liability 
had fallen upon the Powers which guaranteed the loan, and 
representations innumerable had been made upon the subject 
to the Greek Government, but without effect. 110 
Restrictions on Greek financial affairs became more rigid dur-
ing the Boulgaris administration. In the autumn of 1856 the 
Greek government proposed a set of Laws for the alienation of 
the National Lands. Both Britain and France strongly objec-
ted to the sale of the National Lands and advised Rangabes 
that his government had no right to take such action without 
first consulting with the Protecting Powers. The Foreign 
Office advised Wyse to send the following message to the Greek 
foreign minister: 
I have received instructions from Her Majesty's Government 
that in as much as the Protecting Powers have a right under 
the Treaty of 1832 to claim the whole revenues of Greece 
110 Session of June 2, 1856, Hansard, 3rd series, CXII, 
852-54. 
238 
arising from every source, while the National Lands have 
been mortgaged to the British Landholders with whom the 
Greek Government contracted loans in England in 1824, and 
1825, and in which no interest has been paid since 1827, 
to protest against any sale or Allienation of the National 
Lands. 111 
The Foreign Minister obviously objected to the interference of 
the Protecting Powers in Greek internal affairs. But Wyse re-
plied on two different occasions that the Greek government took 
the proposed measures, concerning the National Lands issue, 
before the Chambers to be passed before consulting with the 
112 
three Powers to which Greece still owed money. When Ran-
gabes charged that the Chambers passed the bill therefore it 
was a matter out of his control, Wyse simply placed all res-
113 ponsibility with the foreign minister. The British and 
French Legations in Athens were informed that Rangabes actually 
favored passage of the bill and this is why Wyse entirely 
blamed him for it. There were, however, political reasons for 
the Franco-British opposition to the bill besides the obvious 
economic ones which were stated above by the British represen-
tative. These political reasons were described to the Earl of 
Clarendon by Wyse as follows: 
111 A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, Septem-
ber 25, 1856, also see F.o. 32/245, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, 
September 28, 1856, also F.O. 32/245, Confidential, Wyse to 
Clarendon, Athens, October 7, 1856. 
112 A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, Octo-
ber 14, 1856. 
113 
27, 1856. 
F.O. 32/245, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, October 
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Mr. Boulgaris has been outvoted in the ministry, by Mr. 
Koumoundouros (the ally of General Spiro-Milio, and others 
of his party) by Mr. Rizo Rangabe and Mr. Chrystopoulos. 
Out of doors, General Spiro-Milios, Mr. Chrestides, and 
Mr. Levides give, it is reported, their aid, and laugh at 
the idea that our protests can have the least weight in 
retardinr these measures, "t-Je have had plenty of these 
notes," is their reply, "and what harm have they done? 
have they stopped a single proceeding?" llith other ob-
servations still more contumelious. They act under the 
patronage of the Court and of its partisans, and the pro-
posed Laws are represented as emanating directly from Her 
Majesty. 114 
The king as well as the ministers of the Boulgaris administra-
tion realized that France and Great Britain had lost the poli-
tical battle which they had fought since the fall of the Mav-
rokcirdatos administration. The two Powers which occupied 
Greece for three years had failed to formulate a ministry con-
sisting of pro-British and pro-French members, and of course 
anti-Othonian members. Otho succeeded through his use of dip-
lomacy with the Germanic Powers to prevent the French and the 
British from securing a Greek administration which would be 
loyal to the two Western Protecting Powers. 
Since France and England failed to exert their in-
fluence in Greece by the means of a pro-Franco-British minis-
try in Athens the two Powers resorted to the measure of fin-
ancial pressure. They were determined to curb the king's 
·power whether they exerted their influence through a ministry 
o~ their choice or whether they forced the government to meet 
its financial obligations towards the Protecting Powers. 
114 F.O. 32/245, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, 
Athens, October 7, 1856. 
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In December 1856, the Boulgaris administration having 
no other choice when confronted with the demands that Greece 
should discharge its financial obligations towards the three 
Protecting Powers assured the three Powers that the eventual 
resources of the country would be provided for the Guaranteed 
Loan. 115 In spite of this reassurance from Athens that Greece 
would do its best to clear its financial obligations towards 
France, Russia and Great Britain, Walewski and Clarendon were 
not satisfied with such promises which the Greek government 
had made before but had failed to keep. The following dis-
pate~ from Clarendon stated the official position of Great 
Britain and France: 
• it is conformity with this principle that Her Maj-
esty's Government have determined in concert that of 
France to propose to the Greek Government that the Rep-
resentatives at Athens of the three guaranteeing Powers 
should form a permanent Commission empowered to receive 
and if necessary to call for all the information which 
may be required for enabling their respective governments 
to judge with regard to the due employment of the Public 
Funds. • • • In·a word of duty of the Commissioners will 
be to keep the three governments regularly informed of 
what is going on, so that those governments may be en-
abled to form an opinion of the manner in which the Greek 
Government deals with the resources which are pledged for 
the payment of its debts and if necessary retract the as-
pect given by them .to the proposals of the Cabinet of 
Athens •••• if the Greek Government should acquire in 
the proposal without reserve, the two ~overnments would 
be disposed to look upon it as affording a sufficient 
guarantee to admit of their withdrawing their troops from 
Greece. 116 
115 A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, No. 35, Communication francais 
a M. Mercier, Paris, December 6, 1856. 
116 . A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, Clarendon to Wyse, Foreign 
Office, December 12, 1856. 
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The above dispatch makes it clear that unless the Greek govern-
ment agreed to the setting up of the Financial Commission the 
forces at Piraeus would not be withdrawn. Britain and France 
wanted to lift the occupation and replace it with a system of 
financial control. The Political victory won by Otho in 
September 1855, when he replaced the "ministry of occupation" 
with the Boulgaris administration, was about to be countered 
with an Anglo-French economic victory in Greece. This time 
the Germanic Powers could not come to Otho's rescue as they 
had during the Crimean War, for the simple reason that Austria 
was no longer needed by the Allies to over-power the force of 
Russia in the Near East. Russia, the other country from which 
Otho could expect help, consented to the setting up of a Finan-
cial Commission and the Treaty of 1832 made it legal for the 
Protecting Powers to interfere in the domestic finances of 
Greece. 
The terms und·er which the Commission was to be set up 
made it very easy for the Protecting Powers not only to check 
the Greek finances but to control and operate them. This 
raised questions in the British Parliament which felt that 
the occupying Powers were replacing one means of force, the 
occupation, with another, the Financial Commission. "No 
doubt," said the Marquess of Clanvicarde, "we ought to have 
some control over the finances of the country, as it was our 
debtor, and we ought to take care of our debts; yet if such 
an arrangement was carried too far, it would involve us in 
242 
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difficulties." To this objection the Earl of Clarendon 
responded that Greece had not been responsible to the Protec-
ting Powers in dischar~ing its payments and it became neces-
sary therefore to resort to extreme measures. He defended 
the idea of the Commission as one which would solve many eco-
nomic problems of Greece and would end political rivalry in 
that country among the Protecting Powers. 
He [the Earl of Clarendon] believed that the Protecting 
Powers were about to render essential service to Greece 
by the advice and assistance which the Commissioners would 
be able to render to her Government, and it was expected 
that the Greek Government might in this way have it in 
their power to effect certain administrative and finan-
cial reforms, • • • He believed the Commission would be 
established in a few days and he hoped it would tend even-
tually to put an end to the contests for influence which 
had so often taken place between foreign Powers - - con-
tests which did no service to the Powers engaged and which 
only distracted and wounded the public feeling of the coun-118 try which was so unfortunate as to be the subject of them. 
The people in Greek politics felt that no matter how one viewed 
the Commission, its purpose was financial control of Greece by 
the Protecting Powers. Rangabes immediately protested to the 
Powers against the establishment of the Commission but only 
Prince Alexander Gorchakov, who replaced Nesselrode in May 
1856 as Minister of Foreign Affairs, showed any sympathy. 
The Russian diplomat maintained that the Emperor Alexander 
would not participate in such a Commission with such rigid 
117 Sessions of February 12, 1857, Hansard, 3rd series, 
CXLIV, 510. 
118 Ibid., 511-12. 
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measures taken against Greece by the Western Powers. The 
Russian government's protest forced France and England to re-
consider its harsh schemes of financial control and to adopt 
milder measures towards the Protectorate. When finally es-
tablished, the Financial Commission was to have recommending 
and advisory powers only, a proposal which was readily accep-
ted by the Greek government and went into effect in February 
1857. 120 
On February 19, the troops of England and France be-
gan the evacuation process and by the 27th of the same month 
121 
they had all left Greek waters. Greece was finally re-
lieved of a three year occupation only to become burdened with 
the permanent establishment of a Financial r.ommission. 
119 Levandis, Greek Foreign Debt, 51. 
12° F.O. 32/252, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 3, 
1857. Wyse reported ~n March 3rd that the evacuation was com-
pleted as two meetings of the Financial Commission had taken 
place. The first meeting was on February 18, the second on 
February 25. The representatives were Wyse, de Montherot, 
Ogeroff. 
121 In the spring of 1857 Wyse returned to England. 
"On March 27, 1857, it had been announced that the Queen in-
tended to confer on him a knight-Commandership of the Order 
of the Bath, and on his arrival in England he was received 
by Her Majesty and by his old friend the Prince Consort, both 
of whom congratulated him heartily on his services throughout 
the difficult war years." James Johnston Auchmuty, Sir Thomas 
Wyse, 1791-1862 (London, 1939). 
CONCLUSION 
In the years which have passed since the Greek insur-
rection of 1854 there ·have been numerous attempts to interpret 
the role of Greece in the Eastern Question. The predominate 
view among Greek historians concerning the 1854 insurrection 
and the role of Greece in the Crimean War can be summarized by 
the following passage from a modern account of the insurrection: 
The revolution in Epiros-Thessaly and Macedonia to shake off 
the Ottoman yoke, which was instigated by Greece by dispatch-
ing volunteer corps and which erupted as a result of the Cri-
mean War, was a continuation of the 1821 struggle as a first 
endeavor to complete the ideological potential of the nation 
and the dispositions of the Great Powers in respect to Hel-
lenism. 1 
This conclusion is deduced from a close study of the insurrec-
tion in Thessaly in 1854. It reflects the typical Greek nation~ 
alist point of view held during the Crimean War period as well 
as today. The role of Greece in the Eastern Question for the 
Greek nationalist was the same in 1821 as in 1854, 1866-1869 
2 1897, and 1921. The struggle for Greece to become an inde-
pendent nation began in 1821 and ended for most Greeks 
in 1921. Therefore, the focus of this particular point of view 
is directed at only one objective, namely, territorial expan-
1 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 217. 
2 These dates indicate the struggle of the Greeks who 
tried to carve out a nation for themselves from the Ottoman 
Empire. 
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sion. The insurrection of 1854 and the insurrections which 
followed later were all continuations of the War of Indepen-
dence. 
Among the factors which are not considered under this 
line of thought adopted by Greek nationalists are the role of 
domestic politics in the events of the nation's history, the 
influence of international politics in the foreign and domes-
tic policies of the state and finally, the importance of the 
various socio-economic factors which exercise a great deal of 
control in society. During the War of Independence there was 
no nation of Greece, only Greeks who fought with the aid of 
the Great Powers to achieve their independence. In 1854 there 
was a nation of Greece and it was the king who actually or-
ganized and supported the insurrection against Turkey, there-
fore the role of Greece in the Eastern Question was totally 
different in 1854 than it was during the War of Independence. 
In the process of change and early development, Greece 
formed a number of classes, namely, the merchant, the profes-
sional, the working class and the peasantry. Political par-
ties were also developed to such a stage that by 1843 there 
was a successful constitutional revolution by those progres-
sively minded in politics. Finally, the most important factor 
in the history of the nineteenth century was the constant 
foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the country. 
The second phase of the role of Greece in the Eastern Question 
has, therefore, these elements which are unique and for this 
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reason the occurrences of 1854 cannot be explained by the cir-
cumstances of 1821 or 1897 but only by 1854 alone without of 
course loosing focus of the country's history since the War 
of Independence. 
The socio-economic factor in the insurrection must be 
viewed historically as it was effected by three important 
events in Greece: First, a Constitutional revolution and its 
failure to materialize as a result of the Kolettes triumph in 
1844, second, the British blockade of Greece in 1850, and 
third, the uprising of the Greeks in the Turkish Provinces and 
the Occupation of Piraeus. The failure of the Constitution 
and the triumph of Kolettes resulted in the failure of the 
merchant and professional class to exert its influence in 
society and win economic and political predominance. Kolettes, 
unlike Mavrokordatos who favored economic development, internal 
growth and reform, carved out an expansionist foreign policy 
which would only dam~ge the interests of the qusiness world in 
Greece. The merchant class had nothing to gain from such a 
policy and everything to loose since its trade with Turkey 
and the Great Powers would be damaged in case of a Greek-Turkish 
conflict. The administration of Kolettes, therefore, indirectly 
antagonized by its policy the middle class of Greece which was 
the backbone of the Greek economy. There was a class schism 
created as a result of the triumphant exaltation of the Megali 
Idea; the lower classes, especially the peasants support na-
tionalist expansion while the middle class opposes it. The 
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third group of people which formulated the strength of the 
expansionist group was the chieftains and brigands and the 
wealthy Greeks of Europe who entertained nationalist dreams. 
The blockade of 1850 tended to widen the schism be-
tween middle class and lower allowing room also for excep-
tions such as military personnel, brigands, and wealthy ad-
venturers. For the economy of the country the blockade was 
simply disastrous. The class which suffered the most was the 
middle class so this experience was the last thing desired to 
reoccur by merchants and businessmen. Those who were already 
burning with nationalism became even more radical as a result 
of the blockade and the rise of Russophilism in the early 
years of 1850's is a good indication of that phenomenon. 
Finally, the events of 1854 completed the schism. 
The lower class led by the Court politicians and by brigands 
fully accepted the idea of a regenerated Byzantine Empire and 
morally as well as materially supported the insurrection. On 
the other hand the middle class as well as the large part of 
working class involved in navigation and commerce resented 
the insurrection fearing another blockade and perhaps worse 
consequences. The finest hour for the king and those who 
supported his cause came in March and April 1854, but it was 
followed by the sad disappointment of an occupation in May. 
The triumph of the middle class was April 1855 when the Treaty 
of Commerce and Navigation was signed at Kalinja. The economy 
suffered greatly as a result of the Megali Idea policy from 
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1844 to 1855 and the irony is that the governing class with 
its broad mass support was engaged in a foreign policy that 
contradicted the economic interests of the nation, that is, 
those of the merchant and business classes. In the world of 
nineteenth century Europe which had seen the rise of the middle 
class, Greece in its desperate efforts of national expansion 
jeopardized the very existence of this class. 
Aside from the socio-economic factors which were unique 
to the developments of 1854, the importance of political fac-
tors were also unique to the role of Greece in the Crimean War 
phase of the Eastern Question. If Mavrokordatos had not been 
forced to resign in 1844 and had remained in power, the 185l 
revolution could have been avoided. Kolettes' victory marked 
the beginning of a new domestic and fore~gn policy which led 
to the insurrection and its consequences. He destroyed the 
work of the Co~stitutional revolution only to replace it with 
arbitrary government and handed down to Otho a foreign policy 
which could only lead Greece to disaster. Parliamentary gov-
ernment did not succeed and internal reform and development 
were disregarded by the King. The British blockade did not 
teach Otho a lesson in discipline to the Great Powers and the 
occupation of Piraeus only excited his dreams of expansion to 
an even greater level. Pointing out the absurdity of the 
Megali Idea policy of the Greek Court Dr. Nomikos writes, "in 
1854 under the leadership of Otho, this nation of one million 
people living on 47,000 square kilometers rose to measure it-
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self up against the combined might of the Ottoman Empire and 
3 the major European Powers." The character of politics can-
not be disregarded in the direct influence it exercised over 
the events of the insurrection of the Christians in the Turk-
ish Provinces. The absence of such politics during the War 
of Independence is one more factor which accounts for the dif-
ferentiation of first Greek rebellion against the Turks from 
the second. 
Finally, the role of international politics in Greece 
contributed to the uniqueness of the 1854 experience. During 
the Othonian era there was a constant rivalry among the Pro-
tecting Powers for political control in Greece. The Anglo-
French rivalry in 1844 replaced the Anglo-Russian rivalry and 
the rivalry between Russian and the combined efforts of France 
and England replaced the Franco-British rivalry after 1850. 
Kolettes was responsible to a great extent for the Anglo-French 
rivalry but in spite ·of this charismatic dictator who enjoyed 
antagonizing England, there would have been a rivalry among 
the Powers for control of policies in Greece since this coun-
try was important to control for strategic and commercial 
reasons. 
3 Nomikos, "International Position of Greece,'' 290. 
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Great Britain proved in the decade before the occupa-
tion that no risk was too great for the political domination 
of Greece. In 1850 Palmerston blockaded the country's ports 
because he could not get satisfaction from the Greek govern-
ment for his political demands. In 1854 both France and Eng-
land occupied the country for it had decided not to accept 
their Near Eastern policy. They retained the occupation for 
three long years, a year even after the Paris Peace Treaty 
was signed because they wanted to gain political control. 
When their efforts failed, they decided the next best thing 
to political control was financial control so they set up 
the Financial Commission and then removed the occupying forces. 
The Germanic Powers and Russia, to a lesser extent, 
were the balance of power in Greece during the Crimean War 
period and in many respects during the entire period of the 
reign of king Otho. Austria, Prussia and Bavaria were the 
protectors of the crown against any possible abuses which 
could be inflicted upon it by the Protecting Powers. In 1850 
the Germanic Powers joined the rest of Europe in defending 
Greece against Palmerstonian aggressive diplomacy in that 
nation. In 1854 and throughout the Crimean War Austria and 
the other two Germanic states gave Otho their full support 
when his throne and power was endangered by the Occupying 
Powers. 
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Russia during the six year period of 1844-1850 had 
become, to a large extent, aloof from Greek affairs but in 
1850 the Tsar came out very strong in support of the king 
against Britain. During the Holy Places question Russia took 
the role of the protector and defender of the Orthodox Chris-
tians of the Ottoman Empire and flirted with Greece during 
the entire affair. In 1854 Nesselrode announced that his 
country approved of the Greek insurrection and in that same 
year the Tsar made it known to the world that his struggle 
against Turkey was in defence of the Christians of the Near 
East. At the. Conferences in Paris Russia tried to eliminate 
Anglo-French influence in Greece and asked what were these 
Powers intending to do about the occupation. Finally, Russia 
defended Greece before the Financial Commission was established 
by protesting to the harsh measures of the Commission. 
The foreign policies of the Powers in Greece, the poli-
tics of the court, and the socio-economic factors which exis-
ted in 1854 were absent during the War of Independence. Greece 
discovered after the Crimean War that its role in the Eastern 
Question had undergone radical transformations so the same 
goals which were sought for in 1821 could not be hoped to be 
realized thirty years later under the same circumstances as 
took place during the War of Independence. One indication of 
the realization process that took place was the abolition of 
the "foreign" parties that is "English," "French" and "Russian." 
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The end of the Crimean War marked the end of these parties 
as Greeks realized that their interests could not be identi-
cal with those of any other country than their own. 
APPENDIX 
British interests in Greece were not strategic and 
political only but economic as well. The British currant 
traders of Patras had established an economic stronghold in 
Greece and exercised a great deal of influence in the eco-
nomic policy of the Greek government. In the early months 
of 1853 the British currant traders urged Thomas Wood, Brit-
ish Consul at Patras, to stop a fixed duty on currants in-
1 
troduced by Christides, minister of France. 
When losses were suffered in the currant trade as a 
result of a blight the British Legation in Athens demanded 
that the Greek government should be held responsible for re-
imbursing the British merchants since the merchants paid a 
2 fixed duty on a bad crop of export. 
By December 1853, the British currant merchants in 
Patras and the Ionian Isles demanded a reduction of duty in 
England for their products. Wyse was able to persuade the 
new minister of finance, Provelgios, to comply with the 
demands of the British Legation concerning the economic bene-
fit of the British merchants. The British representative in 
1 F.O. 32/207, c.c. Ignate and Co. toT. Wood, Patras, 
April 26, 1853. 
2 F.O. 1/207, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, June 30, 1853. 
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Athens felt that a reduction of duty on currants would bene-
fit the Greek economy as well as the British merchants of 
Greece. He felt therefore that "if the Greek Government are 
to receive concessions, it ought not to refuse at least its 
cooperation, to render them available, and reduction of duty 
in England ought to suggest and be accompanied by a sweeping 
away of all unnecessary and vixatious interference, and a 
security for a judicious and steady commercial policy in 
3 Greece for the future." The beneficiary of the lower duty 
on currants from Greece would clearly have been the British 
merchants of Patras and thus Great Britain. Greece had little 
to benefit since it would be forced to grant more concessions 
to the British. 
Under the administration of Mavrokordatos fixed duties 
4 
went into effect much to the satisfaction of the British Le-
gation and merchants of Patras. Under the administration of 
Boulgaris the ministry of finance thought it profitable to do 
away with the fixed duty and reintroduce the "old system of 
Protocols." Upon this news Wyse filed the following report 
at the Foreign Office. "Currants form a very large item in 
3 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 
27, 1853. 
4 F.O. 32/222, British and Ionian Merchants to 
T. Wood, Patras, October 10, 1854. 
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the annual list of her (Greece) exports, and the more or less 
extension of the market and production, is to her a matter of 
vital moment. We are the chief consumers, but not dependent 
for the article on her. If we were to recur to force instead 
5 
of reason, we have at any time the remedy in our hands." 
Wyse was successful - - at least - - in persuading the minis-
ter of finance not to change the existing law on currant 
6 
trade. Obviously the presence of the Anglo-French troops 
persuaded the Boulgaris government to comply with British 
demands. 
5 F.O. 32/240, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 15, 
1856. 
6 F.O. 32/241, Wood to Wyse, Patras, April 28, 1856. 
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(VI) Presbeia Ellados en I.ondino - - Spiridon Trikoupis 
(Greek Embassy in London-- Spiridon Trikoupis). 
(VII) Presbeia en Landino (Embassy in London). 
1855 
(I) Presbeia Ellados en Landino (Greek Embassy in London). 
(II) Syntheke Emporiou ke nautelias metaxe Ellados ke 
Othomakikes Autokratorias (Commercial and Navigation 
Treaty Between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman 
Empire). 
(III) Presbeia Ellados en Landino (~reek Embassy in London). 
(IV) Presbeia Ellados en Parisi (Greek Embassy in Paris). 
(V) Presbeia Ellados en Konstantinoupole (Greek Embassy 
in Constantinople). 
(VI) Peri Aglo-Galicon Strateumaton ke eidesis presbeion 
ke proxeneion (Concerning Anglo-French Troops and 
Intellelligence from Consulates and Embassies). 
1856 
(I) Allelographia meta paraproxenikon archon (Corespon-
dence of Consulates). 
(II) Presbeia en Landino (Greek Embassy in London). 
(III) Presbeia en Parisi (Greek Embassy in Paris). 
(V) Presbeia en Landino (Greek Embassy in London). 
General State Archives Athens. 
Alexandros Mavrokordatos Archive 
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2. Public Record Office. Loudon 
Foreign Office 
Greece: General Correspondence 
F.O. 32/205-208-1853 
F.O. 32/215-222-1854 
F.O. 32/227-233-1855 
F.O. 32/239-246-1856 
F.O. 252-252-1857 
3. Archive du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Quai d'Orsay, 
Paris. 
Correspondence Politique, Grece, [vols. 61, 62, 68]. 
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